Timothy J. Lomperis – författare

Timothy Lomperis knows the Vietnam War, both as a soldier and as a scholar. In the latter role he has published extensively, including The War Everyone Lost—and Won, hailed as one of the best books ever written on that conflict. Even though he served two tours "in country" during the war''s most frustrating period-from the infamous Easter Invasion through the Paris Peace negotiations-this is the first time he has written about the war from such a personal perspective. An intelligence officer at the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Lomperis and his comrades were tasked with translating Washington war policy into action. Lomperis provides a rare view of the war from the perspective of a rear echelon officer. He and other so-called REMFs were deeply involved in trying to devise and implement strategies that would the win the war. This largely neglected perspective takes center stage in Lomperis''s memoir, presenting a seldom-seen midlevel perspective that provides the missing links between the Washington-Hanoi peace negotiations and the deadly battles between troops in the field. In exposing the inner workings of a military headquarters during wartime, Lomperis recounts the tensions of a command caught between the political imperatives of Washington and the deteriorating military situation on the ground. Involved in the planning and execution of Nixon''s 1972 Christmas Bombing Campaign, designed to push the North Vietnamese into peace negotiations, Lomperis sheds new light on Nixon''s "secret plan to end the war" while offering rare glimpses of military operations and decision making on the ground in Saigon. Giving color to the REMF story, he also offers a portrait of life in wartime Saigon, writing with genuine respect for and curiosity about Vietnamese culture. And ultimately, he describes his own moral conundrum as the son of missionaries and an initial Cold Warrior who undergoes a gradual disillusionment that resolves into peaceful reconciliation. This incisive memoir is essential for better comprehending what the Vietnam experience was like for the large contingent of Americans who served there. It suggests the need for some fundamental rethinking about Vietnam-not only for the war''s veterans but also for those concerned with the lessons it carries for U.S. involvement in current insurgencies.

Timothy Lomperis knows the Vietnam War, both as a soldier and as a scholar. In the latter role he has published extensively, including The War Everyone Lost—and Won, hailed as one of the best books ever written on that conflict. Even though he served two tours “in country” during the war’s most frustrating period—from the infamous Easter Invasion through the Paris Peace negotiations—this is the first time he has written about the war from such a personal perspective. An intelligence officer at the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Lomperis and his comrades were tasked with translating Washington war policy into action. Lomperis provides a rare view of the war from the perspective of a rear echelon officer. He and other so-called REMFs were deeply involved in trying to devise and implement strategies that would the win the war. This largely neglected perspective takes center stage in Lomperis’s memoir, presenting a seldom-seen midlevel perspective that provides the missing links between the Washington-Hanoi peace negotiations and the deadly battles between troops in the field. In exposing the inner workings of a military headquarters during wartime, Lomperis recounts the tensions of a command caught between the political imperatives of Washington and the deteriorating military situation on the ground. Involved in the planning and execution of Nixon's 1972 Christmas Bombing Campaign, designed to push the North Vietnamese into peace negotiations, Lomperis sheds new light on Nixon’s “secret plan to end the war” while offering rare glimpses of military operations and decision making on the ground in Saigon. Giving color to the REMF story, he also offers a portrait of life in wartime Saigon, writing with genuine respect for and curiosity about Vietnamese culture. And ultimately, he describes his own moral conundrum as the son of missionaries and an initial Cold Warrior who undergoes a gradual disillusionment that resolves into peaceful reconciliation. This incisive memoir is essential for better comprehending what the Vietnam experience was like for the large contingent of Americans who served there. It suggests the need for some fundamental rethinking about Vietnam—not only for the war’s veterans but also for those concerned with the lessons it carries for U.S. involvement in current insurgencies.

Timothy Lomperis persuasively argues the ironic point that the lessons of American involvement in Vietnam are not to be found in any analysis of the war by itself. Rather, he proposes a comparison of the Vietnam experience with seven other cases of Western intervention in communist insurgencies during the Cold War era: China, Indochina, Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Cambodia, and Laos. Lomperis maintains that popular insurgencies are manifestations of crises in political legitimacy, which occur as a result of the societal stresses caused by modernization. Therefore, he argues, any intervention in a 'people's war' will succeed or fail depending on how it affects this crisis. The unifying theme in the cases Lomperis discusses is the power of land reform and electoral democracy to cement political legitimacy and therefore deflect revolutionary movements. Applying this theory to the ongoing Sendero Luminoso insurgency in Peru, Lomperis makes a qualified prediction of that conflict's outcome. He concludes that a global trend toward democratization has produced a new era of 'people's rule.'

Timothy Lomperis persuasively argues the ironic point that the lessons of American involvement in Vietnam are not to be found in any analysis of the war by itself. Rather, he proposes a comparison of the Vietnam experience with seven other cases of Western intervention in communist insurgencies during the Cold War era: China, Indochina, Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Cambodia, and Laos.Lomperis maintains that popular insurgencies are manifestations of crises in political legitimacy, which occur as a result of the societal stresses caused by modernization. Therefore, he argues, any intervention in a ''people’s war'' will succeed or fail depending on how it affects this crisis. The unifying theme in the cases Lomperis discusses is the power of land reform and electoral democracy to cement political legitimacy and therefore deflect revolutionary movements. Applying this theory to the ongoing Sendero Luminoso insurgency in Peru, Lomperis makes a qualified prediction of that conflict’s outcome. He concludes that a global trend toward democratization has produced a new era of ''people’s rule.''

The decade following the American defeat in Vietnam has been filled with doubts about American politics and values, confusion over the lessons of the war, and anger about the physical and psychological suffering that occurred during the war as well as thereafter. In the years since the U.S. withdrawal, our need to make sense of Vietnam has prompted an outpouring of thinking and writing, from scholarly reappraisals of American foreign policy to highly personal accounts of participants. On the tenth anniversary of the final U. S. withdrawal, the Asia Society sponsored a conference on the Vietnam experience in American literature at which leading writers, critics, publishers, commentators, and academics wrestled with this phenomenon. Drawing on the synergy of this conference, Timothy J. Lomperis has produced an original work that focuses on the growing body of literature-including novels, personal accounts, and oral histories-which describes the experiences of American soldiers in Vietnam as well as the experience of veterans upon their return home.

Timothy Lomperis persuasively argues the ironic point that the lessons of American involvement in Vietnam are not to be found in any analysis of the war by itself. Rather, he proposes a comparison of the Vietnam experience with seven other cases of Western intervention in communist insurgencies during the Cold War era: China, Indochina, Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Cambodia, and Laos.Lomperis maintains that popular insurgencies are manifestations of crises in political legitimacy, which occur as a result of the societal stresses caused by modernization. Therefore, he argues, any intervention in a ''people’s war'' will succeed or fail depending on how it affects this crisis. The unifying theme in the cases Lomperis discusses is the power of land reform and electoral democracy to cement political legitimacy and therefore deflect revolutionary movements. Applying this theory to the ongoing Sendero Luminoso insurgency in Peru, Lomperis makes a qualified prediction of that conflict’s outcome. He concludes that a global trend toward democratization has produced a new era of ''people’s rule.''