We live in a moral world in which reasons come in different kinds as well as different weights, so that the claims of one reason upon us are often different from but no greater than the claims of some other reason. Yet law, in its self-presentation and in theoretical accounts of it, proceeds as if its rational pull was conclusive, as if there were no sensible alternative to compliance with its terms. In itself that should not be surprising: each of us often acts asif the reasons that animate us were morally determinative. Why should law operate in any other way? Yet we know that in fact reasons are usually not determinative of action, and while pretence to the contrary may not much matter in individual settings, it matters very much in the setting of the law.The ability of the law to build a life in common, of whatever kind, is dependent on its ability to function, most of the time at least, as if its claims were pre-eminent, rather than undefeated at best. If law is to succeed in its basic project of binding people to its aims, it must buttress its limited rational claims with arational appeals. It needs partners, not only in the prudential considerations that force gives rise to, but also in the beguilement that shared imaginings make possible.This book is an exploration of those partnerships, in principle and in their most important details.

We live in a moral world in which reasons come in different kinds as well as different weights, so that the claims of one reason upon us are often different from but no greater than the claims of some other reason. Yet law, in its self-presentation and in theoretical accounts of it, proceeds as if its rational pull was conclusive, as if there were no sensible alternative to compliance with its terms. In itself that should not be surprising: each of us often acts asif the reasons that animate us were morally determinative. Why should law operate in any other way? Yet we know that in fact reasons are usually not determinative of action, and while pretence to the contrary may not much matter in individual settings, it matters very much in the setting of the law.The ability of the law to build a life in common, of whatever kind, is dependent on its ability to function, most of the time at least, as if its claims were pre-eminent, rather than undefeated at best. If law is to succeed in its basic project of binding people to its aims, it must buttress its limited rational claims with arational appeals. It needs partners, not only in the prudential considerations that force gives rise to, but also in the beguilement that shared imaginings make possible.This book is an exploration of those partnerships, in principle and in their most important details.

We live in a moral world in which reasons come in different kinds as well as different weights, so that the claims of one reason upon us are often different from but no greater than the claims of some other reason. Yet law, in its self-presentation and in theoretical accounts of it, proceeds as if its rational pull was conclusive, as if there were no sensible alternative to compliance with its terms. In itself that should not be surprising: each of us often acts as if the reasons that animate us were morally determinative. Why should law operate in any other way? Yet we know that in fact reasons are usually not determinative of action, and while pretence to the contrary may not much matter in individual settings, it matters very much in the setting of the law. The ability of the law to build a life in common, of whatever kind, is dependent on its ability to function, most of the time at least, as if its claims were pre-eminent, rather than undefeated at best. If law is to succeed in its basic project of binding people to its aims, it must buttress its limited rational claims with arational appeals. It needs partners, not only in the prudential considerations that force gives rise to, but also in the beguilement that shared imaginings make possible. This book is an exploration of those partnerships, in principle and in their most important details.

We live in a moral world in which reasons come in different kinds as well as different weights, so that the claims of one reason upon us are often different from but no greater than the claims of some other reason. Yet law, in its self-presentation and in theoretical accounts of it, proceeds as if its rational pull was conclusive, as if there were no sensible alternative to compliance with its terms. In itself that should not be surprising: each of us often acts as if the reasons that animate us were morally determinative. Why should law operate in any other way? Yet we know that in fact reasons are usually not determinative of action, and while pretence to the contrary may not much matter in individual settings, it matters very much in the setting of the law. The ability of the law to build a life in common, of whatever kind, is dependent on its ability to function, most of the time at least, as if its claims were pre-eminent, rather than undefeated at best. If law is to succeed in its basic project of binding people to its aims, it must buttress its limited rational claims with arational appeals. It needs partners, not only in the prudential considerations that force gives rise to, but also in the beguilement that shared imaginings make possible. This book is an exploration of those partnerships, in principle and in their most important details.

Four values--justice, consent, equality, and collective decision in the form of law--have profoundly shaped the practice of law in the twentieth century and beyond. Value and Circumstance revisits these political and moral ideals, uncovering the relationship between value and the moment.Each of the four key subjects is explored by returning to first principles in a way that invites reflection on the nature and functions of morality itself. The author claims that there is a deep and ongoing connection (and sometimes a dialogue) between the ideal and the everyday. As such, each of those things can be fully understood, appreciated, and pursued only in partnership with the other, even in cases when that partnership is unspoken and unacknowledged.Moreover, the book argues that sound moral comprehension is immanent in experience and engagement. We learn fully what justice calls for by doing justice; learn consent properly through practising consent; learn just when, in what manner, and in what domains to pursue equality through engaging with the prevailing equalities (both secured and unsecured) of our particular times and places; and learn what law should look like only by deciding what law is to be. In this dynamic, the moral world is steadily enlarged by our ordinary engagement with it. We construct and draw upon the realm of value, to which we are accountable for our flourishing. We cannot live well with reference to the ideal alone.

Four values--justice, consent, equality, and collective decision in the form of law--have profoundly shaped the practice of law in the twentieth century and beyond. Value and Circumstance revisits these political and moral ideals, uncovering the relationship between value and the moment. Each of the four key subjects is explored by returning to first principles in a way that invites reflection on the nature and functions of morality itself. The author claims that there is a deep and ongoing connection (and sometimes a dialogue) between the ideal and the everyday. As such, each of those things can be fully understood, appreciated, and pursued only in partnership with the other, even in cases when that partnership is unspoken and unacknowledged. Moreover, the book argues that sound moral comprehension is immanent in experience and engagement. We learn fully what justice calls for by doing justice; learn consent properly through practising consent; learn just when, in what manner, and in what domains to pursue equality through engaging with the prevailing equalities (both secured and unsecured) of our particular times and places; and learn what law should look like only by deciding what law is to be. In this dynamic, the moral world is steadily enlarged by our ordinary engagement with it. We construct and draw upon the realm of value, to which we are accountable for our flourishing. We cannot live well with reference to the ideal alone.

Four values--justice, consent, equality, and collective decision in the form of law--have profoundly shaped the practice of law in the twentieth century and beyond. Value and Circumstance revisits these political and moral ideals, uncovering the relationship between value and the moment. Each of the four key subjects is explored by returning to first principles in a way that invites reflection on the nature and functions of morality itself. The author claims that there is a deep and ongoing connection (and sometimes a dialogue) between the ideal and the everyday. As such, each of those things can be fully understood, appreciated, and pursued only in partnership with the other, even in cases when that partnership is unspoken and unacknowledged. Moreover, the book argues that sound moral comprehension is immanent in experience and engagement. We learn fully what justice calls for by doing justice; learn consent properly through practising consent; learn just when, in what manner, and in what domains to pursue equality through engaging with the prevailing equalities (both secured and unsecured) of our particular times and places; and learn what law should look like only by deciding what law is to be. In this dynamic, the moral world is steadily enlarged by our ordinary engagement with it. We construct and draw upon the realm of value, to which we are accountable for our flourishing. We cannot live well with reference to the ideal alone.

The fundamental freedoms, of speech, conscience, privacy and religion, are now an essential part of the fabric of contemporary society, set down in our most basic laws and regularly invoked in our political and cultural debates. These freedoms play a vital role in securing the spaces and opportunities within which people are able to pursue their own lives in their own ways. Independence of Mind takes this accepted thought a step further, by exploring the ways in which the fundamental freedoms help us to achieve something even more profound, by enabling us to arrive at beliefs, convictions and voices of our own, so that we truly come to think, believe and speak for ourselves in the rich and various ways that the freedoms then protect. Privacy grants us the distance and refuge from others necessary to develop views of our own; freedom of speech calls on us to imagine ways of expressing ourselves that are both true to the views we have developed and innovative in their own right; freedom of conscience enables each of us to create a distinctive rational personality in which to embed the convictions that we wish to treat as non-negotiable; freedom of religion allows groups of us to endorse certain beliefs as articles of faith, free from the full demands of rational scrutiny. Much has been written about the political and legal implications of the fundamental freedoms and their entrenchment in bills of rights. This is the first book to undertake a comprehensive philosophical examination of their moral bases. It offers a penetrating analysis of what makes these particular freedoms matter to us in the ways that they do, and of the true significance of their entrenchment in law.

The fundamental freedoms, of speech, conscience, privacy and religion, are now an essential part of the fabric of contemporary society, set down in our most basic laws and regularly invoked in our political and cultural debates. These freedoms play a vital role in securing the spaces and opportunities within which people are able to pursue their own lives in their own ways.Independence of Mind takes this accepted thought a step further, by exploring the ways in which the fundamental freedoms help us to achieve something even more profound, by enabling us to arrive at beliefs, convictions and voices of our own, so that we truly come to think, believe and speak for ourselves in the rich and various ways that the freedoms then protect. Privacy grants us the distance and refuge from others necessary to develop views of our own; freedom of speech calls on us to imagine ways of expressing ourselves that are both true to the views we have developed and innovative in their own right; freedom of conscience enables each of us to create a distinctive rational personality in which to embed the convictions that we wish to treat as non-negotiable; freedom of religion allows groups of us to endorse certain beliefs as articles of faith, free from the full demands of rational scrutiny.Much has been written about the political and legal implications of the fundamental freedoms and their entrenchment in bills of rights. This is the first book to undertake a comprehensive philosophical examination of their moral bases. It offers a penetrating analysis of what makes these particular freedoms matter to us in the ways that they do, and of the true significance of their entrenchment in law.

In Beyond Comparison: Sex and Discrimination Timothy Macklem addresses foundational issues in the long-running debate in legal, political and social theory about the nature of gender discrimination. He takes the highly original and controversial view that the heart of discrimination lies not in the unfavorable comparisons with the treatment and opportunities that men enjoy but rather in a denial of resources and opportunities that women need to lead successful and meaningful lives as women. Therefore, to understand what women need we must first understand what it is to be a woman. By displaying an impressive command of the feminist literature as well as intellectual rigor, this work promises to be a milestone in the debate about gender equality and will interest students and professionals in the areas of legal theory and gender studies.

We live in a moral world in which reasons come in different kinds as well as different weights, so that the claims of one reason upon us are often different from but no greater than the claims of some other reason. Yet law, in its self-presentation and in theoretical accounts of it, proceeds as if its rational pull was conclusive, as if there were no sensible alternative to compliance with its terms. In itself that should not be surprising: each of us often acts asif the reasons that animate us were morally determinative. Why should law operate in any other way? Yet we know that in fact reasons are usually not determinative of action, and while pretence to the contrary may not much matter in individual settings, it matters very much in the setting of the law.The ability of the law to build a life in common, of whatever kind, is dependent on its ability to function, most of the time at least, as if its claims were pre-eminent, rather than undefeated at best. If law is to succeed in its basic project of binding people to its aims, it must buttress its limited rational claims with arational appeals. It needs partners, not only in the prudential considerations that force gives rise to, but also in the beguilement that shared imaginings make possible.This book is an exploration of those partnerships, in principle and in their most important details.

We live in a moral world in which reasons come in different kinds as well as different weights, so that the claims of one reason upon us are often different from but no greater than the claims of some other reason. Yet law, in its self-presentation and in theoretical accounts of it, proceeds as if its rational pull was conclusive, as if there were no sensible alternative to compliance with its terms. In itself that should not be surprising: each of us often acts asif the reasons that animate us were morally determinative. Why should law operate in any other way? Yet we know that in fact reasons are usually not determinative of action, and while pretence to the contrary may not much matter in individual settings, it matters very much in the setting of the law.The ability of the law to build a life in common, of whatever kind, is dependent on its ability to function, most of the time at least, as if its claims were pre-eminent, rather than undefeated at best. If law is to succeed in its basic project of binding people to its aims, it must buttress its limited rational claims with arational appeals. It needs partners, not only in the prudential considerations that force gives rise to, but also in the beguilement that shared imaginings make possible.This book is an exploration of those partnerships, in principle and in their most important details.

We live in a moral world in which reasons come in different kinds as well as different weights, so that the claims of one reason upon us are often different from but no greater than the claims of some other reason. Yet law, in its self-presentation and in theoretical accounts of it, proceeds as if its rational pull was conclusive, as if there were no sensible alternative to compliance with its terms. In itself that should not be surprising: each of us often acts as if the reasons that animate us were morally determinative. Why should law operate in any other way? Yet we know that in fact reasons are usually not determinative of action, and while pretence to the contrary may not much matter in individual settings, it matters very much in the setting of the law. The ability of the law to build a life in common, of whatever kind, is dependent on its ability to function, most of the time at least, as if its claims were pre-eminent, rather than undefeated at best. If law is to succeed in its basic project of binding people to its aims, it must buttress its limited rational claims with arational appeals. It needs partners, not only in the prudential considerations that force gives rise to, but also in the beguilement that shared imaginings make possible. This book is an exploration of those partnerships, in principle and in their most important details.

We live in a moral world in which reasons come in different kinds as well as different weights, so that the claims of one reason upon us are often different from but no greater than the claims of some other reason. Yet law, in its self-presentation and in theoretical accounts of it, proceeds as if its rational pull was conclusive, as if there were no sensible alternative to compliance with its terms. In itself that should not be surprising: each of us often acts as if the reasons that animate us were morally determinative. Why should law operate in any other way? Yet we know that in fact reasons are usually not determinative of action, and while pretence to the contrary may not much matter in individual settings, it matters very much in the setting of the law. The ability of the law to build a life in common, of whatever kind, is dependent on its ability to function, most of the time at least, as if its claims were pre-eminent, rather than undefeated at best. If law is to succeed in its basic project of binding people to its aims, it must buttress its limited rational claims with arational appeals. It needs partners, not only in the prudential considerations that force gives rise to, but also in the beguilement that shared imaginings make possible. This book is an exploration of those partnerships, in principle and in their most important details.

Four values--justice, consent, equality, and collective decision in the form of law--have profoundly shaped the practice of law in the twentieth century and beyond. Value and Circumstance revisits these political and moral ideals, uncovering the relationship between value and the moment.Each of the four key subjects is explored by returning to first principles in a way that invites reflection on the nature and functions of morality itself. The author claims that there is a deep and ongoing connection (and sometimes a dialogue) between the ideal and the everyday. As such, each of those things can be fully understood, appreciated, and pursued only in partnership with the other, even in cases when that partnership is unspoken and unacknowledged.Moreover, the book argues that sound moral comprehension is immanent in experience and engagement. We learn fully what justice calls for by doing justice; learn consent properly through practising consent; learn just when, in what manner, and in what domains to pursue equality through engaging with the prevailing equalities (both secured and unsecured) of our particular times and places; and learn what law should look like only by deciding what law is to be. In this dynamic, the moral world is steadily enlarged by our ordinary engagement with it. We construct and draw upon the realm of value, to which we are accountable for our flourishing. We cannot live well with reference to the ideal alone.

Four values--justice, consent, equality, and collective decision in the form of law--have profoundly shaped the practice of law in the twentieth century and beyond. Value and Circumstance revisits these political and moral ideals, uncovering the relationship between value and the moment. Each of the four key subjects is explored by returning to first principles in a way that invites reflection on the nature and functions of morality itself. The author claims that there is a deep and ongoing connection (and sometimes a dialogue) between the ideal and the everyday. As such, each of those things can be fully understood, appreciated, and pursued only in partnership with the other, even in cases when that partnership is unspoken and unacknowledged. Moreover, the book argues that sound moral comprehension is immanent in experience and engagement. We learn fully what justice calls for by doing justice; learn consent properly through practising consent; learn just when, in what manner, and in what domains to pursue equality through engaging with the prevailing equalities (both secured and unsecured) of our particular times and places; and learn what law should look like only by deciding what law is to be. In this dynamic, the moral world is steadily enlarged by our ordinary engagement with it. We construct and draw upon the realm of value, to which we are accountable for our flourishing. We cannot live well with reference to the ideal alone.

Four values--justice, consent, equality, and collective decision in the form of law--have profoundly shaped the practice of law in the twentieth century and beyond. Value and Circumstance revisits these political and moral ideals, uncovering the relationship between value and the moment. Each of the four key subjects is explored by returning to first principles in a way that invites reflection on the nature and functions of morality itself. The author claims that there is a deep and ongoing connection (and sometimes a dialogue) between the ideal and the everyday. As such, each of those things can be fully understood, appreciated, and pursued only in partnership with the other, even in cases when that partnership is unspoken and unacknowledged. Moreover, the book argues that sound moral comprehension is immanent in experience and engagement. We learn fully what justice calls for by doing justice; learn consent properly through practising consent; learn just when, in what manner, and in what domains to pursue equality through engaging with the prevailing equalities (both secured and unsecured) of our particular times and places; and learn what law should look like only by deciding what law is to be. In this dynamic, the moral world is steadily enlarged by our ordinary engagement with it. We construct and draw upon the realm of value, to which we are accountable for our flourishing. We cannot live well with reference to the ideal alone.

The fundamental freedoms, of speech, conscience, privacy and religion, are now an essential part of the fabric of contemporary society, set down in our most basic laws and regularly invoked in our political and cultural debates. These freedoms play a vital role in securing the spaces and opportunities within which people are able to pursue their own lives in their own ways. Independence of Mind takes this accepted thought a step further, by exploring the ways in which the fundamental freedoms help us to achieve something even more profound, by enabling us to arrive at beliefs, convictions and voices of our own, so that we truly come to think, believe and speak for ourselves in the rich and various ways that the freedoms then protect. Privacy grants us the distance and refuge from others necessary to develop views of our own; freedom of speech calls on us to imagine ways of expressing ourselves that are both true to the views we have developed and innovative in their own right; freedom of conscience enables each of us to create a distinctive rational personality in which to embed the convictions that we wish to treat as non-negotiable; freedom of religion allows groups of us to endorse certain beliefs as articles of faith, free from the full demands of rational scrutiny. Much has been written about the political and legal implications of the fundamental freedoms and their entrenchment in bills of rights. This is the first book to undertake a comprehensive philosophical examination of their moral bases. It offers a penetrating analysis of what makes these particular freedoms matter to us in the ways that they do, and of the true significance of their entrenchment in law.

The fundamental freedoms, of speech, conscience, privacy and religion, are now an essential part of the fabric of contemporary society, set down in our most basic laws and regularly invoked in our political and cultural debates. These freedoms play a vital role in securing the spaces and opportunities within which people are able to pursue their own lives in their own ways.Independence of Mind takes this accepted thought a step further, by exploring the ways in which the fundamental freedoms help us to achieve something even more profound, by enabling us to arrive at beliefs, convictions and voices of our own, so that we truly come to think, believe and speak for ourselves in the rich and various ways that the freedoms then protect. Privacy grants us the distance and refuge from others necessary to develop views of our own; freedom of speech calls on us to imagine ways of expressing ourselves that are both true to the views we have developed and innovative in their own right; freedom of conscience enables each of us to create a distinctive rational personality in which to embed the convictions that we wish to treat as non-negotiable; freedom of religion allows groups of us to endorse certain beliefs as articles of faith, free from the full demands of rational scrutiny.Much has been written about the political and legal implications of the fundamental freedoms and their entrenchment in bills of rights. This is the first book to undertake a comprehensive philosophical examination of their moral bases. It offers a penetrating analysis of what makes these particular freedoms matter to us in the ways that they do, and of the true significance of their entrenchment in law.

In Beyond Comparison: Sex and Discrimination Timothy Macklem addresses foundational issues in the long-running debate in legal, political and social theory about the nature of gender discrimination. He takes the highly original and controversial view that the heart of discrimination lies not in the unfavorable comparisons with the treatment and opportunities that men enjoy but rather in a denial of resources and opportunities that women need to lead successful and meaningful lives as women. Therefore, to understand what women need we must first understand what it is to be a woman. By displaying an impressive command of the feminist literature as well as intellectual rigor, this work promises to be a milestone in the debate about gender equality and will interest students and professionals in the areas of legal theory and gender studies.