Tomasz Placek – författare

This monograph presents the first detailed exposition of the formal theory of Branching Space-Times. The theory presented here by Nuel Belnap, Thomas Muller, and Tomasz Placek describes how real possibilities can play out in our spatio-temporal world. In our world, some things that are really possible in Cleveland are not really possible in San Francisco; other things were really possible in 1988 but are not really possible in 2021. The authors develop a rigorous, relativity-friendly theory of indeterminism as a local and modal concept, demonstrating that our world contains events with alternative possible outcomes. The book is divided into two parts. The first contains the exposition of the theory, including detailed proofs. The second contains three applications of Branching Space-Times in metaphysics and philosophy of science, focusing on the use of Branching Space-Times to represent pertinent forms of indeterminism in each area. Some specific applications include a formal analysis of modal correlations and of causation and a rigorous theory of objective single-case probabilities, intended to represent degrees of possibility. The authors link their theory to current physics, investigating how local and modal indeterminism relates to issues in the foundations of physics, particularly in quantum non-locality and spatio-temporal relativity. They also relate the theory to philosophy of time, showing how it may be used to explicate the dynamic concept of the past, present, and future based on local indeterminism. The Branching Space-Times theory has been in development over the past 25 years. This volume provides a much needed first systematic and comprehensive book-length exposition of both the theory and its applications.This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

This monograph presents the first detailed exposition of the formal theory of Branching Space-Times. The theory presented here by Nuel Belnap, Thomas Muller, and Tomasz Placek describes how real possibilities can play out in our spatio-temporal world. In our world, some things that are really possible in Cleveland are not really possible in San Francisco; other things were really possible in 1988 but are not really possible in 2021. The authors develop a rigorous, relativity-friendly theory of indeterminism as a local and modal concept, demonstrating that our world contains events with alternative possible outcomes. The book is divided into two parts. The first contains the exposition of the theory, including detailed proofs. The second contains three applications of Branching Space-Times in metaphysics and philosophy of science, focusing on the use of Branching Space-Times to represent pertinent forms of indeterminism in each area. Some specific applications include a formal analysis of modal correlations and of causation and a rigorous theory of objective single-case probabilities, intended to represent degrees of possibility. The authors link their theory to current physics, investigating how local and modal indeterminism relates to issues in the foundations of physics, particularly in quantum non-locality and spatio-temporal relativity. They also relate the theory to philosophy of time, showing how it may be used to explicate the dynamic concept of the past, present, and future based on local indeterminism. The Branching Space-Times theory has been in development over the past 25 years. This volume provides a much needed first systematic and comprehensive book-length exposition of both the theory and its applications. This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

In 1907 Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer defended his doctoral dissertation on the foundations of mathematics and with this event the modem version of mathematical intuitionism came into being. Brouwer attacked the main currents of the philosophy of mathematics: the formalists and the Platonists. In tum, both these schools began viewing intuitionism as the most harmful party among all known philosophies of mathematics. That was the origin of the now-90-year-old debate over intuitionism. As both sides have appealed in their arguments to philosophical propositions, the discussions have attracted the attention of philosophers as well. One might ask here what role a philosopher can play in controversies over mathematical intuitionism. Can he reasonably enter into disputes among mathematicians? I believe that these disputes call for intervention by a philo­ sopher. The three best-known arguments for intuitionism, those of Brouwer, Heyting and Dummett, are based on ontological and epistemological claims, or appeal to theses that properly belong to a theory of meaning. Those lines of argument should be investigated in order to find what their assumptions are, whether intuitionistic consequences really follow from those assumptions, and finally, whether the premises are sound and not absurd. The intention of this book is thus to consider seriously the arguments of mathematicians, even if philosophy was not their main field of interest. There is little sense in disputing whether what mathematicians said about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts belongs to philosophy, or not.

Quantum theory is the most successful of all physical theories: it has a towering mathematical structure, a vast range of accurate predictions, and technological applications. Its interpretation, however, is as unsettled now as in the heroic days of Einstein and Bohr. This book focuses on quantum non-locality, the curious quantum correlations between spatially separated systems. Quantum non-locality was one subject of the debates between Einstein, Bohr and others such as Schrodinger. The topic was revived in the 1960s as a result of Bell's epoch-making theorems; since then it has been a very active research field, both theoretically and experimentally. This book contains 20 papers by eminent researchers, who report recent developments in both the physics of the subject and its philosophy. The physics topics covered include quantum information, the unsharp (positive-operator) approach to observables, the state-space approach, and the pilot-wave theory. The philosophy papers include precise studies of Bohr's reply to the original Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen non-locality paradox, and of non-locality's relation to causation, probability and modality.

Quantum theory is the most successful of all physical theories: it has a towering mathematical structure, a vast range of accurate predictions, and technological applications. Its interpretation, however, is as unsettled now as in the heroic days of Einstein and Bohr.This book focuses on quantum non-locality, the curious quantum correlations between spatially separated systems. Quantum non-locality was one subject of the debates between Einstein, Bohr and others such as Schrödinger. The topic was revived in the 1960s as a result of Bell's epoch-making theorems; since then it has been a very active research field, both theoretically and experimentally.This book contains twenty new papers by eminent researchers, who report recent developments in both the physics of the subject and its philosophy. The physics topics covered include quantum information, the unsharp (positive-operator) approach to observables, the state-space approach, and the pilot-wave theory. The philosophy papers include precise studies of Bohr's reply to the original Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen non-locality paradox, and of non-locality's relation to causation, probability and modality.

On the occasion of bis sixtieth birthday, we dedicate this volume to Jan Wo­ leriski-s-our teacher, our colleague, our friend. Both of us are particularly indebted to Jan not only with regards to profes­ sional matters, but some private ones as well. Hence, we hope that he forgives us an occasional lapse into fondness and affection. That said, may the list of bis personalmerits remain shrouded in mystery; rather than unveil them, we open here by appraising Jan's presence from a broader perspective. Tonote that Jan was not always a part of our lives would not evoke surprise. However, to imagine the Institute of Pbilosophy on Grodzka Street or Krakow pbilosophy without him in it would be a harder task-at least for us, Nonethe­ less, we do remember the days when he was commuting to Krakow as a guest lecturer. Is there anything about those days which particularly comes to mind? To shed light on the story which follows, one must begin by stating that the early 1980s when we were studying philosophy was not a bright period. The great masters of Krakow philosophy-Ingarden, Mehlberg, Zawirski, or Dambska-> were either dead or, for political reasons, kept silent. The years following Martial Law (1981-1983) were intellectually very blighted and barren. In the midst of all this we were attending Jan's course on general methodology.

In 1907 Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer defended his doctoral dissertation on the foundations of mathematics and with this event the modem version of mathematical intuitionism came into being. Brouwer attacked the main currents of the philosophy of mathematics: the formalists and the Platonists. In tum, both these schools began viewing intuitionism as the most harmful party among all known philosophies of mathematics. That was the origin of the now-90-year-old debate over intuitionism. As both sides have appealed in their arguments to philosophical propositions, the discussions have attracted the attention of philosophers as well. One might ask here what role a philosopher can play in controversies over mathematical intuitionism. Can he reasonably enter into disputes among mathematicians? I believe that these disputes call for intervention by a philo­ sopher. The three best-known arguments for intuitionism, those of Brouwer, Heyting and Dummett, are based on ontological and epistemological claims, or appeal to theses that properly belong to a theory of meaning. Those lines of argument should be investigated in order to find what their assumptions are, whether intuitionistic consequences really follow from those assumptions, and finally, whether the premises are sound and not absurd. The intention of this book is thus to consider seriously the arguments of mathematicians, even if philosophy was not their main field of interest. There is little sense in disputing whether what mathematicians said about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts belongs to philosophy, or not.

On the occasion of bis sixtieth birthday, we dedicate this volume to Jan Wo­ leriski-s-our teacher, our colleague, our friend. Both of us are particularly indebted to Jan not only with regards to profes­ sional matters, but some private ones as well. Hence, we hope that he forgives us an occasional lapse into fondness and affection. That said, may the list of bis personalmerits remain shrouded in mystery; rather than unveil them, we open here by appraising Jan's presence from a broader perspective. Tonote that Jan was not always a part of our lives would not evoke surprise. However, to imagine the Institute of Pbilosophy on Grodzka Street or Krakow pbilosophy without him in it would be a harder task-at least for us, Nonethe­ less, we do remember the days when he was commuting to Krakow as a guest lecturer. Is there anything about those days which particularly comes to mind? To shed light on the story which follows, one must begin by stating that the early 1980s when we were studying philosophy was not a bright period. The great masters of Krakow philosophy-Ingarden, Mehlberg, Zawirski, or Dambska-> were either dead or, for political reasons, kept silent. The years following Martial Law (1981-1983) were intellectually very blighted and barren. In the midst of all this we were attending Jan's course on general methodology.

In 1907 Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer defended his doctoral dissertation on the foundations of mathematics and with this event the modem version of mathematical intuitionism came into being. Brouwer attacked the main currents of the philosophy of mathematics: the formalists and the Platonists. In tum, both these schools began viewing intuitionism as the most harmful party among all known philosophies of mathematics. That was the origin of the now-90-year-old debate over intuitionism. As both sides have appealed in their arguments to philosophical propositions, the discussions have attracted the attention of philosophers as well. One might ask here what role a philosopher can play in controversies over mathematical intuitionism. Can he reasonably enter into disputes among mathematicians? I believe that these disputes call for intervention by a philo­ sopher. The three best-known arguments for intuitionism, those of Brouwer, Heyting and Dummett, are based on ontological and epistemological claims, or appeal to theses that properly belong to a theory of meaning. Those lines of argument should be investigated in order to find what their assumptions are, whether intuitionistic consequences really follow from those assumptions, and finally, whether the premises are sound and not absurd. The intention of this book is thus to consider seriously the arguments of mathematicians, even if philosophy was not their main field of interest. There is little sense in disputing whether what mathematicians said about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts belongs to philosophy, or not.