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This edited collection looks at the emerging relationship between politics and economics. The analysis of power relations - traditionally the focus of political science - is becoming increasingly important to economists in order to understand concepts such as the 'contested nature' of market exchanges. These papers examine power relations in the firm and the market place and offer an economic perspective of political relations. The book is divided into three sections:* politics and power in economic organizations* the economic analysis of political organizations* politics, economics and social changeThe final section considers how a combination of economic and political tools can be used effectively to analyse social change.

The traditional role of evolutionary theory in the social sciences has been to explain the existence of an object in terms of the survival of the fittest. In economics this approach has acted as a justification for hypotheses such as profit maximisation, or the existence of institutions in terms of their overall efficiency. This volume challenges that view and argues that one of the first tasks of economic theory should be to explain the enormous diversity of institutional arrangements that has characterised human societies.

This book addresses the lively interaction between the disciplines of law and economics. The traditional boundaries of these two disciplines have somehow inhibited a full understanding of the functioning of and the evolution of economic and legal systems. It has often been the case that these boundaries have had to be reshaped, and sometimes abolished, before either one of the two disciplines could successfully clarify the real life problems arising from the complex institutions of contemporary societies. The contributions to this volume encompass some of the core controversial issues in law and economics arising from interactions between legal orderings and economic institutions. They include:the nature of institutional and legislative change and the emergence of strong institutional complementarity in legal positionsthe relationship between private orderings and the role of the State in enforcing contracts and defining property rightsthe nature and dynamics of endogenous enforcement and the analysis of governance models and corporate ethics.Part of the renowned Siena Studies in Political Economy series, this book will be an essential read for postgraduates and researchers in the fields of law and economics, and the economics of institutions.

The traditional role of evolutionary theory in the social sciences has been to explain the existence of an object in terms of the survival of the fittest. In economics this approach has acted as a justification for hypotheses such as profit maximisation, or the existence of institutions in terms of their overall efficiency. This volume challenges that view and argues that one of the first tasks of economic theory should be to explain the enormous diversity of institutional arrangements that has characterised human societies.

This book addresses the lively interaction between the disciplines of law and economics. The traditional boundaries of these two disciplines have somehow inhibited a full understanding of the functioning of and the evolution of economic and legal systems. It has often been the case that these boundaries have had to be reshaped, and sometimes abolis

This edited collection looks at the emerging relationship between politics and economics. The analysis of power relations - traditionally the focus of political science - is becoming increasingly important to economists in order to understand concepts such as the ''contested nature'' of market exchanges. These papers examine power relations in the fi

The collapse of central planning was hailed as evidence of the economic and moral superiority of capitalism over any possible alternative. The essays in this book challenge that claim. The case for more democratic forms of enterprise management is considered from a variety of viewpoints. One chapter deals with the philosophical justification for enterprise democracy. The remaining chapters are devoted to the question of efficiency, which has been central to economic debates about ownership and control. The orthodox belief amongst economists is that any shift to more democratic forms of enterprise control would be unworkable. The essays in this book provide a thorough theoretical and empirical critique of this orthodoxy.

The collapse of central planning was hailed as evidence of the economic and moral superiority of capitalism over any possible alternative. The essays in this book challenge that claim. The case for more democratic forms of enterprise management is considered from a variety of viewpoints. One chapter deals with the philosophical justification for enterprise democracy. The remaining chapters are devoted to the question of efficiency, which has been central to economic debates about ownership and control. The orthodox belief amongst economists is that any shift to more democratic forms of enterprise control would be unworkable. The essays in this book provide a thorough theoretical and empirical critique of this orthodoxy.

The traditional role of evolutionary theory in the social sciences has been to explain the existence of an object in terms of the survival of the fittest. In economics this approach has acted as a justification for hypotheses such as profit maximisation, or the existence of institutions in terms of their overall efficiency. This volume challenges that view and argues that one of the first tasks of economic theory should be to explain the enormous diversity of institutional arrangements that has characterised human societies.

The traditional role of evolutionary theory in the social sciences has been to explain the existence of an object in terms of the survival of the fittest. In economics this approach has acted as a justification for hypotheses such as profit maximisation, or the existence of institutions in terms of their overall efficiency. This volume challenges that view and argues that one of the first tasks of economic theory should be to explain the enormous diversity of institutional arrangements that has characterised human societies.

This book addresses the lively interaction between the disciplines of law and economics. The traditional boundaries of these two disciplines have somehow inhibited a full understanding of the functioning of and the evolution of economic and legal systems. It has often been the case that these boundaries have had to be reshaped, and sometimes abolished, before either one of the two disciplines could successfully clarify the real life problems arising from the complex institutions of contemporary societies. The contributions to this volume encompass some of the core controversial issues in law and economics arising from interactions between legal orderings and economic institutions. They include:the nature of institutional and legislative change and the emergence of strong institutional complementarity in legal positionsthe relationship between private orderings and the role of the State in enforcing contracts and defining property rightsthe nature and dynamics of endogenous enforcement and the analysis of governance models and corporate ethics.Part of the renowned Siena Studies in Political Economy series, this book will be an essential read for postgraduates and researchers in the fields of law and economics, and the economics of institutions.