Uwe Meixner – författare

This text is a systematic treatise on formal ontology or general metaphysics. Ontological issues - states of affairs, properties, actual existence, identity, exemplification, and others - are always discussed within, and in relation to, formal axiomatic systems. Starting with a theory of states of affairs, these systems become more and more comprehensive, complex and powerful, until finally the level of a universal ontology of intensional entities is reached. The central unifying notion throughout the constructions is that of part. There are many occasions on which historical ontological theories are discussed, notably those of Leibniz. The book should appeal to ontologists and metaphysicians who have a training in formal logic and who are interested in systematic ontological theories which are logically precise both with respect to the deduction of principles and the definition of concepts. It should also be of interest to analytic philosophers and historians of philosophy.

Das Studienbuch enthält grundlegende Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Geistes. In chronologischer Reihenfolge stellt es eine Auswahl der wichtigsten Gestalten dieser Philosophietradition aus der Perspektive analytischer Philosophen vor: Platon, Aristoteles, Plotin, Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin, Descartes, Malebranche, Hume, Kant und Husserl.Jedes Kapitel orientiert sich an einer systematischen Fragestellung. So vermittelt der Band zugleich einen Einblick in die Grundfragen der modernen Philosophie des Geistes: Welche Relation besteht zwischen mentalen und physischen Zuständen? Welchen ontologischen Status hat das Ich? Verfügen wir über Selbstwissen und wenn ja, in welchem Sinne?

This book models and simulates metaphysics by presenting the metaphysics of a model. The small size of the model makes it possible to treat metaphysical matters with a more than usual systematicity and comprehensiveness. In the mirror of sustained analogy, simulation-metaphysics offers a wealth of insights on the real thing: on the doctrines, the methods, and the epistemology of metaphysics.

This book presents a comprehensive, non-model-theoretic theory of ontic necessity and possibility within a formal (and formalized) ontology consisting of states of affairs, properties, and individuals. Its central thesis is that all modalities are reducible to intrinsic (or "logical") possibility and necessity if reference is made to certain states of affairs, called "bases of necessity." The viability of this Bases-Theory of Modality is shown also in the case of conditionals, including counterfactual conditionals. Besides the ontological aspects of the philosophy of modality, also the epistemology of modality is treated in the book. It is shown that the Bases-Theory of Modality provides a satisfactory solution to the epistemological problem of modality. In addition to developing that theory, the book includes detailed discussions of positions in the philosophy of modality maintained by Alvin Plantinga, David Lewis, Charles Chihara, Graeme Forbes, David Armstrong, and others. Among the themes treated are: possibilism vs. actualism; the theory of essences; conceivability and possibility; the nature of possible worlds; the nature of logical, nomological, and metaphysical possibility and necessity.

The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as inaugurated by Brentano and worked out in a very sophisticated way by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. Their criticism is, in the epistemological regard, directed against introspectionism, and in the ontological regard, against an internalist and qualia-friendly, non-functionalist (or: broadly dualistic/idealistic) conception of the mind. The book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hacker, Dennett, and other authors, reconstructing their arguments, and pointing out where they fall short of their aim. In defending Husserl against his Wittgensteinian critics, the book also offers a comprehensive fresh view of phenomenology as a philosophy of mind. In particular, Husserl’s non-representationalist theory of intentionality is carefully described in its various aspects and elucidated also with respect to its development, taking into account writings from various periods of Husserl’s career. Last but not least, the book shows Wittgensteinianism to be one of the effective roots of the present-day hegemony of physicalism.

Quantum physics, in contrast to classical physics, allows non-locality and indeterminism in nature. Moreover, the role of the observer seems indispensable in quantum physics. In fact, quantum physics, unlike classical physics, suggests a metaphysics that is not physicalism (which is today’s official metaphysical doctrine). As is well known, physicalism implies a reductive position in the philosophy of mind, specifically in its two core areas, the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of action. Quantum physics, in contrast, is compatible with psychological non-reductionism, and actually seems to support it. The essays in this book explore, from various points of view, the possibilities of basing a non-reductive philosophy of mind on quantum physics. In doing so, they not only engage with the ontological and epistemological aspects of the question but also with the neurophysiological ones.

Quantum physics, in contrast to classical physics, allows non-locality and indeterminism in nature. Moreover, the role of the observer seems indispensable in quantum physics. In fact, quantum physics, unlike classical physics, suggests a metaphysics that is not physicalism (which is today’s official metaphysical doctrine). As is well known, physicalism implies a reductive position in the philosophy of mind, specifically in its two core areas, the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of action. Quantum physics, in contrast, is compatible with psychological non-reductionism, and actually seems to support it. The essays in this book explore, from various points of view, the possibilities of basing a non-reductive philosophy of mind on quantum physics. In doing so, they not only engage with the ontological and epistemological aspects of the question but also with the neurophysiological ones.