William B. Tye – författare

It is common to assert that utility investors are compensated in the allowed rate of return for the risk of large disallowances, such as arise for investments found imprudent or not `used and useful'. However, this book develops a new theory of asymmetric regulatory risk that shows that infallible estimates of the cost of capital are sure to provide downward-biased estimates of the necessary allowed rates of return in the presence of such regulatory risks. The book uses the new theory of regulatory risk to understand recent developments in the risk of natural gas pipelines and other regulated industries.

This comprehensive survey of transportation economic policy pays homage to a classic work, Techniques of Transportation Planning, by renowned transportation scholar John R. Meyer. With contributions from leading economists in the field, it includes added emphasis on policy developments and analysis. The book covers the basic analytic methods used in transportation economics and policy analysis; focuses on the automobile, as both the mainstay of American transportation and the source of some of its most serious difficulties; covers key issues of urban public transportation; and analyzes the impact of regulation and deregulation on the U.S. airline, railroad, and trucking industries. In addition to the editors, the contributors are Alan A. Altshuler, Harvard University; Ronald R. Braeutigam, Northwestern University; Robert E. Gallamore, Union Pacific Railroad; Arnold M. Howitt, Harvard University; Gregory K. Ingram, The Wold Bank; John F. Kain, University of Texas at Dallas; Charles Lave, University of California, Irvine; Lester Lave, Carnegie Mellon University; Robert A. Leone, Boston University; Zhi Liu, The World Bank; Herbert Mohring, University of Minnesota; Steven A. Morrison, Northeastern University; Katherine M. O'Regan, Yale University; Don Pickrell, U.S. Department of Transportation; John M. Quigley, University of California, Berkeley; Ian Savage, Northwestern University; and Kenneth A. Small, University of California Irvine.

It is common to assert that utility investors are compensated in the allowed rate of return for the risk of large disallowances, such as arise for investments found imprudent or not `used and useful'. However, this book develops a new theory of asymmetric regulatory risk that shows that infallible estimates of the cost of capital are sure to provide downward-biased estimates of the necessary allowed rates of return in the presence of such regulatory risks. The book uses the new theory of regulatory risk to understand recent developments in the risk of natural gas pipelines and other regulated industries.