William Lucy – författare

Explaining and Understanding Adjudication is the first book that attempts to analyse and define the methodology and values of contemporary accounts of adjudication, which can be divided into orthodox philosophies on the one hand and heretical accounts on the other. The author offers an incisive and original analysis of how these supposedly incompatible accounts actually differ. Through an evaluation of Neil MacCormick, Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin as the principal exponents of the orthodoxy and Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger providing the heretical accounts, William Lucy argues that there are few important differences between the two. Rather, the author concludes, both theories have acute problems in relation to the methodology and values they apply in interpreting adjudication.

On what basis does tort law hold us responsible to those who suffer as a result of our carelessness? Why, when we breach our contracts, should we make good the losses of those with whom we contracted? In what sense are our torts and our breaches of contract 'wrongs'? These two branches of private law have for centuries provided philosophers and jurists with grounds for puzzlement. This book provides an outline of, and intervention in, contemporary jurisprudential debates about the nature and foundation of liability in private law.After outlining the realm of the philosophy of private law, the book divides into two. Part I examines the various components of liability responsibility in private law, including the notions of basic responsibility, conduct, causation and wrongfulness. Part II considers arguments purporting to show that private law does and should embody a conception of either distributive or corrective justice or some combination of the two. Throughout the book a number of distinctions - between conceptual and normative argument, between jurisprudential 'theory' and private law 'practice', between legal obligation and moral obligation - are analyzed, the aim being to give students an informed grasp of both the limits and possibilities of the philosophy of private law.

Cities ruled the first half of the 20th century; the second half belonged to the suburbs. Will cities become dominant again? Can the recent decline of many suburbs be slowed? This book  predicts a surprising outcome in the decades-long tug-of-war between urban hubs and suburban outposts. The authors document signs of resurgence in cities and i

That America entered a profound housing crisis in 2008 is well known. The wave of foreclosures that began to sweep the nation has had radical economic effects. But the force, ramifications, and implications for communities across America have never been spelled out as clearly and thoroughly as they are in this volume. As he did in Tomorrow's Cities, Tomorrow's Suburbs, the author has taken a clear-eyed and meticulous look at the latest data and found lessons that the mainstream discussion has overlooked - particularly with regard to the spatial and demographic implications of the housing crisis. The housing market did not collapse uniformly, and the pain has not been felt equally in all age groups. Planners, public officials, activists, students, and others will benefit from the author's's analysis of the real shape of the crisis, for what happens next will reflect these inequities. The author pulls no punches in this taut, readable assessment of what the crisis will mean for the shapes of our exurbs, older suburbs, and central cities.

Law’s Judgement elucidates and defends a feature of contemporary law that is currently either overlooked or too glibly dismissed as morally troublesome or historically anachronistic. That feature is the abstract nature of law’s judgement and its three components show that, when law judges us, it often does so in ignorance of our particular characters and abilities, on the one hand, and in ignorance of our context and circumstances, on the other. Law’s judgement is thus insensitive to all or much that makes us the particular people we are. The book explores various connections between this mode of judgement and some of our most important legal and political values. It shows that law’s abstract judgement is closely related to important juristic conceptions of personhood, responsibility and impartiality, and that these notions are not without moral significance. The book also examines the connections between modern law’s judgement and three of our most important political values, namely, dignity, equality and community. It argues that, if we value particular conceptions of dignity, equality and community, then we must also value law’s judgement. Illuminating these connections therefore serves a double purpose: first, it makes a case against those who counsel liberation from law’s abstract judgement and, second, it redirects attention to the task of morally evaluating law’s abstract judgement in its own terms.

Law’s Judgement elucidates and defends a feature of contemporary law that is currently either overlooked or too glibly dismissed as morally troublesome or historically anachronistic. That feature is the abstract nature of law’s judgement and its three components show that, when law judges us, it often does so in ignorance of our particular characters and abilities, on the one hand, and in ignorance of our context and circumstances, on the other. Law’s judgement is thus insensitive to all or much that makes us the particular people we are. The book explores various connections between this mode of judgement and some of our most important legal and political values. It shows that law’s abstract judgement is closely related to important juristic conceptions of personhood, responsibility and impartiality, and that these notions are not without moral significance. The book also examines the connections between modern law’s judgement and three of our most important political values, namely, dignity, equality and community. It argues that, if we value particular conceptions of dignity, equality and community, then we must also value law’s judgement. Illuminating these connections therefore serves a double purpose: first, it makes a case against those who counsel liberation from law’s abstract judgement and, second, it redirects attention to the task of morally evaluating law’s abstract judgement in its own terms.

Cities ruled the first half of the 20th century; the second half belonged to the suburbs. Will cities become dominant again? Can the recent decline of many suburbs be slowed? This book  predicts a surprising outcome in the decades-long tug-of-war between urban hubs and suburban outposts. The authors document signs of resurgence in cities and interpret omens of decline in many suburbs. They offer an extensive analysis of the 2000 census, with insights into the influence of income disparities, housing age and size, racial segregation, immigration, and poverty. They also examine popular perceptions-and misperceptions-about safety and danger in cities, suburbs, and exurbs that affect settlement patterns. This book offers evidence that the decline of cities can continue to be reversed, tempered by a warning of a mid-life crisis looming in the suburbs. It also offers practical policies for local action, steps that planners, elected officials, and citizens can take to create an environment in which both cities and suburbs can thrive.