Winston Harrington - Böcker

Over the past decades, considerable debate has emerged surrounding the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to analyze and make recommendations for environmental and safety regulations. Critics argue that CBA forces values on unquantifiable factors, that it does not adequately measure benefits across generations, and that it is not adaptable in situations of uncertainty. Proponents, on the other hand, believe that a well-done CBA provides useful, albeit imperfect, information to policymakers precisely because of the standard metrics that are applied across the analysis. Largely absent from the debate have been practical questions about how the use of CBA could be improved. Relying on the assumption that CBA will remain an important component in the regulatory process, this new work from Resources for the Future brings together experts representing both sides of the debate to analyze the use of CBA in three key case studies: the Clean Air Interstate Rule, the Clean Air Mercury Rule, and the Cooling Water Intake Structure Rule (Phase II). Each of the case studies is accompanied by critiques from both an opponent and a proponent of CBA and includes consideration of complementary analyses that could have been employed. The work's editors - two CBA supporters and one critic - conclude the report by offering concrete recommendations for improving the use of CBA, focusing on five areas: technical quality of the analyses, relevance to the agency decision-making process, transparency of the analyses, treatment of new scientific findings, and balance in both the analyses and associated processes, including the treatment of distributional consequences.

In the wake of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 in the United States, sources of emissions could be held accountable for the degradation of air quality in the local environment. This case study of air quality management in New Mexico was produced to shed some light on the procedures and activities used by agencies in order to control air quality. Originally published in 1981, Winston Harrington uses New Mexico as a case study for its largely centralised control system in Santa Fe to explore the behaviour of air quality agencies and pollution sources and comments on policy implications from this study’s conclusions. This title will be of interest to students of environmental studies and policy makers.

In the wake of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 in the United States, sources of emissions could be held accountable for the degradation of air quality in the local environment. This case study of air quality management in New Mexico was produced to shed some light on the procedures and activities used by agencies in order to control air quality. Originally published in 1981, Winston Harrington uses New Mexico as a case study for its largely centralised control system in Santa Fe to explore the behaviour of air quality agencies and pollution sources and comments on policy implications from this study’s conclusions. This title will be of interest to students of environmental studies and policy makers.

Originally published in 1991, this study uses the 1983 outbreak of Giardiasis in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania as a case study to explore the social costs of waterborne illnesses to a community. With over 6,000 people affected in that particular case, Economics and Episodic Disease emphasises the importance of Federal and State drinking water standards to protect the population from contamination whilst also commenting how regulations can be applied to other areas within public health as well as how to appraise the damage caused to surface water by the release of hazardous substances. This title will be of interest to students of Environmental Studies.

Originally published in 1991, this study uses the 1983 outbreak of Giardiasis in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania as a case study to explore the social costs of waterborne illnesses to a community. With over 6,000 people affected in that particular case, Economics and Episodic Disease emphasises the importance of Federal and State drinking water standards to protect the population from contamination whilst also commenting how regulations can be applied to other areas within public health as well as how to appraise the damage caused to surface water by the release of hazardous substances. This title will be of interest to students of Environmental Studies.

Economic models are used to show the extent of the difficulties involved in monitoring and enforcing pollution control laws on a continual basis. The authors make several recommendations for policy change. They also show that high rates of compliance can be achieved within tight budget constraints.Originally published in 1986

Rules in the Making represents an attempt to revolutionize ways of thinking about regulatory decision-making. The book tries to show that statistical methodologies can be used to determine what factors are important in the establishment of government regulation by developing a mathematical model of the regulatory process and agency behavior. The model is then tested using a case study of the Environmental Protection Agency's setting of effluent discharge standards under the Clean Water Act.Originally published in 1986

The two distinct approaches to environmental policy include direct regulation-sometimes called 'command and control' policies-and regulation by economic, or market-based incentives. This book is the first to compare the costs and outcomes of these approaches by examining realworld applications. In a unique format, paired case studies from the United States and Europe contrast direct regulation on one side of the Atlantic with an incentivebased policy on the other. For example, Germany‘s direct regulation of SO2 emissions is compared with an incentive approach in the U.S. Direct regulation of water pollution via the U.S. Clean Water Act is contrasted with Hollands incentive-based fee system. Additional studies contrast solutions for eliminating leaded gasoline and reducing nitrogen oxide emissions, CFCs, and chlorinated solvents. The cases presented in Choosing Environmental Policy were selected to allow the sharpest, most direct comparisons of direct regulation and incentive-based strategies. In practice, environmental policy is often a mix of both types of instruments. This innovative investigation will interest scholars, students, and policymakers who want more precise information as to what kind of 'blend' will yield the most effective policy. Are incentive instruments more efficient than regulatory ones? Do regulatory policies necessarily have higher administrative costs? Are incentive policies more difficult to monitor? Are firms more likely to oppose market-based instruments or traditional regulation? These are some of the important questions the authors address, often with surprising results.

The two distinct approaches to environmental policy include direct regulation-sometimes called 'command and control' policies-and regulation by economic, or market-based incentives. This book is the first to compare the costs and outcomes of these approaches by examining realworld applications. In a unique format, paired case studies from the United States and Europe contrast direct regulation on one side of the Atlantic with an incentivebased policy on the other. For example, Germany‘s direct regulation of SO2 emissions is compared with an incentive approach in the U.S. Direct regulation of water pollution via the U.S. Clean Water Act is contrasted with Hollands incentive-based fee system. Additional studies contrast solutions for eliminating leaded gasoline and reducing nitrogen oxide emissions, CFCs, and chlorinated solvents. The cases presented in Choosing Environmental Policy were selected to allow the sharpest, most direct comparisons of direct regulation and incentive-based strategies. In practice, environmental policy is often a mix of both types of instruments. This innovative investigation will interest scholars, students, and policymakers who want more precise information as to what kind of 'blend' will yield the most effective policy. Are incentive instruments more efficient than regulatory ones? Do regulatory policies necessarily have higher administrative costs? Are incentive policies more difficult to monitor? Are firms more likely to oppose market-based instruments or traditional regulation? These are some of the important questions the authors address, often with surprising results.