Wolfe Mays – författare
Visar alla böcker från författaren Wolfe Mays. Handla med fri frakt och snabb leverans.
6 produkter
6 produkter
Inbunden, Engelska, 2013
1 762 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
This volume of essays brings a phenomenological focus to bear on the subject of education in order to provide a fruitful stimulus for educational philosophy. It is for philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and indeed anyone who seeks to understand the perennially interesting questions about the nature of self-consciousness and how our view of it might affect our thinking about education.Originally published in 1978, the essays explore some of the main phenomenological and existentialist themes in relation to the development of consciousness. Two deal with Kierkegaard’s concern for our need to know the world that is true for ourselves, and with the part that imagination plays here. There are two on the development of thinking based round Piaget’s work on the child’s concept of causality and an alternative view proposed by Merleau-Ponty. The role of memory in education is considered and a distinction drawn between mere memorizing and that process of remembering which enables an individual to develop his self-image. Other essays discuss some of the child’s problems in establishing himself in the adult world, and explore the contact between child and teacher. The effects of bringing up a child in isolation from other children is considered with reference to Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of his childhood.
Häftad, Engelska, 2015
695 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
This volume of essays brings a phenomenological focus to bear on the subject of education in order to provide a fruitful stimulus for educational philosophy. It is for philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and indeed anyone who seeks to understand the perennially interesting questions about the nature of self-consciousness and how our view of it might affect our thinking about education.Originally published in 1978, the essays explore some of the main phenomenological and existentialist themes in relation to the development of consciousness. Two deal with Kierkegaard’s concern for our need to know the world that is true for ourselves, and with the part that imagination plays here. There are two on the development of thinking based round Piaget’s work on the child’s concept of causality and an alternative view proposed by Merleau-Ponty. The role of memory in education is considered and a distinction drawn between mere memorizing and that process of remembering which enables an individual to develop his self-image. Other essays discuss some of the child’s problems in establishing himself in the adult world, and explore the contact between child and teacher. The effects of bringing up a child in isolation from other children is considered with reference to Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of his childhood.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 1972687 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
This volume contains the proceedings of the six symposia of the ''Philosophers into Europe'' conference held under he joint auspices of the Royal Institute of Philosophy and the British Society for Phenomenology at the University of Southampton in September 1969.
Häftad, Engelska, 1972
547 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
This volume contains the proceedings of the six symposia of the 'Philosophers into Europe' conference held under he joint auspices of the Royal Institute of Philosophy and the British Society for Phenomenology at the University of Southampton in September 1969.
549 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
XVI Psychologists have, however, shown that what we are primarily aware of is not a succession of sense-data but figures-ground phenomena: Wittgenstein's ambiguous duck-rabbit is merely one such example. They have also drawn our attention to the existence of tertiary qualities in perception, such as 'symmetry' and 'elegance' which are just as directly given as are the perceived colours red, green or yellow. It is interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty has made considerable use of Gestalt ideas in his Phenomenology of Perception. One of the commonest reasons given by linguistic philosophers for not making direct use of the results of psychological research (although philosophers are usually willing to accept the first-hand results of physical science) is that philosophical accounts of perception and thinking are concerned with analysing the language in which these reports are made; that is to say, they are second-order enquiries. Often this approach is still more restricted and ordinary linguistic usage is taken as the yardstick against which questions relating to thought and perception are to be measured. The task of the philosopher is then con fined to the analysis of ordinary language. If he is more adventurous, as some writers on philosophical psychology are, he might go on to show how far the language used by psychological researchers falls short of the paradigms of common sense.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2012687 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
XVI Psychologists have, however, shown that what we are primarily aware of is not a succession of sense-data but figures-ground phenomena: Wittgenstein''s ambiguous duck-rabbit is merely one such example. They have also drawn our attention to the existence of tertiary qualities in perception, such as ''symmetry'' and ''elegance'' which are just as directly given as are the perceived colours red, green or yellow. It is interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty has made considerable use of Gestalt ideas in his Phenomenology of Perception. One of the commonest reasons given by linguistic philosophers for not making direct use of the results of psychological research (although philosophers are usually willing to accept the first-hand results of physical science) is that philosophical accounts of perception and thinking are concerned with analysing the language in which these reports are made; that is to say, they are second-order enquiries. Often this approach is still more restricted and ordinary linguistic usage is taken as the yardstick against which questions relating to thought and perception are to be measured. The task of the philosopher is then con fined to the analysis of ordinary language. If he is more adventurous, as some writers on philosophical psychology are, he might go on to show how far the language used by psychological researchers falls short of the paradigms of common sense.