On June 6, 1982, the Israeli Defence Forces entered Lebanon for what was billed as a relatively limited operation. In reality, the Lebanon War claimed many lives and undermined public trust in decision-makers. Through newly published archival documents, this book explores the events that led to the war and the actions of the people involved.

With the help of documents published in this book for the first time, historian Yigal Kipnis lays out the circumstances of the war, the preparations and discussions leading up to and during it, Israel''s convoluted moves against the administration in Washington and against the Lebanese Christians, and above all – the consistent coordination between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon. The goals of the war were derived from Begin''s worldview. Sharon worked to achieve these goals in the military field while Begin operated in the Israeli political field and diplomatically with the United States. To this end, he skillfully, cleverly, and decisively maneuvered between his principles and his obligations as a leader guiding a nation to war and to the political struggle for its justice. However, he was also subject to extreme emotional changes, as revealed by the detailed reports of his behavioral transformations by representatives of the US State Department.

This book will be of interest to researchers of Middle Eastern political history, US-Israeli relations, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as political science and political history.

On June 6, 1982, the Israeli Defence Forces entered Lebanon for what was billed as a relatively limited operation. In reality, the Lebanon War claimed many lives and undermined public trust in decision-makers. Through newly published archival documents, this book explores the events that led to the war and the actions of the people involved.

With the help of documents published in this book for the first time, historian Yigal Kipnis lays out the circumstances of the war, the preparations and discussions leading up to and during it, Israel''s convoluted moves against the administration in Washington and against the Lebanese Christians, and above all – the consistent coordination between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon. The goals of the war were derived from Begin''s worldview. Sharon worked to achieve these goals in the military field while Begin operated in the Israeli political field and diplomatically with the United States. To this end, he skillfully, cleverly, and decisively maneuvered between his principles and his obligations as a leader guiding a nation to war and to the political struggle for its justice. However, he was also subject to extreme emotional changes, as revealed by the detailed reports of his behavioral transformations by representatives of the US State Department.

This book will be of interest to researchers of Middle Eastern political history, US-Israeli relations, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as political science and political history.

Presenting the settlement landscape of the Golan before and after June 1967, The Golan Heights deals with the issue of the border between Israel and Syria, and with the Israeli settlement process in the area following the Six Day War.

The story of the Golan Heights and its position between Syria and Israel does not belong only to the past; it is still interwoven in the political present of the two countries. Public discourse in Israel on the political future of the Golan, and the direct and indirect political discussions between Israel and Syria, rest to a great extent on personal and collective memories, and these, by nature, are based on the past. The perceptions of the Israeli public were constructed upon the image of a mountain that became a monster. This image reached its peak on the eve of the Six Day War in June 1967, but continued to be consolidated and preserved in the Israeli collective memory, and so it has remained until the present.

Addressing the question of the political future of the Golan, a central issue for both Israel and the wider Middle East, this book will be an invaluable resource for students and scholars of Political History, Settlement Geography and Geopolitics.

Dr. Yigal Kipnis teaches International Relations at Haifa University. He received a BS in Civil Engineering from the Technion in Haifa and an MA and PhD in Land of Israel Studies from Haifa University. His first book, The Mountain That Was as a Monster: The Golan Between Syria and Israel, was published in 2009. His second book, 1973: The Way to War, published in 2012, immediately became a bestseller. It reveals the continuing political process which led to the Middle East war of October 1973.

Presenting the settlement landscape of the Golan before and after June 1967, The Golan Heights deals with the issue of the border between Israel and Syria, and with the Israeli settlement process in the area following the Six Day War.

The story of the Golan Heights and its position between Syria and Israel does not belong only to the past; it is still interwoven in the political present of the two countries. Public discourse in Israel on the political future of the Golan, and the direct and indirect political discussions between Israel and Syria, rest to a great extent on personal and collective memories, and these, by nature, are based on the past. The perceptions of the Israeli public were constructed upon the image of a mountain that became a monster. This image reached its peak on the eve of the Six Day War in June 1967, but continued to be consolidated and preserved in the Israeli collective memory, and so it has remained until the present.

Addressing the question of the political future of the Golan, a central issue for both Israel and the wider Middle East, this book will be an invaluable resource for students and scholars of Political History, Settlement Geography and Geopolitics.

Dr. Yigal Kipnis teaches International Relations at Haifa University. He received a BS in Civil Engineering from the Technion in Haifa and an MA and PhD in Land of Israel Studies from Haifa University. His first book, The Mountain That Was as a Monster: The Golan Between Syria and Israel, was published in 2009. His second book, 1973: The Way to War, published in 2012, immediately became a bestseller. It reveals the continuing political process which led to the Middle East war of October 1973.

On June 6, 1982, the Israeli Defence Forces entered Lebanon for what was billed as a relatively limited operation. In reality, the Lebanon War claimed many lives and undermined public trust in decision-makers. Through newly published archival documents, this book explores the events that led to the war and the actions of the people involved.

With the help of documents published in this book for the first time, historian Yigal Kipnis lays out the circumstances of the war, the preparations and discussions leading up to and during it, Israel''s convoluted moves against the administration in Washington and against the Lebanese Christians, and above all – the consistent coordination between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon. The goals of the war were derived from Begin''s worldview. Sharon worked to achieve these goals in the military field while Begin operated in the Israeli political field and diplomatically with the United States. To this end, he skillfully, cleverly, and decisively maneuvered between his principles and his obligations as a leader guiding a nation to war and to the political struggle for its justice. However, he was also subject to extreme emotional changes, as revealed by the detailed reports of his behavioral transformations by representatives of the US State Department.

This book will be of interest to researchers of Middle Eastern political history, US-Israeli relations, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as political science and political history.

On June 6, 1982, the Israeli Defence Forces entered Lebanon for what was billed as a relatively limited operation. In reality, the Lebanon War claimed many lives and undermined public trust in decision-makers. Through newly published archival documents, this book explores the events that led to the war and the actions of the people involved.

With the help of documents published in this book for the first time, historian Yigal Kipnis lays out the circumstances of the war, the preparations and discussions leading up to and during it, Israel''s convoluted moves against the administration in Washington and against the Lebanese Christians, and above all – the consistent coordination between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon. The goals of the war were derived from Begin''s worldview. Sharon worked to achieve these goals in the military field while Begin operated in the Israeli political field and diplomatically with the United States. To this end, he skillfully, cleverly, and decisively maneuvered between his principles and his obligations as a leader guiding a nation to war and to the political struggle for its justice. However, he was also subject to extreme emotional changes, as revealed by the detailed reports of his behavioral transformations by representatives of the US State Department.

This book will be of interest to researchers of Middle Eastern political history, US-Israeli relations, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as political science and political history.

Presenting the settlement landscape of the Golan before and after June 1967, The Golan Heights deals with the issue of the border between Israel and Syria, and with the Israeli settlement process in the area following the Six Day War.

The story of the Golan Heights and its position between Syria and Israel does not belong only to the past; it is still interwoven in the political present of the two countries. Public discourse in Israel on the political future of the Golan, and the direct and indirect political discussions between Israel and Syria, rest to a great extent on personal and collective memories, and these, by nature, are based on the past. The perceptions of the Israeli public were constructed upon the image of a mountain that became a monster. This image reached its peak on the eve of the Six Day War in June 1967, but continued to be consolidated and preserved in the Israeli collective memory, and so it has remained until the present.

Addressing the question of the political future of the Golan, a central issue for both Israel and the wider Middle East, this book will be an invaluable resource for students and scholars of Political History, Settlement Geography and Geopolitics.

Dr. Yigal Kipnis teaches International Relations at Haifa University. He received a BS in Civil Engineering from the Technion in Haifa and an MA and PhD in Land of Israel Studies from Haifa University. His first book, The Mountain That Was as a Monster: The Golan Between Syria and Israel, was published in 2009. His second book, 1973: The Way to War, published in 2012, immediately became a bestseller. It reveals the continuing political process which led to the Middle East war of October 1973.

Presenting the settlement landscape of the Golan before and after June 1967, The Golan Heights deals with the issue of the border between Israel and Syria, and with the Israeli settlement process in the area following the Six Day War.

The story of the Golan Heights and its position between Syria and Israel does not belong only to the past; it is still interwoven in the political present of the two countries. Public discourse in Israel on the political future of the Golan, and the direct and indirect political discussions between Israel and Syria, rest to a great extent on personal and collective memories, and these, by nature, are based on the past. The perceptions of the Israeli public were constructed upon the image of a mountain that became a monster. This image reached its peak on the eve of the Six Day War in June 1967, but continued to be consolidated and preserved in the Israeli collective memory, and so it has remained until the present.

Addressing the question of the political future of the Golan, a central issue for both Israel and the wider Middle East, this book will be an invaluable resource for students and scholars of Political History, Settlement Geography and Geopolitics.

Dr. Yigal Kipnis teaches International Relations at Haifa University. He received a BS in Civil Engineering from the Technion in Haifa and an MA and PhD in Land of Israel Studies from Haifa University. His first book, The Mountain That Was as a Monster: The Golan Between Syria and Israel, was published in 2009. His second book, 1973: The Way to War, published in 2012, immediately became a bestseller. It reveals the continuing political process which led to the Middle East war of October 1973.