Visar resultat för..."The Free Press"

John W. Dafoe was a dominant figure in western Canadian political history during the first half of the twentieth century. As editor of the Winnipeg Free Press from 1901 to 1944, he gained an international reputation for his perceptive analysis of the issues facing Canada and the world. He was at the centre of almost every major political development of his time: he advised prime ministers, was deeply involved in organizing the Progressive party, and was a member of the crucial Rowell-Sirois Commission on federal-provincial relations. His influence was enormous, and at the time of his death he was widely regarded as the nation's most distinguished editor. This book is a study at close quarters of Dafoe, the man of politics.It focuses on the Dafoe who read and studied and the Dafoe who observed  men and events; on Dafoe in his centre of operation and at the Free Press and Dafoe moving watchfully about the country and abroad when critical decisions were in the making; on the ideas confided in letters to friends and the ideas delivered in public speeches; on contributions made to conferences and commissions and advice given to political figures. The book is not intended as a complete biography of Dafoe in all his aspects, but it is even less an abstract treatise in the field of political theory. It is the biography of a political mind. The impression is of a mind recalled to its full vigour, for no prejudgments have been made about it and no restraints upon it.Ramsay Cook treats his subject with candour, but also with understanding and a sense of humour. He has ordered his material with extraordinary skill, so that his book is enjoyable reading as well as a valuable source of information about a distinguished Canadian and a momentous period in Canadian history.

This book explores the relationship between truth and freedom in the free press. It argues that the relationship is problematic because the free press implies a competition between plural ideas, whereas truth is univocal. Based on this tension the book claims that the idea of a free press is premised on an epistemological illusion. This illusion enables society to maintain that the world it perceives through the press corresponds to the world as it actually exists, explaining why defenders of the free press continue to rely on its capacity to discover the truth, despite economic conditions and technological innovations undermining much of its independence. The book invites the reader to reconsider the philosophical foundations, constitutional justifications, and structure and functions of the free press, and whether the institution can, in fact, realise both freedom and truth. It will be of great interest to anyone concerned in the role and value of the free press in the modern world.

This book explores the relationship between truth and freedom in the free press. It argues that the relationship is problematic because the free press implies a competition between plural ideas, whereas truth is univocal. Based on this tension the book claims that the idea of a free press is premised on an epistemological illusion. This illusion enables society to maintain that the world it perceives through the press corresponds to the world as it actually exists, explaining why defenders of the free press continue to rely on its capacity to discover the truth, despite economic conditions and technological innovations undermining much of its independence. The book invites the reader to reconsider the philosophical foundations, constitutional justifications, and structure and functions of the free press, and whether the institution can, in fact, realise both freedom and truth. It will be of great interest to anyone concerned in the role and value of the free press in the modern world.

A critical media culture continues to sustain and engage the public with trustworthy independent news and analysis.

The role of science in policymaking has gained unprecedented stature in the United States, raising questions about the place of science and scientific expertise in the democratic process. Some scientists have been given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance, and the politicizing of these issues has become highly contentious.Since World War II, most philosophers of science have purported the concept that science should be \u201cvalue-free.\u201d In Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal, Heather E. Douglas argues that such an ideal is neither adequate nor desirable for science. She contends that the moral responsibilities of scientists require the consideration of values even at the heart of science. She lobbies for a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, thus protecting the integrity and objectivity of science. In this vein, Douglas outlines a system for the application of values to guide scientists through points of uncertainty fraught with moral valence.Following a philosophical analysis of the historical background of science advising and the value-free ideal, Douglas defines how values should-and should not-function in science. She discusses the distinctive direct and indirect roles for values in reasoning, and outlines seven senses of objectivity, showing how each can be employed to determine the reliability of scientific claims. Douglas then uses these philosophical insights to clarify the distinction between junk science and sound science to be used in policymaking. In conclusion, she calls for greater openness on the values utilized in policymaking, and more public participation in the policymaking process, by suggesting various models for effective use of both the public and experts in key risk assessments.