Biosecurity - Böcker

In recent years much has happened to justify an examination of biological research in light of national security concerns. The destructive application of biotechnology research includes activities such as spreading common pathogens or transforming them into even more lethal forms. Policymakers and the scientific community at large must put forth a vigorous and immediate response to this challenge. This new book by the National Research Council recommends that the government expand existing regulations and rely on self-governance by scientists rather than adopt intrusive new policies. One key recommendation of the report is that the government should not attempt to regulate scientific publishing but should trust scientists and journals to screen their papers for security risks, a task some journals have already taken up. With biological information and tools widely distributed, regulating only U.S. researchers would have little effect. A new International Forum on Biosecurity should encourage the adoption of similar measures around the world.Seven types of risky studies would require approval by the Institutional Biosafety Committees that already oversee recombinant DNA research at some 400 U.S. institutions. These a /experiments of concerna include making an infectious agent more lethal and rendering vaccines powerless.

Biomedical advances have made it possible to identify and manipulate features of living organisms in useful ways--leading to improvements in public health, agriculture, and other areas. The globalization of scientific and technical expertise also means that many scientists and other individuals around the world are generating breakthroughs in the life sciences and related technologies. The risks posed by bioterrorism and the proliferation of biological weapons capabilities have increased concern about how the rapid advances in genetic engineering and biotechnology could enable the production of biological weapons with unique and unpredictable characteristics. Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of Life Sciences examines current trends and future objectives of research in public health, life sciences, and biomedical science that contain applications relevant to developments in biological weapons 5 to 10 years into the future and ways to anticipate, identify, and mitigate these dangers.

The 2nd International Forum on Biosecurity, held in Budapest, Hungary on March 30 - April 2, 2008, represents the efforts of a number of individuals and organizations, over the last five years, to engage the international community of life scientists in addressing how to reduce the risk that the results of their work could be used for hostile purposes by terrorists and states. The participants who gathered in Budapest were already engaged in this challenging task, and, therefore, the focus of the meeting was on what had been accomplished and what challenges remained. There was no attempt to achieve consensus, since there exist real and important differences among those involved concerning the appropriate policies and actions to be undertaken. But there was a serious effort to identify a range of potential next steps, and also an effort to identify opportunities where international scientific organizations could make substantive contributions and offer their advice and expertise to policy discussions. The Forum's presentations, discussions, and results are summarized in this book.

In response to a request from the U.S. Congress, this book examines how the unique experience and extensive capabilities of the Department of Defense (DOD) can be extended to reduce the threat of bioterrorism within developing countries outside the former Soviet Union (FSU). During the past 12 years, DOD has invested $800 million in reducing the risk from bioterrorism with roots in the states of the FSU. The program's accomplishments are many fold. The risk of bioterrorism in other countries is too great for DOD not to be among the leaders in addressing threats beyond the FSU. Taking into account possible sensitivities about a U.S. military presence, DOD should engage interested governments in about ten developing countries outside the FSU in biological threat reduction programs during the next five years. Whenever possible, DOD should partner with other organizations that have well established humanitarian reputations in the countries of interest. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the World Health Organization should be considered as potential partners.

The effort to understand and combat infectious diseases has, during the centuries, produced many key advances in science and medicine--including the development of vaccines, drugs, and other treatments. A subset of this research is conducted with agents that, like anthrax, not only pose a severe threat to the health of humans, plants, and animals but can also be used for ill-intended purposes. Such agents have been listed by the government as biological select agents and toxins. The 2001 anthrax letter attacks prompted the creation of new regulations aimed at increasing security for research with dangerous pathogens. The outcome of the anthrax letter investigation has raised concern about whether these measures are adequate. Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins evaluates both the physical security of select agent laboratories and personnel reliability measures designed to ensure the trustworthiness of those with access to biological select agents and toxins. The book offers a set of guiding principles and recommended changes to minimize security risk and facilitate the productivity of research.The book recommends fostering a culture of trust and responsibility in the laboratory, engaging the community in oversight of the Select Agent Program, and enhancing the operation of the Select Agent Program.

The Challenges and Opportunities for Education About Dual Use Issues in the Life Sciences workshop was held to engage the life sciences community on the particular security issues related to research with dual use potential. More than 60 participants from almost 30 countries took part and included practicing life scientists, bioethics and biosecurity practitioners, and experts in the design of educational programs. The workshop sought to identify a baseline about (1) the extent to which dual use issues are currently being included in postsecondary education (undergraduate and postgraduate) in the life sciences; (2) in what contexts that education is occurring (e.g., in formal coursework, informal settings, as stand-alone subjects or part of more general training, and in what fields); and (3) what online educational materials addressing research in the life sciences with dual use potential already exist.

When, in late 2011, it became public knowledge that two research groups had submitted for publication manuscripts that reported on their work on mammalian transmissibility of a lethal H5N1 avian influenza strain, the information caused an international debate about the appropriateness and communication of the researchers' work, the risks associated with the work, partial or complete censorship of scientific publications, and dual-use research of concern in general. Recognizing that the H5N1 research is only the most recent scientific activity subject to widespread attention due to safety and security concerns, on May 1, 2012, the National Research Council's Committee on Science, Technology and Law, in conjunction with the Board on Life Sciences and the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Microbial Threats, convened a one-day public workshop for the purposes of 1) discussing the H5N1 controversy; 2) considering responses by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), which had funded this research, the World Health Organization, the U.S.National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), scientific publishers, and members of the international research community; and 3) providing a forum wherein the concerns and interests of the broader community of stakeholders, including policy makers, biosafety and biosecurity experts, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the general public might be articulated. Perspectives on Research with H5N1 Avian Influenza: Scientific Enquiry, Communication, Controversy summarizes the proceedings of the workshop.

On March 10-11, 2016, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine held a public symposium on potential U.S. government policies for the oversight of gain-of- function (GOF) research. This was the Academiesa (TM) second meeting held at the request of the U.S. government to provide a mechanism to engage the life sciences community and the broader public and solicit feedback on optimal approaches to ensure effective federal oversight of GOF research as part of a broader U.S. government deliberative process. The first symposium, held in December 2014, examined the underlying scientific and technical questions surrounding the potential risks and benefits of GOF research involving pathogens with pandemic potential. The second symposium focused on discussion of the draft recommendations regarding GOF research of a Working Group of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. This report summarizes the key issues and ideas identified during the second symposium.