Concepts in the Study of Religion – serie

Comparison is held to be one of the central methods of the academic study of religion. While many ostensibly engage in the comparative act, often overlooked is what it actually means to do this. What is comparison? Why engage in it and for what purposes? Can there be such a thing as a valid or invalid comparison? Can comparison itself be compared to anything? This book starts with the premise that while there are good comparisons and bad comparisons, what is common to both is the sheer artificiality of the enterprise and develops an analytical framework for using the method in the context of religious studies. After briefly tracing the history and genealogy of the category, Hughes draws on his own extensive work in Judaism and Islam to argue that comparison can be a useful method, but only under strictly controlled conditions.

This volume does not focus on “theory” in a broad sense, but specifically on theories of religion. Theories of religion are texts that seek to interpret or explain “religion”, attempting to account for its meaning of “religion”, its specificity and its ontological status. They typically discuss the origins, structure, and functions (or products) of “religion”. Hence, theories of religion differ from “theoretical approaches”, “theoretical frameworks”, “theoretical models”, “definition of religion”, “ideas”, or similar concepts.The volume explores “theories of religion” as a fundamental concept in the study of religion/s in a specific, albeit interdisciplinary sense. Notably, many of the key theorists of religion are anthropologists, cognitive and evolutionary theorists, philosophers, and sociologists, in addition to scholars of religion in a more disciplinary sense. The book starts by giving a brief synopsis of theories of religions advanced since 1966. This starting point is chosen because of the appearance of two theoretical manifestos–contemporary classics–by Clifford Geertz, and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, which have set the stage for subsequent theories of religion as points of references.The main part of the volume surveys some 40 works by the following theorists in chronological order: Clifford Geertz, Thomas Luckmann, Peter Berger, Pierre Bourdieu, Niklas Luhmann, Donald Crosby, Andrew Greeley, Ninian Smart, Martin Prozesky, Rodney Stark (with William Sims Bainbridge and Roger Finke respectively), Felicitas Goodman, John Hick, E. Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley, Stewart Guthrie, Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Henri Hatzfeld, Jacques Derrida, Walter Burkert, Roy Rappaport, Pascal Boyer, Scott Atran, David Sloan Wilson, Lee Kirkpatrick, Loyal Rue, Daniel Dennett, Thomas Tweed, Martin Riesebrodt, Peter Sloterdijk, Robert Bellah, Gavin Flood, Jeppe Sinding Jensen, Ronald Dworkin, Jan-Ove Henriksen, Christian Smith, Paul-Francois Tremlett, Jonathan Turner with Alexandra Maryanski, Anders Klostergaard Petersen, and Armin Geertz, Volkhard Krech, Gabriel Levy.The book is written in clear and accessible language and will serve as a unique resource for students and scholars alike.

Comparison is held to be one of the central methods of the academic study of religion. While many ostensibly engage in the comparative act, often overlooked is what it actually means to do this. What is comparison? Why engage in it and for what purposes? Can there be such a thing as a valid or invalid comparison? Can comparison itself be compared to anything? This book starts with the premise that while there are good comparisons and bad comparisons, what is common to both is the sheer artificiality of the enterprise and develops an analytical framework for using the method in the context of religious studies. After briefly tracing the history and genealogy of the category, Hughes draws on his own extensive work in Judaism and Islam to argue that comparison can be a useful method, but only under strictly controlled conditions.

Evil: A Critical Primer begins with the claim that evil is a concept that is contextually bound. This means that we should not expect to find shared or similar notions of evil across cultures. Addressing evil in a way that is at once contextually specific and applicable to cross-cultural settings, this primer breaks with moral conceptions of evil by redescribing it within a new framework of dangers and aversions (i.e., things that cause harm and things to avoid). Doing so provides an empirical and heuristic framework as a new starting point for the study of religion, deemphasizing things associated with evil (like the devil, wickedness, or a diabolic will) and focusing instead on attitudes and practices (like rituals of purity and impurity, notions of clean and dirty, or expressions of disgust). Introducing and reflecting on cultural and cognitive aspects of classification, myth, ritual, emotions, and morality, Evil: A Critical Primer argues that our colloquial conception of evil, as related exclusively to the moral domain, is usefully illuminated by attending to historical and cultural context and cross-cultural comparison.

Evil: A Critical Primer begins with the claim that evil is a concept that is contextually bound. This means that we should not expect to find shared or similar notions of evil across cultures. Addressing evil in a way that is at once contextually specific and applicable to cross-cultural settings, this primer breaks with moral conceptions of evil by redescribing it within a new framework of dangers and aversions (i.e., things that cause harm and things to avoid). Doing so provides an empirical and heuristic framework as a new starting point for the study of religion, deemphasizing things associated with evil (like the devil, wickedness, or a diabolic will) and focusing instead on attitudes and practices (like rituals of purity and impurity, notions of clean and dirty, or expressions of disgust). Introducing and reflecting on cultural and cognitive aspects of classification, myth, ritual, emotions, and morality, Evil: A Critical Primer argues that our colloquial conception of evil, as related exclusively to the moral domain, is usefully illuminated by attending to historical and cultural context and cross-cultural comparison.

This book looks at the concept of tradition as used in the discourse of the study of religion. It examines the history of meanings of the concept, the range of uses in the field of religious studies at present, theoretical perspectives, core conceptual implications, and recommendations for clearing the air of a key theoretical tension surrounding the concept of the “invention of tradition.”It problematizes the use of ‘tradition’ as a synonym for ‘religion.’ It engages critically with important theoretical works, ranging from Robert Redfield’s Peasant Society and Culture (1956), Edward Shils’ Tradition (1981) and Hobsbawm/Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition (1992) to Pascal Boyer’s The Naturalness of Religious Ideas (1994) and Harvey Whitehouse’s Modes of Religiosity (2004). It reviews the small but growing list of publications reflecting on this category in the study of religions itself. Discussions and arguments are illustrated with examples from a variety of religions, including Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Christianities, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Candomblé, South Pacific cultures, and different western esoteric streams (not least Traditionalism).

This book looks at the concept of tradition as used in the discourse of the study of religion. It examines the history of meanings of the concept, the range of uses in the field of religious studies at present, theoretical perspectives, core conceptual implications, and recommendations for clearing the air of a key theoretical tension surrounding the concept of the “invention of tradition.”It problematizes the use of ‘tradition’ as a synonym for ‘religion.’ It engages critically with important theoretical works, ranging from Robert Redfield’s Peasant Society and Culture (1956), Edward Shils’ Tradition (1981) and Hobsbawm/Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition (1992) to Pascal Boyer’s The Naturalness of Religious Ideas (1994) and Harvey Whitehouse’s Modes of Religiosity (2004). It reviews the small but growing list of publications reflecting on this category in the study of religions itself. Discussions and arguments are illustrated with examples from a variety of religions, including Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Christianities, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Candomblé, South Pacific cultures, and different western esoteric streams (not least Traditionalism).

This volume examines the nature of interpretation, strategies within interpretation, and negotiations about the adequacy of an interpretation, with special attention paid to possible roles interpretation plays in the academic study of religions. While many people engage in interpretation, it is not clear what interpretation is. Throughout the book, a number of fundamental questions posed throughout the history of hermeneutics (theory of interpretation) are addressed. What is an “interpretation”? What or who determines the meaning of a text? What helps in navigating competitions or conflicts of interpretation? What is the place of interpretation in the academy, relative to explanatory sciences and productive arts? The unique approach taken to interpretation here is based on the fundamental axiom of philosophical hermeneutics—the hermeneutic priority of questioning. Through this, the author makes a case for the critical value of interpretation. Most other books focus either on historical developments of hermeneutics, on key modern hermeneutic philosophers, or on specific sacred texts such as in biblical or Quranic hermeneutics. Each chapter of this book refines a conceptual element that combines with others into a theory of interpretation useful for the classroom and in scholarship on hermeneutics.

This volume examines the nature of interpretation, strategies within interpretation, and negotiations about the adequacy of an interpretation, with special attention paid to possible roles interpretation plays in the academic study of religions. While many people engage in interpretation, it is not clear what interpretation is. Throughout the book, a number of fundamental questions posed throughout the history of hermeneutics (theory of interpretation) are addressed. What is an “interpretation”? What or who determines the meaning of a text? What helps in navigating competitions or conflicts of interpretation? What is the place of interpretation in the academy, relative to explanatory sciences and productive arts? The unique approach taken to interpretation here is based on the fundamental axiom of philosophical hermeneutics—the hermeneutic priority of questioning. Through this, the author makes a case for the critical value of interpretation. Most other books focus either on historical developments of hermeneutics, on key modern hermeneutic philosophers, or on specific sacred texts such as in biblical or Quranic hermeneutics. Each chapter of this book refines a conceptual element that combines with others into a theory of interpretation useful for the classroom and in scholarship on hermeneutics.

This book provides an overview of the various ways the concepts enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment have been used both within religious studies scholarship and in related fields. Despite the prevalence of these concepts in recent scholarship, no introductory text on the subject of enchantment has yet been written. The first half of the book provides a concise overview of theoretical work on disenchantment, a critical exploration of empirical evidence for premodern enchantment and modern disenchantment, and an account of how enchantment has been used in scholarly and popular works to mark specific beliefs and practices as unacceptable, dangerous, or delusional. The second half of the book explores recent scholarship on re-enchantment and distinguishes between two main varieties: rational reenchantment, which involves heightened emotions that are free from negative appraisals of premodern belief in magic and spirits, and spiritual re-enchantment, which involves the recovery of premodern beliefs and practices or the development of new alternative spiritual paths. The final chapter outlines a novel theoretical model for explaining modern enchantment as a variety of playful half-belief. This book will be useful for scholars and students working on a variety of topics including religion in modernity, theories of secularization, conflicts between science and religion, new religious movements, new materialisms, and immanent justifications for environmentalism.

This book provides an overview of the various ways the concepts enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment have been used both within religious studies scholarship and in related fields. Despite the prevalence of these concepts in recent scholarship, no introductory text on the subject of enchantment has yet been written. The first half of the book provides a concise overview of theoretical work on disenchantment, a critical exploration of empirical evidence for premodern enchantment and modern disenchantment, and an account of how enchantment has been used in scholarly and popular works to mark specific beliefs and practices as unacceptable, dangerous, or delusional. The second half of the book explores recent scholarship on re-enchantment and distinguishes between two main varieties: rational reenchantment, which involves heightened emotions that are free from negative appraisals of premodern belief in magic and spirits, and spiritual re-enchantment, which involves the recovery of premodern beliefs and practices or the development of new alternative spiritual paths. The final chapter outlines a novel theoretical model for explaining modern enchantment as a variety of playful half-belief. This book will be useful for scholars and students working on a variety of topics including religion in modernity, theories of secularization, conflicts between science and religion, new religious movements, new materialisms, and immanent justifications for environmentalism.