De Gruyter Studies in Philosophy of Humor – serie

Contrary to common opinion, philosophy’s relations with the comic are profound and complex, yet surprisingly understudied. Amir conceptualizes the relations that philosophy entertains with the comic in ten traditions, eight dating from antiquity and two from modern and postmodern times. She explains how the view that philosophy is inimical to the comic originated and invites the reader to re-evaluate philosophy’s attitude towards the comic.

Who is morally permitted to tell jokes about Jews? Poles? Women? Only those in the group? Only those who would be punching up? Anyone, since they are just jokes? All of the standard approaches are too broad or too narrow. In on the Joke provides a more sophisticated approach according to which each person possesses "joke capital" that can serve as "comic insurance" covering certain jokes in certain contexts. When Bob tells a joke about Jews, we can never know exactly what Bob is intending since we cannot see inside Bob’s mind. But we could reasonably infer, if we knew Bob himself was Jewish, if he worked tirelessly for Jewish causes, or was a card-carrying Neo-Nazi. Each would affect his joke capital, and, in certain circumstances, we would have a moral standing to demand to see his ledger to see how much joke capital he had with respect to Jews. The permissibility of that joke depends upon four factors: the joke, the teller of the joke, the audience, and the setting. The view developed in In on the Joke is the only view that clearly explains how each of these components work together in an integrated, effective ethic of humor.

Humor has been praised by philosophers and poets as a balm to soothe the sorrows that outrageous fortune’s slings and arrows cause inevitably, if not incessantly, to each and every one of us. In mundane life, having a sense of humor is seen not only as a positive trait of character, but as a social prerequisite, without which a person’s career and mating prospects are severely diminished, if not annihilated. However, humor is much more than this, and so much else. In particular, humor can accompany cruelty, inform it, sustain it, and exemplify it. Therefore, in this book, we provide a comprehensive, reasoned exploration of the vast literature on the concepts of humor and cruelty, as these have been tackled in Western philosophy, humanities, and social sciences, especially psychology. Also, the apparent cacophony of extant interpretations of these two concepts is explained as the inevitable and even useful result of the polysemy inherent to all common-sense concepts, in line with the understanding of concepts developed by M. Polanyi in the 20th century. Thus, a thorough, nuanced grasp of their complex mutual relationship is established, and many platitudes affecting today's received views, and scholarship, are cast aside. "Like Aristotle and Dewey, Arnarsson and Baruchello do not define their terms at the outset, but instead they relentlessly pursue the meanings of two ordinary words that everyone vaguely understads to arrive at a critical insight into the concepts these words represent, which are both disparate and interrelated." - Richard Marc Rubin, President, George Santayana Society

The present book addresses the background, rationale, general structure, and particular aims and arguments characterizing our third and last volume about "humor" and "cruelty". A guiding foray is provided into the vast expert literature that can be retrieved in the Western humanities and social sciences on these two terms. Pivotal thinkers and crucial notions are duly identified, highlighted, and examined. Apposite subsidiary references are also included, especially with regard to psychodynamics and clinical psychology, existentialism, feminism, liberalism, Marxism, and representative recent studies in the philosophy of humor and its cognates. The stage is thus set for the exploration and assessment of the conflicts between humor and cruelty unfolding in Part 2 of Volume 3. Being the philosophical terminus of our entire research project, Volume 3 counterbalances, complements, and, occasionally, complexifies the numerous forms of mutual cooperation between humor and cruelty that the preceding Volume 2 had unearthed and discussed. "Like Aristotle and Dewey, Arnarsson and Baruchello do not define their terms at the outset, but instead they relentlessly pursue the meanings of two ordinary words that everyone vaguely understads to arrive at a critical insight into the concepts these words represent, which are both disparate and interrelated." - Richard Marc Rubin, President, George Santayana Society

The role of humor as helpful in our individual lives has long been touted. Satirists and comics have also been known to play important roles in our society. But what hasn't been explored is why and how humor and mirth are important to the overall health of the public. This book explores the idea of humor as a public good. A good the promotes the health and well-being of the society and its individual members. The book begins with an exploration of the notion of a public good and then argues for a particular view of what a public good is. Topics covered will include the importance of humor and mirth to an individual's happiness, the role of satire and the comic in our world, and how these two pieces together work to promote the public good. Content will be devoted to covering what humor is and how it works and why the way it works is also important to the public good. Ultimately, the argument for humor as a public good is to help grow the purview of humor studies more generally as well as provide and novel argument about the relevance and importance of humor in our public and private lives.

Part 2 of Volume 3 addresses in detail the conflicts between humor and cruelty, i.e., how cruelty can be unleashed against humor and, conversely, humor can be utilized against cruelty. Potent enmities to mirth and jollity are retrieved from a variety of socio-historical contexts, ranging from Europe’s medieval monasteries to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo massacre. Special attention is paid to the cruel humor and humorous cruelty arising thereof, insofar as such phenomena can reveal critical aspects of today’s neoliberal socio-economic order. In parallel, settings where humor has been used as an instrument to cope with suffered cruelty, whether natural or human in origin, are also retrieved and discussed. These also vary greatly and encompass domains such as hospital wards, 20th-century Jewish ghettoes, and contemporary funeral homes. A set of concluding reflections is then offered on the psychological, theological, ethical, and metaphysical roots of humor—and its cruel rejection. "Like Aristotle and Dewey, Arnarsson and Baruchello do not define their terms at the outset, but instead they relentlessly pursue the meanings of two ordinary words that everyone vaguely understads to arrive at a critical insight into the concepts these words represent, which are both disparate and interrelated." - Richard Marc Rubin, President, George Santayana Society

In his Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant noted that the understanding intuits nothing. Now, the significance of this insight comes to light. Tristan Burt explains why our intuition of nothing resolves a central philosophical problem: how can we know what is (absolutely) real? The answer to this question is as surprising, and amusing, as reality itself.

Humor and cruelty can be the best of friends. Many cruel domains have facilitated hilarity of all kinds, whether experienced directly or vicariously, stretching from the torture chamber to the living room—or wherever else a screen is to be found. Conversely, many jests have provided the vehicle with which to dispense cruelty, whether callously or gleefully, in myriad settings, from public events to intimate family dinners. Combining the sources and resources of the humanities and social sciences, this book investigates the mutually supportive liaisons of humor and cruelty. We unearth the brutal, aggressive, and/or sadomasochistic roots of mockery and self-mockery, sarcasm and satire, whilst addressing contemporary debates in humor studies focusing on the thorny ethics and existential challenges arising from the acceptance of the much-appreciated yet seldom innocent channel for human interaction called "humor." "Like Aristotle and Dewey, Arnarsson and Baruchello do not define their terms at the outset, but instead they relentlessly pursue the meanings of two ordinary words that everyone vaguely understads to arrive at a critical insight into the concepts these words represent, which are both disparate and interrelated." - Richard Marc Rubin, President, George Santayana Society

Part 2 of Volume 3 addresses in detail the conflicts between humor and cruelty, i.e., how cruelty can be unleashed against humor and, conversely, humor can be utilized against cruelty. Potent enmities to mirth and jollity are retrieved from a variety of socio-historical contexts, ranging from Europe’s medieval monasteries to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo massacre. Special attention is paid to the cruel humor and humorous cruelty arising thereof, insofar as such phenomena can reveal critical aspects of today’s neoliberal socio-economic order. In parallel, settings where humor has been used as an instrument to cope with suffered cruelty, whether natural or human in origin, are also retrieved and discussed. These also vary greatly and encompass domains such as hospital wards, 20th-century Jewish ghettoes, and contemporary funeral homes. A set of concluding reflections is then offered on the psychological, theological, ethical, and metaphysical roots of humor—and its cruel rejection. "Like Aristotle and Dewey, Arnarsson and Baruchello do not define their terms at the outset, but instead they relentlessly pursue the meanings of two ordinary words that everyone vaguely understads to arrive at a critical insight into the concepts these words represent, which are both disparate and interrelated." - Richard Marc Rubin, President, George Santayana Society