Die Wehrmacht im Kampf - Böcker

Published for the first time in English, this is a German account of the German invasionof Norway in the spring of 1940. It focuses on the efforts of Group “1” led by Eduard Dietl. This group of gebirgstruppen was landed at Narvik in early April by tendestroyers. These ships were then all sunk by the Allies. Dietl’s troops wereoutnumbered by Allied troops but his defense utilized ammunition, food and sailorsfrom the sunken ships and his men retook Narvik once the Allies abandoned theirefforts to push the Germans out of Norway.

In 1941, military operations were conducted by large formations along the northern coast of Scandinavia – for the first time in history of warfare. A modern army suddenly swept into that isolated and inhospitable region that was yet to possess the level of importance it would later assume in Cold War polar strategy. The Arctic Front was the northernmost theatre in the war waged by Germany against Russia. For a period of four years, German troops from all branches of the Wehrmacht fought side by side with Finnish border guard units. The high point of the war on the Arctic Front was the assembly and advance of Germany’s Mountain Corps Norway in the summer and autumn of 1941. Commanded by general of the mountain troops, Eduard Dietl, and composed of the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions, the Mountain Corps advanced out of occupied North Norway, assembled in the Petsamo Corridor in North Finland, and struck into Russian territory in an attempt to seize Murmansk. It did not reach its objective. This account of the operation was written by Wilhelm Hess, quartermaster of the Mountain Corps Norway. He draws upon his personal experience of the conditions and actions on the Arctic Front in order to describe and analyse the environment, the sequence of events, and the reasons behind certain decisions. In addition to describing how operations conducted by the Mountain Corps unfolded, Hess provides insight as to how the terrain, the flow of supplies, and the war at sea impacted those operations.

This volume in the Die Wehrmacht im Kampf series examines Erich Hoepner's leadership of panzer formations in Poland in 1939, France in 1940, and Russia in 1941. It is written by Walter Chales de Beaulieu, a general staff officer who fought alongside Hoepner. Erich Hoepner was one of the most competent tank commanders of World War II, playing a significant role in Germany’s early successes. As the commander of the XVI Panzer Corps at the outbreak of war in 1939, Hoepner carried out the main thrust towards Warsaw. The panzer corps covered 250 kilometres and reached the outskirts of the city in only eight days.  In 1940, commanding the same formation, Hoepner fought the French Cavalry Corps in Belgium, partook in the encirclement of Allied forces near Dunkirk, and advanced southwards over the Weygand Line deep into French territory. In 1941, Hoepner became the commander of Panzer Group 4, which was the main attack formation for the advance on Leningrad. It made rapid progress to begin with, but an increasingly wide and exposed front meant that the attack gradually ground to a halt. After one final attempt to capture the city in the middle of September failed, the panzer group was redeployed to the central sector of the Eastern Front. It was there that the panzer group was to help with the push towards Moscow. In conjunction with Panzer Group 3, Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4 completed and eliminated the Vyazma pocket. Hoepner frequently felt that he was not allowed to advance on Moscow quickly enough by his superiors, yet his decision to conduct a withdrawal in January 1942 led to his dismissal.  In this book, Walter Chales de Beaulieu provides insight into Erich Hoepner’s ability as a panzer commander, painting a picture of a man who was committed to the military profession, who possessed a strong sense of responsibility, and who was confident enough to exercise his own will.