Information Security and Cryptography – serie

In this book the author introduces a novel approach to securing exam systems. He provides an in-depth understanding, useful for studying the security of exams and similar systems, such as public tenders, personnel selections, project reviews, and conference management systems.After a short chapter that explains the context and objectives of the book, in Chap. 2 the author introduces terminology for exams and the foundations required to formulate their security requirements. He describes the tasks that occur during an exam, taking account of the levels of detail and abstraction of an exam specification and the threats that arise out of the different exam roles. He also presents a taxonomy that classifies exams by types and categories. Chapter 3 contains formal definitions of the authentication, privacy, and verifiability requirements for exams, a framework based on the applied pi-calculus for the specification of authentication and privacy, and a more abstract approach based on set-theory that enables the specification of verifiability. Chapter 4 describes the Huszti-Pethő protocol in detail and proposes a security enhancement. In Chap. 5 the author details Remark!, a protocol for Internet-based exams, discussing its cryptographic building blocks and some security considerations. Chapter 6 focuses on WATA, a family of computer-assisted exams that employ computer assistance while keeping face-to-face testing. The chapter also introduces formal definitions of accountability requirements and details the analysis of a WATA protocol against such definitions. In Chaps. 4, 5, and 6 the author uses the cryptographic protocol verifier ProVerif for the formal analyses. Finally, the author outlines future work in Chap. 7. The book is valuable for researchers and graduate students in the areas of information security, in particular for people engaged with exams or protocols.

Hash functions are the cryptographer’s Swiss Army knife. Even though they play an integral part in today’s cryptography, existing textbooks discuss hash functions only in passing and instead often put an emphasis on other primitives like encryption schemes. In this book the authors take a different approach and place hash functions at the center. The result is not only an introduction to the theory of hash functions and the random oracle model but a comprehensive introduction to modern cryptography.After motivating their unique approach, in the first chapter the authors introduce the concepts from computability theory, probability theory, information theory, complexity theory, and information-theoretic security that are required to understand the book content. In Part I they introduce the foundations of hash functions and modern cryptography. They cover a number of schemes, concepts, and proof techniques, including computational security, one-way functions, pseudorandomness and pseudorandom functions, game-based proofs, message authentication codes, encryption schemes, signature schemes, and collision-resistant (hash) functions. In Part II the authors explain the random oracle model, proof techniques used with random oracles, random oracle constructions, and examples of real-world random oracle schemes. They also address the limitations of random oracles and the random oracle controversy, the fact that uninstantiable schemes exist which are provably secure in the random oracle model but which become insecure with any real-world hash function. Finally in Part III the authors focus on constructions of hash functions. This includes a treatment of iterative hash functions and generic attacks against hash functions, constructions of hash functions based on block ciphers and number-theoretic assumptions, a discussion of privately keyed hash functions including a full security proof for HMAC, and a presentation of real-world hash functions.The text is supported with exercises, notes, references, and pointers to further reading, and it is a suitable textbook for undergraduate and graduate students, and researchers of cryptology and information security.

Hash functions are the cryptographer’s Swiss Army knife. Even though they play an integral part in today’s cryptography, existing textbooks discuss hash functions only in passing and instead often put an emphasis on other primitives like encryption schemes. In this book the authors take a different approach and place hash functions at the center. The result is not only an introduction to the theory of hash functions and the random oracle model but a comprehensive introduction to modern cryptography.After motivating their unique approach, in the first chapter the authors introduce the concepts from computability theory, probability theory, information theory, complexity theory, and information-theoretic security that are required to understand the book content. In Part I they introduce the foundations of hash functions and modern cryptography. They cover a number of schemes, concepts, and proof techniques, including computational security, one-way functions, pseudorandomness and pseudorandom functions, game-based proofs, message authentication codes, encryption schemes, signature schemes, and collision-resistant (hash) functions. In Part II the authors explain the random oracle model, proof techniques used with random oracles, random oracle constructions, and examples of real-world random oracle schemes. They also address the limitations of random oracles and the random oracle controversy, the fact that uninstantiable schemes exist which are provably secure in the random oracle model but which become insecure with any real-world hash function. Finally in Part III the authors focus on constructions of hash functions. This includes a treatment of iterative hash functions and generic attacks against hash functions, constructions of hash functions based on block ciphers and number-theoretic assumptions, a discussion of privately keyed hash functions including a full security proof for HMAC, and a presentation of real-world hash functions.The text is supported with exercises, notes, references, and pointers to further reading, and it is a suitable textbook for undergraduate and graduate students, and researchers of cryptology and information security.

There are three fundamental components in Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) enforcement. The first component is accurately recovering the policy (CFG). Usually, the more precise the policy is, the more security CFI improves, but precise CFG generation was considered hard without the support of source code. The second component is embedding the CFI policy securely. Current CFI enforcement usually inserts checks before indirect branches to consult a read-only table which stores the valid CFG information. However, this kind of read-only table can be overwritten by some kinds of attacks (e.g., the Rowhammer attack and data-oriented programming). The third component is to efficiently enforce the CFI policy. In current approaches CFI checks are always executed whenever there is an indirect control flow transfer. Therefore, it is critical to minimize the performance impact of CFI  checks.In this book, we propose novel solutions to handle these three fundamental components.To generate a precise CFI policy without the support of the source code, we systematically study two methods which recover CFI policy based on function signature matching at the binary level and propose our novel rule- and heuristic-based mechanism to more accurately recover function signature. To embed CFI policy securely, we design a novel platform which encodes the policy into the machine instructions directly without relying on consulting any read-only data structure, by making use of the idea of instruction-set randomization. Each basic block is encrypted with a key derived from the CFG. To efficiently enforce CFI policy, we make use of a mature dynamic code optimization platform called DynamoRIO to enforce the policy so that we are only required to do the CFI check when needed.

This book provides a concise yet comprehensive overview of computer and Internet security, suitable for a one-term introductory course for junior/senior undergrad or first-year graduate students. It is also suitable for self-study by anyone seeking a solid footing in security – including software developers and computing professionals, technical managers and government staff. An overriding focus is on brevity, without sacrificing breadth of core topics or technical detail within them. The aim is to enable a broad understanding in roughly 350 pages. Further prioritization is supported by designating as optional selected content within this. Fundamental academic concepts are reinforced by specifics and examples, and related to applied problems and real-world incidents.The first chapter provides a gentle overview and 20 design principles for security. The ten chapters that follow provide a framework for understanding computer and Internet security. They regularly refer back to the principles, with supporting examples. These principles are the conceptual counterparts of security-related error patterns that have been recurring in software and system designs for over 50 years.The book is “elementary” in that it assumes no background in security, but unlike “soft” high-level texts it does not avoid low-level details, instead it selectively dives into fine points for exemplary topics to concretely illustrate concepts and principles. The book is rigorous in the sense of being technically sound, but avoids both mathematical proofs and lengthy source-code examples that typically make books inaccessible to general audiences. Knowledge of elementary operating system and networking concepts is helpful, but review sections summarize the essential background. For graduate students, inline exercises and supplemental references provided in per-chapter endnotes provide a bridge to further topics and a springboard to the research literature; for those in industry and government, pointers are provided to helpful surveys and relevant standards, e.g., documents from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology.

When the SCION project started in 2009, the goal was to create an architecture offering high availability and security for basic point-to-point communication. In the five years since the publication of SCION: A Secure Internet Architecture, this next-generation Internet architecture has evolved in terms of both design and deployment.On the one hand, there has been development of exciting new concepts and systems, including a new global time-synchronization system, an inter-domain approach for bandwidth reservations called COLIBRI, and Green Networking, which allows combating global climate change on three fronts. On the other hand, SCION is now also in production use by the Swiss financial ecosystem, and enables participants such as the Swiss National Bank, the Swiss provider of clearing services (SIX), and all Swiss financial institutes to communicate securely and reliably with each other via the Secure Swiss Finance Network.This unique guidebook provides an updated description of SCION's main components, covering new research topics and the most recent deployments. In particular, it presents in-depth discussion of formal verification efforts. Importantly, it offers a comprehensive, thorough description of the current SCION system:Describes the principles that guided SCION's design as a secure and robust Internet architectureProvides a comprehensive description of the next evolution in the way data finds its way through the InternetExplains how SCION can contribute to reducing carbon emissions, by introducing SCION Green NetworkingDemonstrates how SCION not only functions in academic settings but also works in production deploymentsDiscusses additional use cases for driving SCION's adoptionPresents the approaches for formal verification of protocols and codeIllustrated with many colorful figures, pictures, and diagrams, allowing easy access to the concepts and use cases Assembled by a team with extensive experience in the fields of computer networks and security, this text/reference is suitable for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students interested in network security. Also, readers with limited background in computer networking but with a desire to know more about SCION will benefit from an overview of relevant chapters in the beginning of the book.

When the SCION project started in 2009, the goal was to create an architecture offering high availability and security for basic point-to-point communication. In the five years since the publication of SCION: A Secure Internet Architecture, this next-generation Internet architecture has evolved in terms of both design and deployment.On the one hand, there has been development of exciting new concepts and systems, including a new global time-synchronization system, an inter-domain approach for bandwidth reservations called COLIBRI, and Green Networking, which allows combating global climate change on three fronts. On the other hand, SCION is now also in production use by the Swiss financial ecosystem, and enables participants such as the Swiss National Bank, the Swiss provider of clearing services (SIX), and all Swiss financial institutes to communicate securely and reliably with each other via the Secure Swiss Finance Network.This unique guidebook provides an updated description of SCION's main components, covering new research topics and the most recent deployments. In particular, it presents in-depth discussion of formal verification efforts. Importantly, it offers a comprehensive, thorough description of the current SCION system:Describes the principles that guided SCION's design as a secure and robust Internet architectureProvides a comprehensive description of the next evolution in the way data finds its way through the InternetExplains how SCION can contribute to reducing carbon emissions, by introducing SCION Green NetworkingDemonstrates how SCION not only functions in academic settings but also works in production deploymentsDiscusses additional use cases for driving SCION's adoptionPresents the approaches for formal verification of protocols and codeIllustrated with many colorful figures, pictures, and diagrams, allowing easy access to the concepts and use cases Assembled by a team with extensive experience in the fields of computer networks and security, this text/reference is suitable for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students interested in network security. Also, readers with limited background in computer networking but with a desire to know more about SCION will benefit from an overview of relevant chapters in the beginning of the book.

Research over the last two decades has considerably expanded knowledge of Internet cryptography, revealing the important interplay between standardization, implementation, and research.This practical textbook/guide is intended for academic courses in IT security and as a reference guide for Internet security. It describes important Internet standards in a language close to real-world cryptographic research and covers the essential cryptographic standards used on the Internet, from WLAN encryption to TLS and e-mail security. From academic and non-academic research, the book collects information about attacks on implementations of these standards (because these attacks are the main source of new insights into real-world cryptography). By summarizing all this in one place, this useful volume can highlight cross-influences in standards, as well as similarities in cryptographic constructions.Topics and features:· Covers the essential standards in Internet cryptography· Integrates work exercises and problems in each chapter· Focuses especially on IPsec, secure e-mail and TLS· Summarizes real-world cryptography in three introductory chapters· Includes necessary background from computer networks· Keeps mathematical formalism to a minimum, and treats cryptographic primitives mainly as blackboxes· Provides additional background on web security in two concluding chaptersOffering a uniquely real-world approach to Internet cryptography, this textbook/reference will be highly suitable to students in advanced courses on cryptography/cryptology, as well as eminently useful to professionals looking to expand their background and expertise.Professor Dr. Jörg Schwenk holds the Chair for Network and Data Security at the Ruhr University in Bochum, Germany. He (co-)authored about 150 papers on the book’s topics, including for conferences like ACM CCS, Usenix Security, IEEE S&P, and NDSS.

Research over the last two decades has considerably expanded knowledge of Internet cryptography, revealing the important interplay between standardization, implementation, and research.This practical textbook/guide is intended for academic courses in IT security and as a reference guide for Internet security. It describes important Internet standards in a language close to real-world cryptographic research and covers the essential cryptographic standards used on the Internet, from WLAN encryption to TLS and e-mail security. From academic and non-academic research, the book collects information about attacks on implementations of these standards (because these attacks are the main source of new insights into real-world cryptography). By summarizing all this in one place, this useful volume can highlight cross-influences in standards, as well as similarities in cryptographic constructions.Topics and features:· Covers the essential standards in Internet cryptography· Integrates work exercises and problems in each chapter· Focuses especially on IPsec, secure e-mail and TLS· Summarizes real-world cryptography in three introductory chapters· Includes necessary background from computer networks· Keeps mathematical formalism to a minimum, and treats cryptographic primitives mainly as blackboxes· Provides additional background on web security in two concluding chaptersOffering a uniquely real-world approach to Internet cryptography, this textbook/reference will be highly suitable to students in advanced courses on cryptography/cryptology, as well as eminently useful to professionals looking to expand their background and expertise.Professor Dr. Jörg Schwenk holds the Chair for Network and Data Security at the Ruhr University in Bochum, Germany. He (co-)authored about 150 papers on the book’s topics, including for conferences like ACM CCS, Usenix Security, IEEE S&P, and NDSS.

Lattice-based cryptography is a promising post-quantum cryptographic approach that can withstand potential attacks from future quantum computers. This book will introduce the theoretical mathematics that underpins lattice-based cryptography, such as the hard problems based on lattices upon which the security of lattice-based cryptosystems rely. It will provide examples of how these hard problems can be used to build basic lattice-based cryptographic primitives, namely encryption, digital signatures and key exchange, in addition to more advanced primitives such as identity-based encryption (IBE), attribute-based encryption (ABE) and hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE). Subsequently, the practical aspects of designing efficient and robust lattice-based cryptosystems in both hardware and software will be detailed. The resilience of lattice-based implementations to physical attacks will be discussed in addition to appropriate countermeasures that can be integrated into implementations to defend against such attacks. Finally, three case studies will be described to illustrate how lattice-based cryptography can be successfully embedded into real-world scenarios.

Fault-tolerant distributed consensus is a fundamental concept, both in cryptography as well as distributed computing. Ever since the inception of the problem by Lamport et al in 1982, the problem has been widely studied, both in cryptography as well as distributed computing community and several fundamental results have been obtained regarding the possibility, feasibility and optimality of the consensus protocols in various network models and adversarial settings. The problem has generated revived interest from several other communities over the last few years, after the advent of Blockchain protocols. Traditionally, the consensus protocols are studied either in the synchronous or in the asynchronous communication setting and very often the protocols in the former category serve as the basis for the protocols in the latter category. The focus of this book will be on the synchronous communication setting. The book presents all the seminal possibility and feasibility results in this model ever since the inception of the consensus problem, with formal security proofs. Even though the synchronous corruption model may seem weaker than the more practical asynchronous communication model, designing protocols in the synchronous model turns out to be non-trivial and demands sophisticated and highly advanced techniques. Moreover, understanding protocols in the synchronous setting often constitutes the first stepping stone to understanding the more complex asynchronous consensus protocols. The topic of synchronous consensus protocols in itself is a very vast and important topic to be covered in a single book.

The Tamarin prover is an open-source analysis tool for cryptographic protocols. Given a specification of a protocol, possible adversaries, and the desired security properties, Tamarin either verifies the protocol or provides counter examples witnessing attacks. Tamarin is a robust and powerful analysis tool: it has been under development for over a decade and has reached a state of maturity where it can be applied to model and analyze a wide range of real-world cryptographic protocols. It is now one of the leading tools in this domain, with a wide and active user community spanning both academia and industry. The objective of this book is to help both researchers and practitioners to gain a general understanding of how Formal Methods tools like Tamarin can be used to analyze and improve the quality of real-world protocols. Moreover, we specifically showcase the Tamarin prover and provide guidance on its usage. In this sense, this book provides a user’s manual forTamarin. But it goes far beyond that, highlighting Tamarin’s underlying theory and its use in modeling and applications.

Cryptographic protocols are the backbone of secure digital interactions, but achieving both security and efficiency is a challenging balancing act.  The challenge is how to minimize computational costs and reduce interaction while maintaining provable security.  This book explores cutting-edge techniques to optimize cryptographic protocols under well-established assumptions. The monograph focuses on secure multi-party computation, non-malleable commitments, and proof systems, presenting new constructions based on general and standard cryptographic assumptions. Topics and features:First optimal-round two-party computation protocol:  introduces the first secure, two-party computation protocol (and multi-party protocol for coin-tossing) with black-box simulation under standard assumptions, achieving optimal round complexity in the simultaneous message exchange modelBreakthrough in non-malleable commitments:  develops the first four-round, concurrent, non-malleable commitment scheme based on one-way functions and a three-round variant under stronger (still general and standard) assumptionsAdvances in zero-knowledge proofs:  non-interactive, Zero-Knowledge proof systems that improve both efficiency and generality, enhancing practical applicability in cryptographic protocolsEfficient witness-indistinguishable proof systems: three-round, witness-indistinguishable proof systems with a novel delayed-input property, with application to interactive zero-knowledgeThis work is primarily intended for researchers, academics, and graduate students in cryptography, theoretical computer science, and cybersecurity who are interested in designing cryptographic protocols from standard and general assumptions—in particular in the setting where no setup is available.

Feistel networks are one of the easiest ways to build pseudorandom permutations. Thanks to this property, many secret key algorithms (symmetric ciphers) have been designed as Feistel networks, and it is possible to design many others. The most famous of them is probably the Data Encryption Standard algorithm, a former U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology standard block cipher, originally released in 1977.This book provides a comprehensive survey of different kinds of Feistel ciphers, including their definitions and mathematical/computational properties.Topics and features:Description of the best-known attacks against the Data Encryption Standard algorithm, including linear cryptanalysis, differential cryptanalysis, and Davies’ attackGeneric attacks against balanced, unbalanced, and generalized Feistel networksUp-to-date security analysis of balanced Feistel networksQuantum cryptanalysis of Feistel networksThe results consolidated in this volume provide an overview of this important cipher design to researchers and practitioners willing to understand the design and security analysis of Feistel ciphers.

Everyone needs security:  Nations need national security, corporations need corporate security, individuals need personal security, cybersecurity, AI security. What is the common denominator of these security concepts? Security and science are the building blocks of the modern civilization. Science gave us the powers to change the world. Security should protect us from abuses of those powers. Yet humans have been hesitant to apply the methods of science to the problems of security. This core security-science (SecSci) textbook is a step in that direction. While many students pursue security out of genuine interest, most security curricula are plastered with industry buzzwords and policy slogans, driven by market incentives and government funding. The result is the attackers get richer, and their victims get poorer—while security experts inhabit the realm of informal narratives in-between. Before joining the fray, some students want to understand it. This textbook arose from the authors' efforts to cater to such students by peeling off the veils of expertise and replacing them with explanations and simple mathematical models. Topics, goals and features:Understand the basic ideas behind the main security concepts and beyond the buzzwordsCybersecurity and computer security are not as different from physical security and national security as they make you think.Physical space is described by its geometry, but what is the geometry of cyberspace?Different programming languages and different network and computer architectures require different security tools. Learn the security methods independent on the differences.Privacy is not a security requirement but the right to be left alone.The more I trust you, the less security and privacy I need from you. But why do I trust you? This uniquely informative textbook provides supporting materials for undergraduate and graduate courses on security, privacy, and trust. The early chapters introduce the basic concepts at the beginner level. The later chapters require some technical confidence and intellectual maturity. The book can also be used as an entry point into SecSci research.The authors are professors at the Department of Information and Computer Sciences at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa.

Protocols connect the many devices used in our personal and professional lives.  Hence we require assurances that they are secure in the face of threats.Security is too important to leave to intuition and experience alone. We need methodologies to precisely determine our security goals. A security property is one that holds despite the best efforts of an attacker, as captured by a threat model. When attacking a protocol, an eavesdropper may inject messages leading to sessions being hijacked and other data breaches.This textbook goes from intuition, to theory, to tools, explaining different security properties. Ubiquitous protocols keep the discussion real:  ePassport protocols used at border checkpoints; the EMV protocol for contactless payments; and Open ID Connect used to sign in to websites. Even threats enabling car theft via relay attacks are taken into consideration by authenticating proximity. The book also analyses threats to privacy such as tracking, mitigated by making sessions unlinkable.Topics and features:The learning curve brings readers to the edge of the topic of security protocols.Multiple security and privacy properties and threats are expressed in a core calculus.Large real-world case studies showcase the methods in practice.The theory informs the accurate usage of tools for checking security protocols.Minimal protocols are selected to cleanly illustrate new concepts.This textbook is designed to take readers with some grounding in computer science to the edge of the field of security protocols. Additionally, it can serve as a highly useful reference for established researchers and security professionals branching out into threat modelling.Reynaldo Gil-Pons, Felix Stutz and Semen Yurkov were postdoctoral researchers in the Security and Trust of Software Systems group headed by Sjouke Mauw, professor at University of Luxembourg. Ross Horne directs the Cyber Security MSc at University of Strathclyde, UK.

In this introductory textbook the author explains the key topics in cryptography. He takes a modern approach, where defining what is meant by "secure" is as important as creating something that achieves that goal, and security definitions are central to the discussion throughout.The author balances a largely non-rigorous style — many proofs are sketched only — with appropriate formality and depth. For example, he uses the terminology of groups and finite fields so that the reader can understand both the latest academic research and "real-world" documents such as application programming interface descriptions and cryptographic standards. The text employs colour to distinguish between public and private information, and all chapters include summaries and suggestions for further reading.This is a suitable textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in computer science, mathematics and engineering, and for self-study byprofessionals in information security. While the appendix summarizes most of the basic algebra and notation required, it is assumed that the reader has a basic knowledge of discrete mathematics, probability, and elementary calculus.

This book is the first to develop a systematized approach for the comparison and evaluation of secure deletion solutions. The book focuses on novel secure deletion solutions targeting specific real-world environments where secure deletion is problematic: mobile storage and remote storage. The author surveys related work, organizes existing solutions in terms of their interfaces, presents a taxonomy of adversaries differing in their capabilities, and then builds a system and adversarial model based on the survey of related work.The book is useful for both academics, researchers and graduate students, and for practitioners who may integrate its results into deployed systems.

In this introductory textbook the author explains the key topics in cryptography. He takes a modern approach, where defining what is meant by "secure" is as important as creating something that achieves that goal, and security definitions are central to the discussion throughout.The author balances a largely non-rigorous style — many proofs are sketched only — with appropriate formality and depth. For example, he uses the terminology of groups and finite fields so that the reader can understand both the latest academic research and "real-world" documents such as application programming interface descriptions and cryptographic standards. The text employs colour to distinguish between public and private information, and all chapters include summaries and suggestions for further reading.This is a suitable textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in computer science, mathematics and engineering, and for self-study byprofessionals in information security. While the appendix summarizes most of the basic algebra and notation required, it is assumed that the reader has a basic knowledge of discrete mathematics, probability, and elementary calculus.

This is a graduate textbook of advanced tutorials on the theory of cryptography and computational complexity. In particular, the chapters explain aspects of garbled circuits, public-key cryptography, pseudorandom functions, one-way functions, homomorphic encryption, the simulation proof technique, and the complexity of differential privacy. Most chapters progress methodically through motivations, foundations, definitions, major results, issues surrounding feasibility, surveys of recent developments, and suggestions for further study.This book honors Professor Oded Goldreich, a pioneering scientist, educator, and mentor. Oded was instrumental in laying down the foundations of cryptography, and he inspired the contributing authors, Benny Applebaum, Boaz Barak, Andrej Bogdanov, Iftach Haitner, Shai Halevi, Yehuda Lindell, Alon Rosen, and Salil Vadhan, themselves leading researchers on the theory of cryptography and computational complexity. The book is appropriate for graduate tutorials and seminars, and for self-study by experienced researchers, assuming prior knowledge of the theory of cryptography.

This book describes the essential components of the SCION secure Internet architecture, the first architecture designed foremost for strong security and high availability. Among its core features, SCION also provides route control, explicit trust information, multipath communication, scalable quality-of-service guarantees, and efficient forwarding. The book includes functional specifications of the network elements, communication protocols among these elements, data structures, and configuration files. In particular, the book offers a specification of a working prototype.The authors provide a comprehensive description of the main design features for achieving a secure Internet architecture. They facilitate the reader throughout, structuring the book so that the technical detail gradually increases, and supporting the text with a glossary, an index, a list of abbreviations, answers to frequently asked questions, and special highlighting for examples and for sections that explain important research, engineering, and deployment features. The book is suitable for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students who are interested in network security.

In this book the author introduces a novel approach to securing exam systems. He provides an in-depth understanding, useful for studying the security of exams and similar systems, such as public tenders, personnel selections, project reviews, and conference management systems.After a short chapter that explains the context and objectives of the book, in Chap. 2 the author introduces terminology for exams and the foundations required to formulate their security requirements. He describes the tasks that occur during an exam, taking account of the levels of detail and abstraction of an exam specification and the threats that arise out of the different exam roles. He also presents a taxonomy that classifies exams by types and categories. Chapter 3 contains formal definitions of the authentication, privacy, and verifiability requirements for exams, a framework based on the applied pi-calculus for the specification of authentication and privacy, and a more abstract approach based on set-theory that enables the specification of verifiability. Chapter 4 describes the Huszti-Pethő protocol in detail and proposes a security enhancement. In Chap. 5 the author details Remark!, a protocol for Internet-based exams, discussing its cryptographic building blocks and some security considerations. Chapter 6 focuses on WATA, a family of computer-assisted exams that employ computer assistance while keeping face-to-face testing. The chapter also introduces formal definitions of accountability requirements and details the analysis of a WATA protocol against such definitions. In Chaps. 4, 5, and 6 the author uses the cryptographic protocol verifier ProVerif for the formal analyses. Finally, the author outlines future work in Chap. 7. The book is valuable for researchers and graduate students in the areas of information security, in particular for people engaged with exams or protocols.

This book is the first to develop a systematized approach for the comparison and evaluation of secure deletion solutions. The book focuses on novel secure deletion solutions targeting specific real-world environments where secure deletion is problematic: mobile storage and remote storage. The author surveys related work, organizes existing solutions in terms of their interfaces, presents a taxonomy of adversaries differing in their capabilities, and then builds a system and adversarial model based on the survey of related work.The book is useful for both academics, researchers and graduate students, and for practitioners who may integrate its results into deployed systems.

This is a graduate textbook of advanced tutorials on the theory of cryptography and computational complexity. In particular, the chapters explain aspects of garbled circuits, public-key cryptography, pseudorandom functions, one-way functions, homomorphic encryption, the simulation proof technique, and the complexity of differential privacy. Most chapters progress methodically through motivations, foundations, definitions, major results, issues surrounding feasibility, surveys of recent developments, and suggestions for further study.This book honors Professor Oded Goldreich, a pioneering scientist, educator, and mentor. Oded was instrumental in laying down the foundations of cryptography, and he inspired the contributing authors, Benny Applebaum, Boaz Barak, Andrej Bogdanov, Iftach Haitner, Shai Halevi, Yehuda Lindell, Alon Rosen, and Salil Vadhan, themselves leading researchers on the theory of cryptography and computational complexity. The book is appropriate for graduate tutorials and seminars, and for self-study by experienced researchers, assuming prior knowledge of the theory of cryptography.

This book describes the essential components of the SCION secure Internet architecture, the first architecture designed foremost for strong security and high availability. Among its core features, SCION also provides route control, explicit trust information, multipath communication, scalable quality-of-service guarantees, and efficient forwarding. The book includes functional specifications of the network elements, communication protocols among these elements, data structures, and configuration files. In particular, the book offers a specification of a working prototype.The authors provide a comprehensive description of the main design features for achieving a secure Internet architecture. They facilitate the reader throughout, structuring the book so that the technical detail gradually increases, and supporting the text with a glossary, an index, a list of abbreviations, answers to frequently asked questions, and special highlighting for examples and for sections that explain important research, engineering, and deployment features. The book is suitable for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students who are interested in network security.

This book presents a comprehensive mathematical theory that explains precisely what information flow is, how it can be assessed quantitatively – so bringing precise meaning to the intuition that certain information leaks are small enough to be tolerated – and how systems can be constructed that achieve rigorous, quantitative information-flow guarantees in those terms. It addresses the fundamental challenge that functional and practical requirements frequently conflict with the goal of preserving confidentiality, making perfect security unattainable.Topics include: a systematic presentation of how unwanted information flow, i.e., "leaks", can be quantified in operationally significant ways and then bounded, both with respect to estimated benefit for an attacking adversary and by comparisons between alternative implementations; a detailed study of capacity, refinement, and Dalenius leakage, supporting robust leakage assessments; a unification of information-theoretic channels and information-leaking sequential programs within the same framework; and a collection of case studies, showing how the theory can be applied to interesting realistic scenarios.The text is unified, self-contained and comprehensive, accessible to students and researchers with some knowledge of discrete probability and undergraduate mathematics, and contains exercises to facilitate its use as a course textbook.

Zero-knowledge proofs are fascinating and extremely useful constructs. Their fascinating nature is due to their seemingly contradictory de?nition; ze- knowledge proofs are convincing and yet yield nothing beyond the validity of the assertion being proved. Their applicability in the domain of cryptography is vast; they are typically used to force malicious parties to behave according to a predetermined protocol. In addition to their direct applicability in cr- tography, zero-knowledge proofs serve as a good benchmark for the study of variousproblemsregardingcryptographicprotocols(e.g.,“securecomposition of protocols”). A fundamental question regarding zero-knowledge protocols refers to the preservation of security (i.e., of the zero-knowledge feature) when many - stances are executed concurrently, and in particular under a purely as- chronous model. The practical importance of this question, in the days of extensive Internet communication, seems clear. It turned out that this qu- tion is also very interesting from a theoretical point of view. In particular, this question served as a benchmark for the study of the security of concurrent executions of protocols and led to the development of techniques for coping with the problems that arise in that setting.

This book, by the designers of the block cipher, presents Rijndael from scratch. The underlying mathematics and the wide trail strategy as the basic design idea are explained in detail and the basics of differential and linear cryptanalysis are reworked. Subsequent chapters review all known attacks against the Rijndael structure and deal with implementation and optimization issues. In addition, other ciphers related to Rijndael are presented.

Computer network security is critical to fraud prevention and accountability. Network participants are required to observe predefined steps called security protocols, whose proof of correctness is evidence that each protocol step preserves some desired properties.The author investigates proofs of correctness of realistic security protocols in a formal, intuitive setting. The protocols examined include Kerberos versions, smartcard protocols, non-repudiation protocols, and certified email protocols. The method of analysis, the Inductive Method in the theorem prover Isabelle, turns out to be both powerful and flexible. This research advances significant extensions to the method of analysis, while the findings on the protocols analysed are novel and illuminating.This book will benefit researchers and graduate students in the fields of formal methods, information security, inductive methods, and networking.