Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science – serie

This book explores relationships and maps out intersections between discussions on causation in three scientific disciplines: linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. The book is organized in five thematic parts, investigating connections between philosophical and linguistic studies of causation; presenting novel methodologies for studying the representation of causation; tackling central issues in syntactic and semantic representation of causal relations; and introducing recent advances in philosophical thinking on causation.Beyond its thematic organization, readers will find several recurring topics throughout this book, such as the attempt to reduce causality to other non-causal terms; causal pluralism vs. one all-encompassing account for causation; causal relations pertaining to the mental as opposed to the physical realm, and more.This collection also lays the foundation for questioning whether it is possible to evaluate available philosophical approaches to causation against the variety of linguistic phenomena ranging across diverse lexical and grammatical items, such as bound morphemes, prepositions, connectives, and verbs. Above all, it lays the groundwork for considering whether the fruits of the psychological-cognitive study of the perception of causal relations may contribute to linguistic and philosophical studies, and whether insights from linguistics can benefit the other two disciplines.

This book explores relationships and maps out intersections between discussions on causation in three scientific disciplines: linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. The book is organized in five thematic parts, investigating connections between philosophical and linguistic studies of causation; presenting novel methodologies for studying the representation of causation; tackling central issues in syntactic and semantic representation of causal relations; and introducing recent advances in philosophical thinking on causation.Beyond its thematic organization, readers will find several recurring topics throughout this book, such as the attempt to reduce causality to other non-causal terms; causal pluralism vs. one all-encompassing account for causation; causal relations pertaining to the mental as opposed to the physical realm, and more.This collection also lays the foundation for questioning whether it is possible to evaluate available philosophical approaches to causation against the variety of linguistic phenomena ranging across diverse lexical and grammatical items, such as bound morphemes, prepositions, connectives, and verbs. Above all, it lays the groundwork for considering whether the fruits of the psychological-cognitive study of the perception of causal relations may contribute to linguistic and philosophical studies, and whether insights from linguistics can benefit the other two disciplines.

This volume provides a broad perspective on the state of the art in the philosophy and conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics. Its essays take their starting point in the work and influence of Itamar Pitowsky, who has greatly influenced our understanding of what is characteristically non-classical about quantum probabilities and quantum logic, and this serves as a vantage point from which they reflect on key ongoing debates in the field. Readers will find a definitive and multi-faceted description of the major open questions in the foundations of quantum mechanics today, including: Is quantum mechanics a new theory of (contextual) probability? Should the quantum state be interpreted objectively or subjectively? How should probability be understood in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics? What are the limits of the physical implementation of computation? The impact of this volume goes beyond the exposition of Pitowsky’s influence: it provides a unique collection of essays by leading thinkers containing profound reflections on the field.Chapter 1. Classical logic, classical probability, and quantum mechanics (Samson Abramsky)Chapter 2. Why Scientific Realists Should Reject the Second Dogma of Quantum Mechanic (Valia Allori)Chapter 3. Unscrambling Subjective and Epistemic Probabilities (Guido Bacciagaluppi)Chapter 4. Wigner’s Friend as a Rational Agent (Veronika Baumann, Časlav Brukner)Chapter 5. Pitowsky's Epistemic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the PBR Theorem (Yemima Ben-Menahem)Chapter 6. On the Mathematical Constitution and Explanation of Physical Facts (Joseph Berkovitz)Chapter 7. Everettian probabilities, the Deutsch-Wallace theorem and the Principal Principle (Harvey R. Brown, Gal Ben Porath)Chapter 8. ‘Two Dogmas’ Redu (Jeffrey Bub)Chapter 9. Physical Computability Theses (B. Jack Copeland, Oron Shagrir)Chapter 10. Agents in Healey’s Pragmatist Quantum Theory: A Comparison with Pitowsky’s Approach to Quantum Mechanics (Mauro Dorato)Chapter 11. Quantum Mechanics As a Theory of Observables and States and, Thereby, As a Theory of Probability (John Earman, Laura Ruetsche)Chapter 12. The Measurement Problem and two Dogmas about Quantum Mechanic (Laura Felline)Chapter 13. There Is More Than One Way to Skin a Cat: Quantum Information Principles In a Finite World(Amit Hagar)Chapter 14. Is Quantum Mechanics a New Theory of Probability? (Richard Healey)Chapter 15. Quantum Mechanics as a Theory of Probability (Meir Hemmo, Orly Shenker)Chapter 16. On the Three Types of Bell's Inequalities (Gábor Hofer-Szabó)Chapter 17. On the Descriptive Power of Probability Logic (Ehud Hrushovski)Chapter 18. The Argument against Quantum Computers (Gil Kalai)Chapter 19. Why a Relativistic Quantum Mechanical World Must be Indeterministic (Avi Levy, Meir Hemmo)Chapter 20. Subjectivists about Quantum Probabilities Should be Realists about Quantum States (Wayne C. Myrvold)Chapter 21. The Relativistic Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument (Michael Redhead)Chapter 22. What price statistical independence? How Einstein missed the photon.(Simon Saunders)Chapter 23. How (Maximally) Contextual is Quantum Mechanics? (Andrew W. Simmons)Chapter 24. Roots and (Re)Sources of Value (In)Definiteness Versus Contextuality (Karl Svozil) Chapter 25: Schrödinger’s Reaction to the EPR Paper (Jos Uffink)Chapter 26. Derivations of the Born Rule (Lev Vaidman)Chapter 27. Dynamical States and the Conventionality of (Non-) Classicality (Alexander Wilce).

This volume provides a broad perspective on the state of the art in the philosophy and conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics. Its essays take their starting point in the work and influence of Itamar Pitowsky, who has greatly influenced our understanding of what is characteristically non-classical about quantum probabilities and quantum logic, and this serves as a vantage point from which they reflect on key ongoing debates in the field. Readers will find a definitive and multi-faceted description of the major open questions in the foundations of quantum mechanics today, including: Is quantum mechanics a new theory of (contextual) probability? Should the quantum state be interpreted objectively or subjectively? How should probability be understood in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics? What are the limits of the physical implementation of computation? The impact of this volume goes beyond the exposition of Pitowsky’s influence: it provides a unique collection of essays by leading thinkers containing profound reflections on the field.Chapter 1. Classical logic, classical probability, and quantum mechanics (Samson Abramsky)Chapter 2. Why Scientific Realists Should Reject the Second Dogma of Quantum Mechanic (Valia Allori)Chapter 3. Unscrambling Subjective and Epistemic Probabilities (Guido Bacciagaluppi)Chapter 4. Wigner’s Friend as a Rational Agent (Veronika Baumann, Časlav Brukner)Chapter 5. Pitowsky's Epistemic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the PBR Theorem (Yemima Ben-Menahem)Chapter 6. On the Mathematical Constitution and Explanation of Physical Facts (Joseph Berkovitz)Chapter 7. Everettian probabilities, the Deutsch-Wallace theorem and the Principal Principle (Harvey R. Brown, Gal Ben Porath)Chapter 8. ‘Two Dogmas’ Redu (Jeffrey Bub)Chapter 9. Physical Computability Theses (B. Jack Copeland, Oron Shagrir)Chapter 10. Agents in Healey’s Pragmatist Quantum Theory: A Comparison with Pitowsky’s Approach to Quantum Mechanics (Mauro Dorato)Chapter 11. Quantum Mechanics As a Theory of Observables and States and, Thereby, As a Theory of Probability (John Earman, Laura Ruetsche)Chapter 12. The Measurement Problem and two Dogmas about Quantum Mechanic (Laura Felline)Chapter 13. There Is More Than One Way to Skin a Cat: Quantum Information Principles In a Finite World(Amit Hagar)Chapter 14. Is Quantum Mechanics a New Theory of Probability? (Richard Healey)Chapter 15. Quantum Mechanics as a Theory of Probability (Meir Hemmo, Orly Shenker)Chapter 16. On the Three Types of Bell's Inequalities (Gábor Hofer-Szabó)Chapter 17. On the Descriptive Power of Probability Logic (Ehud Hrushovski)Chapter 18. The Argument against Quantum Computers (Gil Kalai)Chapter 19. Why a Relativistic Quantum Mechanical World Must be Indeterministic (Avi Levy, Meir Hemmo)Chapter 20. Subjectivists about Quantum Probabilities Should be Realists about Quantum States (Wayne C. Myrvold)Chapter 21. The Relativistic Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument (Michael Redhead)Chapter 22. What price statistical independence? How Einstein missed the photon.(Simon Saunders)Chapter 23. How (Maximally) Contextual is Quantum Mechanics? (Andrew W. Simmons)Chapter 24. Roots and (Re)Sources of Value (In)Definiteness Versus Contextuality (Karl Svozil) Chapter 25: Schrödinger’s Reaction to the EPR Paper (Jos Uffink)Chapter 26. Derivations of the Born Rule (Lev Vaidman)Chapter 27. Dynamical States and the Conventionality of (Non-) Classicality (Alexander Wilce).

This book subjects the traditional concept of law of nature to critical examination. There are two kinds of reasons that invite this reexamination, one deriving from philosophical concerns over the traditional concept, the other motivated by theoretical and practical changes in science. One of the philosophical worries is that the idiom of law of nature, especially when combined with the notion of laws 'governing' individual events and processes, is no longer as intelligible as it used to be in the theistic context in which the formulation of laws became central to science. The traditional concept is also challenged in various ways by contemporary scientific theories such as quantum mechanics, chaos theory and the general theory of relativity. It is no longer clear that there are any universal laws, laws do not always guarantee predictability, and the border between physical and mathematical considerations is constantly shifting. The most difficult challenge, perhaps, isto come up with a scientific explanation of the origin of laws. Wrestling with these intriguing problems, the papers in this volume broaden both our understanding of the natural order and our desiderata of scientific explanation.

This book subjects the traditional concept of law of nature to critical examination. There are two kinds of reasons that invite this reexamination, one deriving from philosophical concerns over the traditional concept, the other motivated by theoretical and practical changes in science. One of the philosophical worries is that the idiom of law of nature, especially when combined with the notion of laws 'governing' individual events and processes, is no longer as intelligible as it used to be in the theistic context in which the formulation of laws became central to science. The traditional concept is also challenged in various ways by contemporary scientific theories such as quantum mechanics, chaos theory and the general theory of relativity. It is no longer clear that there are any universal laws, laws do not always guarantee predictability, and the border between physical and mathematical considerations is constantly shifting. The most difficult challenge, perhaps, isto come up with a scientific explanation of the origin of laws. Wrestling with these intriguing problems, the papers in this volume broaden both our understanding of the natural order and our desiderata of scientific explanation.

This book offers a unique perspective on one of the deepest questions about the world we live in: is reality multi-leveled, or can everything be reduced to some fundamental ‘flat’ level?  This deep philosophical issue has widespread implications in philosophy, since it is fundamental to how we understand the world and the basic entities in it. Both the notion of ‘levels’ within science and their ontological implications are issues that are underexplored in the philosophical literature. The volume reconsiders the view that reality contains many levels and opens new ways to understand the ontological status of the special sciences. The book focuses on major open questions that arise at the foundations of cognitive science, cognitive psychology, brain science and other special sciences, in particular with respect to the physical foundations of these sciences. For example: Is the mental computational? Do brains compute? How can the special sciences be autonomous from physics, grounded in, or based on, physics and at the same time irreducible to physics?  The book is an important read for scientists and philosophers alike. It is of interest to philosophers of science, philosophers of mind and biology interested in the notion of levels, but also to psychologists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists investigating such issues as the precise relation of the mental to the underlying neural structures and the appropriate approach to study it.

This book offers a unique perspective on one of the deepest questions about the world we live in: is reality multi-leveled, or can everything be reduced to some fundamental ‘flat’ level?  This deep philosophical issue has widespread implications in philosophy, since it is fundamental to how we understand the world and the basic entities in it. Both the notion of ‘levels’ within science and their ontological implications are issues that are underexplored in the philosophical literature. The volume reconsiders the view that reality contains many levels and opens new ways to understand the ontological status of the special sciences. The book focuses on major open questions that arise at the foundations of cognitive science, cognitive psychology, brain science and other special sciences, in particular with respect to the physical foundations of these sciences. For example: Is the mental computational? Do brains compute? How can the special sciences be autonomous from physics, grounded in, or based on, physics and at the same time irreducible to physics?  The book is an important read for scientists and philosophers alike. It is of interest to philosophers of science, philosophers of mind and biology interested in the notion of levels, but also to psychologists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists investigating such issues as the precise relation of the mental to the underlying neural structures and the appropriate approach to study it.

This book provides a survey of a number of the major issues in the philosophy of mathematics, such as ontological questions regarding the nature of mathematical objects, epistemic questions about the acquisition of mathematical knowledge, and the intriguing riddle of the applicability of mathematics to the physical world. Some of these issues go back to the nascent years of mathematics itself, others are just beginning to draw the attention of scholars. In addressing these questions, some of the papers in this volume wrestle with them directly, while others use the writings of philosophers such as Hume and Wittgenstein to approach their problems by way of interpretation and critique. The contributors include prominent philosophers of science and mathematics as well as promising younger scholars. The volume seeks to share the concerns of philosophers of mathematics with a wider audience and will be of interest to historians, mathematicians and philosophers alike.

This book provides a survey of a number of the major issues in the philosophy of mathematics, such as ontological questions regarding the nature of mathematical objects, epistemic questions about the acquisition of mathematical knowledge, and the intriguing riddle of the applicability of mathematics to the physical world. Some of these issues go back to the nascent years of mathematics itself, others are just beginning to draw the attention of scholars. In addressing these questions, some of the papers in this volume wrestle with them directly, while others use the writings of philosophers such as Hume and Wittgenstein to approach their problems by way of interpretation and critique. The contributors include prominent philosophers of science and mathematics as well as promising younger scholars. The volume seeks to share the concerns of philosophers of mathematics with a wider audience and will be of interest to historians, mathematicians and philosophers alike.

This book defends the very contentious Idealist interpretation of Hume on external objects, and draws from it far-reaching metaphysical and epistemological consequences for Hume’s philosophy. Its interest is both interpretive and analytic. The content Hume ascribes to the belief in “bodies” is susceptible to more than one reading, and has not been systematically considered. Upholding the Idealistic interpretation is interesting in its own right, but also yields several important conclusions about the spatiality of objects, causation, Hume’s “science of man” and his epistemology. For instance, it argues that the Idealist reading means that there are no cross-temporal spatial relationships, and that the (more prevalent) Materialist reading takes Hume further away from methodological empiricism than does the Idealist counterpart, and may render his practice less in conformity with his official methodology. The monograph is therefore of great interest to not only academics but also scholars, graduate students and researchers.

This book defends the very contentious Idealist interpretation of Hume on external objects, and draws from it far-reaching metaphysical and epistemological consequences for Hume’s philosophy. Its interest is both interpretive and analytic. The content Hume ascribes to the belief in “bodies” is susceptible to more than one reading, and has not been systematically considered. Upholding the Idealistic interpretation is interesting in its own right, but also yields several important conclusions about the spatiality of objects, causation, Hume’s “science of man” and his epistemology. For instance, it argues that the Idealist reading means that there are no cross-temporal spatial relationships, and that the (more prevalent) Materialist reading takes Hume further away from methodological empiricism than does the Idealist counterpart, and may render his practice less in conformity with his official methodology. The monograph is therefore of great interest to not only academics but also scholars, graduate students and researchers.

This book brings together scholars from ethics and philosophy of science in order to identify ways in which insights gleaned from one subfield can shed light on the other. The book focuses on two radical Anti-Theory movements that emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s, one in philosophy of science and the other in ethics. Both movements challenged attempts to supply general, systematized philosophical theories within their domains and thus invited the reconsideration of what philosophical theorizing can and should offer. Each of these movements was domain-specific – that is, each criticized the aspirations to philosophical theories within its own domain and advanced arguments aimed at philosophers within their own specific subfield. The innovative systematic comparative examination of these movements by scholars from each domain sheds new light on some familiar debates, offers new and exciting paths of research to pursue in each domain, provides insight into the place of science and ethics in contemporary life and culture, and enables a fresh view on the longstanding and alluring philosophical aspiration for a fully general, absolute theory of reality and an ultimate objective foundational theory of knowledge.

This book brings together scholars from ethics and philosophy of science in order to identify ways in which insights gleaned from one subfield can shed light on the other. The book focuses on two radical Anti-Theory movements that emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s, one in philosophy of science and the other in ethics. Both movements challenged attempts to supply general, systematized philosophical theories within their domains and thus invited the reconsideration of what philosophical theorizing can and should offer. Each of these movements was domain-specific – that is, each criticized the aspirations to philosophical theories within its own domain and advanced arguments aimed at philosophers within their own specific subfield. The innovative systematic comparative examination of these movements by scholars from each domain sheds new light on some familiar debates, offers new and exciting paths of research to pursue in each domain, provides insight into the place of science and ethics in contemporary life and culture, and enables a fresh view on the longstanding and alluring philosophical aspiration for a fully general, absolute theory of reality and an ultimate objective foundational theory of knowledge.