Middle Eastern Military Studies - Böcker

This new book looks at the relationship between the Israeli armed forces, the government, and the origins of the 1967 War. Ami Gluska discusses the effect of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on Israel’s defense policy between 1963-1967 against the backdrop of the developments in the Middle East. In addition, he describes in detail the decision-making process leading to the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in June 1967 through the prism of the relations between the military and political echelons. He shows how the Six Day War was a watershed event in the Middle-Eastern conflict and had a profound effect on the development of the Palestinian problem and the character of the State of Israel over the past four decades. This book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, strategic studies, Israeli politics and military history in general.

This book analyzes Palestinian attempts to create an organized military force from the period of the Mandate up to the present day.Beginning with a comparative overview of the relationship between insurgent movements and the quest to build up a standard military, the book looks, first, at how the 1936 revolt galvanized the Palestinian leadership to attempt to create a military. It then goes on to examines other major topics such as: the 1948 failure to create an organized armed force; Palestinian participation in other Arab armed forces; the creation of the PLA; attempts to develop a security apparatus after Oslo; and, finally, the question of security reform and peace-making. The book concludes by identifying the lessons from the Palestinian experience that can be applied in promoting healthy civil-military relations within political entities located in major conflict zones.

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) plays a key role in Israeli society, and has traditionally been perceived not only as the guardian of national survival, but also as a 'people's army' responsible for the custody of national values. This volume analyses the circumstances currently undermining these perceptions, and explores both the changes occurring in Israel’s military framework, and their potential implications.The book highlights the influence exerted by massive shifts in both Israel's external strategic landscape and in the country's domestic and cultural environments, which have compelled the IDF to undertake major programmes of structural reform, technological adaptation and doctrinal revision. This book argues that these changes have lead the public to subject the armed forces and their conduct to unprecedented critical scrutiny. The way in which Israelis and their army resolve these tensions is of crucial importance not only for Israel, but for the Middle East as a whole.

This book provides the first comprehensive study of the evolution of the Iraqi military from the British mandate era to post-Baathist Iraq. Ethnic and sectarian turmoil is endemic to Iraq, and its armed forces have been intertwined with its political affairs since their creation. This study illustrates how the relationship between the military and the political centre in Iraq has evolved, with the military bringing about three regime changes in Iraq’s history before being brought under control by Saddam Hussein, up until the 2003 war. The instability that followed was partly due to the failure to create a new military that does not threaten the government, yet is still strong enough to deter rival factions from armed conflict. The reconstitution of the armed forces will be a prerequisite for an American withdrawal from Iraq, but this book argues that immense challenges lie ahead, despite the praise from the Bush administration for the progress of the new Iraqi army.

This volume analyzes the conduct of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) counter-insurgency operations during the two major Palestinian uprisings (1987-1993 and 2000-2005) in the Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It employs primary and secondary resources to produce a comprehensive analysis on whether or not the IDF has been able to adapt its conventional conduct of warfare to the realities of the Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict and achieve any sort of victory over the Palestinian insurgents. Sergio Catignani provides new insights into how conventional armies struggle with contemporary insurgency by looking in particular at the strategic, operational, tactical and ethical dilemmas of the IDF over the last two decades. By examining the way in which the IDF and the Israeli security doctrine were formed and developed over time, he explores the extent to which Israeli security assumptions, civil-military relations, the organizational culture, command and control structure, and conduct of the IDF have affected its adaptation to the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict. Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas will be of much interest to students of low-intensity conflict and counter-insurgency, the Israeli army, the Middle Eastern conflict and strategic studies in general.

This book examines the local and international dynamics and strategies that have come to define the often violent relationship between Israel and Lebanon.Since the end of the Cold War, academic debate over the nature of war in the contemporary world has focused upon the asymmetric nature of conflict among a raft of failed or failing states, often held together by only a fragile notion of a shared communal destiny. Little scholarly attention has been paid, however, to one such conflict that predates the ending of the Cold War, yet still appears as intractable as ever: Israel’s hostile relationship with Lebanon and in particular, its standoff with the Lebanese Shi’a militia group, Hizbollah. As events surrounding the ‘Second Lebanon War’ in the summer of 2006 demonstrate, the clear potential for further cross border violence as well as the potential for a wider regional conflagration that embraces Damascus and Tehran remains as acute as ever.This book focuses on the historical background of the conflict, while also considering the role that other external actors, most notably Syria, Iran and the United Nations, play in influencing the conduct and outcomes of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. In addition, it also looks at Hizbollah’s increasing sway in Lebanese domestic politics, its increased military cooperation with Iran and Syria, and the implications of such developments. This book will be of much interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, War and Conflict Studies, International Security and International Relations in general. Clive Jones is Professor of Middle East Studies and International Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), University of Leeds, UK. His books include Soviet Jewish Aliyah 1989-92 (1996), Israel: Challenges to Democracy, Identity and the State (with Emma Murphy, 2002), and co-editor The al-Aqsa Intifada: Between Terrorism and Civil War (2005). Sergio Catignani is Lecturer in Security and Strategic Studies and MA Programme Director for the MA in Security and Strategic Studies at the Department of Politics, University of Sussex. He is the author of Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army (2008).

Political violence and instability in the Middle East is arguably the world's most important political issue. The region is certainly the globe's leading area for turmoil, war, and violence; and its conflicts have continuously involved Western countries both directly and indirectly. This book surveys the main conflicts and insurgencies in recent Middle East history, focusing mainly on the period since the 1980s. Taking a historical-analytical approach, it covers challenges from revolutionary groups, civil wars, and the main conventional wars in the region. In addition to providing detailed narratives, the contributors also analyse the lessons for political and military affairs stemming from these conflicts.Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East assembles for the first time detailed studies of the Iran-Iraq, Israel-Hizballah, and the two Coalition-Iraq wars, along with analyses of a number of insurgencies. Assessing successes and failures, strategy and tactics, and changes in military technologies, the book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, insurgencies, security studies and International Relations in general, as well as policymakers and military professionals.

This book analyzes the way Israel has coped with nine wars of attrition from the 1950s to the recent Second Lebanon War (2006), questioning the belief that Western democracy cannot sustain prolonged wars of attrition.Challenging Israel with attrition has been compatible with the 'Arab way of war', which emphasizes staying power, and with the belief that democracies cannot tolerate wars of attrition, either economically or psychologically. Israel for its part developed a self-image of incapacity to sustain prolonged wars, committing itself to a traditional offensive approach to blitzkrieg, whenever possible. The book offers an account of nine wars of attrition that Israel was involved in over almost 60 years, from Palestinian infiltration and fedayeen activities against Israel in the early 1950s, through to the Second Lebanon War in 2006. The author uses these cases to challenge the myth that Israel cannot afford to become involved in a draining war of attrition. Focusing on central aspects typical of Western democracies engaged in wars of attrition – operational effectiveness; the societal staying power; the economic burden of the war; moral dilemmas; and conflict management problems - the book challenges the myth that Israel cannot afford to become involved in a draining war of attrition, while at the same time highlighting the fact that in its wars of attrition Israel has not always succeeded in avoiding undesired escalation. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, Israeli history, Middle Eastern politics, and security studies in general. Avi Kober is a member of the Department of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University, Israel and is a Senior Research associate with the BESA Center for Strategic Studies.

This new book looks at the relationship between the Israeli armed forces, the government, and the origins of the 1967 War. Ami Gluska discusses the effect of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on Israel’s defense policy between 1963-1967 against the backdrop of the developments in the Middle East. In addition, he describes in detail the decision-making process leading to the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in June 1967 through the prism of the relations between the military and political echelons. He shows how the Six Day War was a watershed event in the Middle-Eastern conflict and had a profound effect on the development of the Palestinian problem and the character of the State of Israel over the past four decades. This book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, strategic studies, Israeli politics and military history in general.

This book provides the first comprehensive study of the evolution of the Iraqi military from the British mandate era to post-Baathist Iraq. Ethnic and sectarian turmoil is endemic to Iraq, and its armed forces have been intertwined with its political affairs since their creation. This study illustrates how the relationship between the military and the political centre in Iraq has evolved, with the military bringing about three regime changes in Iraq’s history before being brought under control by Saddam Hussein, up until the 2003 war. The instability that followed was partly due to the failure to create a new military that does not threaten the government, yet is still strong enough to deter rival factions from armed conflict. The reconstitution of the armed forces will be a prerequisite for an American withdrawal from Iraq, but this book argues that immense challenges lie ahead, despite the praise from the Bush administration for the progress of the new Iraqi army.

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) plays a key role in Israeli society, and has traditionally been perceived not only as the guardian of national survival, but also as a 'people's army' responsible for the custody of national values. This volume analyses the circumstances currently undermining these perceptions, and explores both the changes occurring in Israel’s military framework, and their potential implications.The book highlights the influence exerted by massive shifts in both Israel's external strategic landscape and in the country's domestic and cultural environments, which have compelled the IDF to undertake major programmes of structural reform, technological adaptation and doctrinal revision. This book argues that these changes have lead the public to subject the armed forces and their conduct to unprecedented critical scrutiny. The way in which Israelis and their army resolve these tensions is of crucial importance not only for Israel, but for the Middle East as a whole.

This volume analyzes the conduct of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) counter-insurgency operations during the two major Palestinian uprisings (1987-1993 and 2000-2005) in the Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It employs primary and secondary resources to produce a comprehensive analysis on whether or not the IDF has been able to adapt its conventional conduct of warfare to the realities of the Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict and achieve any sort of victory over the Palestinian insurgents. Sergio Catignani provides new insights into how conventional armies struggle with contemporary insurgency by looking in particular at the strategic, operational, tactical and ethical dilemmas of the IDF over the last two decades. By examining the way in which the IDF and the Israeli security doctrine were formed and developed over time, he explores the extent to which Israeli security assumptions, civil-military relations, the organizational culture, command and control structure, and conduct of the IDF have affected its adaptation to the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict. Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas will be of much interest to students of low-intensity conflict and counter-insurgency, the Israeli army, the Middle Eastern conflict and strategic studies in general.

Political violence and instability in the Middle East is arguably the world's most important political issue. The region is certainly the globe's leading area for turmoil, war, and violence; and its conflicts have continuously involved Western countries both directly and indirectly. This book surveys the main conflicts and insurgencies in recent Middle East history, focusing mainly on the period since the 1980s. Taking a historical-analytical approach, it covers challenges from revolutionary groups, civil wars, and the main conventional wars in the region. In addition to providing detailed narratives, the contributors also analyse the lessons for political and military affairs stemming from these conflicts.Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East assembles for the first time detailed studies of the Iran-Iraq, Israel-Hizballah, and the two Coalition-Iraq wars, along with analyses of a number of insurgencies. Assessing successes and failures, strategy and tactics, and changes in military technologies, the book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, insurgencies, security studies and International Relations in general, as well as policymakers and military professionals.

This book analyzes Palestinian attempts to create an organized military force from the period of the Mandate up to the present day.Beginning with a comparative overview of the relationship between insurgent movements and the quest to build up a standard military, the book looks, first, at how the 1936 revolt galvanized the Palestinian leadership to attempt to create a military. It then goes on to examines other major topics such as: the 1948 failure to create an organized armed force; Palestinian participation in other Arab armed forces; the creation of the PLA; attempts to develop a security apparatus after Oslo; and, finally, the question of security reform and peace-making. The book concludes by identifying the lessons from the Palestinian experience that can be applied in promoting healthy civil-military relations within political entities located in major conflict zones.

This book examines the local and international dynamics and strategies that have come to define the often violent relationship between Israel and Lebanon.Since the end of the Cold War, academic debate over the nature of war in the contemporary world has focused upon the asymmetric nature of conflict among a raft of failed or failing states, often held together by only a fragile notion of a shared communal destiny. Little scholarly attention has been paid, however, to one such conflict that predates the ending of the Cold War, yet still appears as intractable as ever: Israel’s hostile relationship with Lebanon and in particular, its standoff with the Lebanese Shi’a militia group, Hizbollah. As events surrounding the ‘Second Lebanon War’ in the summer of 2006 demonstrate, the clear potential for further cross border violence as well as the potential for a wider regional conflagration that embraces Damascus and Tehran remains as acute as ever.This book focuses on the historical background of the conflict, while also considering the role that other external actors, most notably Syria, Iran and the United Nations, play in influencing the conduct and outcomes of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. In addition, it also looks at Hizbollah’s increasing sway in Lebanese domestic politics, its increased military cooperation with Iran and Syria, and the implications of such developments. This book will be of much interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, War and Conflict Studies, International Security and International Relations in general. Clive Jones is Professor of Middle East Studies and International Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), University of Leeds, UK. His books include Soviet Jewish Aliyah 1989-92 (1996), Israel: Challenges to Democracy, Identity and the State (with Emma Murphy, 2002), and co-editor The al-Aqsa Intifada: Between Terrorism and Civil War (2005). Sergio Catignani is Lecturer in Security and Strategic Studies and MA Programme Director for the MA in Security and Strategic Studies at the Department of Politics, University of Sussex. He is the author of Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army (2008).