New Synthese Historical Library - Böcker

Among Anglo-American philosophers, interest in mysticism has typically been limited to the question of whether or not mystical and religious experi­ ences provide evidence for, or knowledge of, the existence and nature of God. Most authors conclude that they do not, because such experiences lack certain qualities needed in order to be counted as cognitive. In this study I examine some current philosophical opinions about mysticism and objec­ tions to its epistemic significance in the context of a detailed study of the writings of a single mystical author, the Spanish Carmelite Saint John of the Cross (1542-1591). I argue that from his works one can draw a coherent theory of what takes place in the Christian mystical life, and will indicate how acceptance of this theory might be defended as rational through a type of inference often referred to as the "Argument to the Best Explanation. " In this way I hope to show that mysticism still has a significant bearing on the justification of religious faith even if it cannot be used to "prove" the exis­ tence of God. The nature and advantages of my own somewhat unusual approach to mysticism can perhaps best be explained by contrasting it with the way other authors have dealt with the subject. One of the most striking develop­ ments in recent decades has been the growing fascination with mysticism, meditation, and the experiential aspects of religion.

The middle years of the nineteenth century saw two crucial develop­ ments in the history of modern logic: George Boole's algebraic treat­ ment of logic and Augustus De Morgan's formulation of the logic of relations. The former episode has been studied extensively; the latter, hardly at all. This is a pity, for the most central feature of modern logic may well be its ability to handle relational inferences. De Morgan was the first person to work out an extensive logic of relations, and the purpose of this book is to study this attempt in detail. Augustus De Morgan (1806-1871) was a British mathematician and logician who was Professor of Mathematics at the University of London (now, University College) from 1828 to 1866. A prolific but not highly original mathematician, De Morgan devoted much of his energies to the rather different field of logic. In his Formal Logic (1847) and a series of papers "On the Syllogism" (1846-1862), he attempted with great ingenuity to reformulate and extend the tradi­ tional syllogism and to systematize modes of reasoning that lie outside its boundaries. Chief among these is the logic of relations. De Mor­ gan's interest in relations culminated in his important memoir, "On the Syllogism: IV and on the Logic of Relations," read in 1860.

overall title and the commentary of Narboni, but in which the treatise is given a close association rath De Substantia Orbis VII, which immedi­ ately follows it in the text. This third version is the sole case in which a Hebrew translator can be named: the translation was made by Todros Todrosi in the year 1340. The only conclusion to be drawn from his translation is that Todrosi may definitively be eliminated as the translator of any of the other ver­ sions. However, we may be able to draw a tentative conclusion as to the formation of the Hebrew collection. The earliest evidence for the existence of the nine treatise collec­ tion is the commentary of Narboni, completed in 1349. The fact that nine years earlier one treatise could be attached to a work outside the corpus may indicate that the Hebrew collection of nine treatises was formed during those nine years, or mar even indicate that Narboni him­ self collected the various treatises. 5 Narboni, however, was not the translator of these works In fact, no 1 definitive indication of the translator's identity exists. 6 3. The Nature of the Question-Form Steinschneider offered the following general characterization of Aver­ roes' Quaestiones: These are mostly brief discussions, more or less answers to questions; they may be partially occasioned by topics i9 his commentaries and may be considered as appendices to them.

Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides, 1288-1344), medieval Jewry's boldest philosopher and scientist, emerges from this study as an impressive figure in the history of logic. Profoundly disturbed by the many "mistakes" he found in Averroes' paraphrase of the "Prior Analytics", the yound Gersonides wrote "The Book of the Correct Syllogism" to place syllogistic on a sure footing. Neither commentary nor compendium, the work differs from Aristotle's theory in approach and in scope. Of special interest is Gersonides' treatment of the modal syllogism and his spirited defence of the fourth syllogistic figure. "The Logic of Gersonides" includes an introductory essay analyzing Gersonides' logical writings, a translation based on the author's critical edition of the "Correct Syllogism", and an extensive analytical commentary and glossary.

Berkeley's philosophy has been much studied and discussed over the years, and a growing number of scholars have come to the realization that scientific and mathematical writings are an essential part of his philosophical enterprise. The aim of this volume is to present Berkeley's two most important scientific texts in a form which meets contemporary standards of scholarship while rendering them accessible to the modern reader. Although editions of both are contained in the fourth volume of the Works, these lack adequate introductions and do not provide com­ plete and corrected texts. The present edition contains a complete and critically established text of both De Motu and The Analyst, in addi­ tion to a new translation of De Motu. The introductions and notes are designed to provide the background necessary for a full understanding of Berkeley's account of science and mathematics. Although these two texts are very different, they are united by a shared a concern with the work of Newton and Leibniz. Berkeley's De Motu deals extensively with Newton's Principia and Leibniz's Specimen Dynamicum, while The Analyst critiques both Leibnizian and Newto­ nian mathematics. Berkeley is commonly thought of as a successor to Locke or Malebranche, but as these works show he is also a successor to Newton and Leibniz.

This study provides an English translation of "Lectura" I 39, a key text of the medieval theologian and philosopher John Duns Scotus (1266-1308), together with an introduction and a commentary. In the history of thought, Scotus is the first scholar to develop a consistent analysis of the basic Christian notions of "contingency" and "freedom". This analysis can be found in his important early work, "Lectura" I 39, in which the question of whether God has knowledge of future contingents is discussed. Reality is contingent, which means that reality in its factual shape could have been otherwise; God does not rule by determinism nor is He ruled by it - nor is man, neither is their relationship. This fundamental insight made Christian thought turn away from the ancient conception that everything is (at bottom) necessary. This text is suitable for graduate students, philosophers and theologians.

This work surveys the major interpretations, ancient, medieval and modern, of Aristotle's "modal syllogistic". It presents a framework within which these competing interpretations are compared and evaluated. A new interpretation is developed, which agrees in large measure with Aristotle's text, including his theses, methods of proof, and use of examples. This interpretation reads Aristotle's modal sentences "de re", and attaches considerable importance to his use of ecthesis and counter-examples. It features a formal semantic analysis that makes no reference to possible worlds, and it articulates the links, both theoretical and genetic, between the modal syllogistic and Aristotle's essentialist metaphysics.

In the "Critique of Judgment", Kant argues that feeling is part of the system of the mind. Judgements of taste based on feeling are a unique kind of judgement, and the feeling that is their foundation forms an independent third power of the mind. Feeling has a special role within this system in that it also provides a transition between the other two powers of the mind, cognition and desire. The author of this text argues that feeling, our experience of beauty, provides a transition because it orients humans in a sensible world. Judgments of taste help overcome the difficulties that arise when rational cognitive and moral ends must be pursued in a sensible world. She demonstrates how feeling, disassociated from rational activities in Kant's earlier works, is now central in reaching rational ends and understanding humans as unified rational beings.

This text is a history of one of the oldest problems in the philosophy of space and time: How is the change from one state to its opposite to be described? Authors treated in this book range from Plato, Aristotle, medieval logicians, Kant, Brentano and Russell to contemporary authors, taking into account such theories as interval semantics and paraconsistent logic. The texts are analyzed under two main aspects: Which, if any of the opposite states does the moment of change belong to? And does it contain an instantaneous event? In the last part a new way of treating the moment of change is developed, which leads to a solution to Zeno's Flying Arrow Paradox. The book should be of interest to advanced students and scholars of analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy.

Discussions about the nature of the emotions in Hellenistic philosophy have aroused intense scholarly interest over the last few years. The topics covered by the essays in this volume range from the classical background of Hellenistic theories, through debates on emotion in the major Hellenistic schools, to discussions in later antiquity. Special emphasis is placed on the development of the Stoic views on the nature and value of the emotions. The essays are written with a high level of philosophical and classical scholarship, but contain no exclusive technicalities. This treatment of the emotions in Hellenistic philosophy is aimed at both professionals in ancient philosophy and also all those who are interested in the philosophy of mind and its history.

The 11 essays collected here have been composed by members of the North American Spinoza Society. They exhibit the fruits of the research, investigation and erudition of an array of established scholars and newer students whose interpretations of Spinoza's philosophical doctrines are receiving critical acclaim. This collection is dedicated exclusively to topics, problems or questions raised by the teachings found in Baruch Spinoza's "Tractatus theologico-politicus". Divided into the themes of piety, peace, and the freedom to philosophize, the essays treat Spinoza's views on faith and philosophy, miracles, the light of Scripture, political power, religion, the state, the body politic, the idea of tolerance, and philosophic communication, as well as his connections to Walter Benjamin, Blaise Pascal, David Hume, and his Jewish heritage.

Until the 1970s, most sociologists believed that only knowledge in the humanities and social sciences is open to sociological analysis. This is no longer the case: a large number of studies have shown that the knowledge of science and technology also has the character of social institutions. The success of sociologists in understanding the social dimensions of science and technology has led to a relative decline of sociological studies of the humanities in general, philosophy in particular. This anthology seeks to correct that neglect. The authors seek to show that contextual and sociological sensitivity is crucial to an understanding of the very content of philosophical positions and controversies, and for recapturing the contingency in the history of philosophy.

Central topics in medieval logic are here treated in a way that is congenial to the modern reader, without compromising historical reliability, rendering the achievements of medieval logic available to a broad philosophical public. The three genres of logica moderna arising in a later Middle Ages are covered: obligations, insolubles and consequences. The articles on obligations look at the role of logical consistence in medieval disputation techniques. Those on insolubles concentrate on medieval solutions to the Liar Paradox. There is also a systematic account of how medieval authors described the logical content of an inference, and how they thought that the validity of an inference could be guaranteed.

Is Aquinas's "Sententia libri Ethicorum" an interpretation of Aristotle based on "principles of Christian ethics"? Or do we see in the work a presentation of the foundation of Aquinas's moral philosophy? The author answers these questions by examining the historical context within which the "Sententia" was composed. Chapters 1 and 2 establish the work's role as a corrective to earlier commentaries. Chapter 3 examines philosophy at Paris between 1215 and 1283 and so reveals that Aquinas's proposal of a moral philosophy would have been unexceptional. Chapter 4's investigation of the principles underlying the moral theory of the "Sententia" makes it apparent that Aquinas regarded them as both philosophical and Aristotelian. The date to be assigned to the composition of the "Sententia" is studied in Chapter 5, with the conclusion that the work is quite probably the author's final proposal of moral doctrines. The closing chapter summarizes that moral philosophy against the historical background earlier adduced.

Abelard was one of the foremost protagonists of the "12th-century Renaissance". He followed Boethius, resuming the activity of commenting on Aristotle's works. This book focuses on the logical-grammatical analysis of natural language, which for Abelard is a fragment of "scientific Latin". Tools of modern categorial grammar are employed to clarify many of the problems raised by historiography (such as meaning, abstract entities and universals). The volume highlights the radical interplay between the traditions of Aristotle's and Priscian's commentators and, in this context, Abelard's peculiar role in exploring a new field of linguistic inquiry. An ample analysis of grammatical sources and critical literature allows to evaluate the progress which is at the basis of the forthcoming terministic logic. The book is aimed at scholars of medieval philosophy as well as historians of logic and linguistics.

This text develops an interpretation of Aristotle's "Metaphysics". By exploring the significance of the long ignored distinction between being with regard to categories and being with regard to potentiality and actuality, the author presents Aristotle's science of being as having two distinct aspects: an investigation of the basic constituents of reality in terms of categories, predication, and definition, and an investigation which deals with change, process, and order of the world. The author argues that corresponding to the distinction between these two kinds of being, the central books of the Metaphysics contain not one, but two theories of substance, depending on whether the matter/form relation is associated with the potentiality/actuality relation. Together, these two studies of being and substance provide a complete picture of the Aristotle's world as both a static and a dynamic reality.

The 13 articles brought together in this volume explore key aspects of the transmission of learning and the transformation of thought from the late Middle Ages to the early modern period. Focusing on important topics in early modern metaphysics, philosophical theology, and modal theory, the contributions gathered here view developments in the early modern period against the backdrop of late-medieval scholasticism. This approach not only reveals the continuity of Western intellectual life in a period of profound change, but also makes it possible to identify with precision what is original in early modern thought. The topics dealt with include metaphysics as a science, the rise of probabilistic modality, freedom of the human will, as well as the role and validity of logical reasoning in speculative theology. The volume should be of interest to scholars who work on medieval and early modern philosophy, theology and intellectual history.

This book gives a clear and thorough description of three fascinating linguistic projects that were carried out in the seventeenth century: the philosophical languages of George Dalgarno (1661) and John Wilkins (1668), as well as the work of Leibniz in this area. These projects combined practical purposes, such as improving communication, with profound theoretical insights concerning the representation of knowledge and the nature of language. Rich in detail, this book provides all the material for a proper understanding of the workings of these schemes, while illuminating the intellectual context in which they took shape. It will be welcomed by anyone interested in the history of linguistics and philosophy of language.This book: - offers in-depth analysis of the two most sophisticated universal language schemes created in the seventeenth century: the philosophical languages of Dalgarno and Wilkins, supplementing existing literature in focusing on the internal details of the languages, highlights and documents the controversy between Dalgarno and Wilkins, largely ignored in most other books on the subject, showing that their schemes resulted from different, and in various respects antagonistic approaches, presents a careful account of Leibniz's plans for a philosophical language, and illustrates, in discussing his philosophy of language, how his thought was formed in constant interaction with contemporaries, discusses at greater length than usual the extensive work Leibniz did in carrying out his plans, and shows to what extent he was indebted to Dalgarno and Wilkins, emphasizes the importance of the logical tradition for the structure of artificial languages constructed in the seventeenth century, and clarifies the role played by dominant views of the relation between spoken and written language, maintains a fine balance between historical research and argument, presenting what was said as accurately as possible and placing it within its proper context, but also attempting to evaluate the views described, is of interest to linguists, philosophers and historians of ideas.

Feminist work in the history of philosophy has come of age as an innovative field in the history of philosophy. This volume marks that accomplishment with original essays by leading feminist scholars who ask basic questions: What is distinctive of feminist work in the history of philosophy? Is there a method that is distinctive of feminist historical work? How can women philosophers be meaningfully included in the history of the discipline? Who counts as a philosopher? This collection is a unique collaboration among philosophers from North America and the Nordic Countries, including papers written from both analytic and continental philosophical perspectives and discussing both ancient and modern philosophers. Feminist Reflections on the History of Philosophy will be of interest to historians of philosophy, feminist theorists, women's studies faculty and students, and humanists interested in canon formation and transformation.

This study explores the theoretical relationship between Aristotle’s theory of syllogism and his conception of demonstrative knowledge. More specifically, I consider why Aristotle’s theory of demonstration presupposes his theory of syllogism. In reconsidering the relationship between Aristotle’s two Analytics, I modify this widely discussed question. The problem of the relationship between Aristotle’s logic and his theory of proof is commonly approached from the standpoint of whether the theory of demonstration presupposes the theory of syllogism. By contrast, I assume the theoretical relationship between these two theories from the start. This assumption is based on much explicit textual evidence indicating that Aristotle considers the theory of demonstration a branch of the theory of syllogism. I see no textual reasons for doubting the theoretical relationship between Aristotle’s two Analytics so I attempt to uncover here the common theoretical assumptions that relate the syllogistic form of reasoning to the cognitive state (i. e. , knowledge), which is attained through syllogistic inferences. This modification of the traditional approach reflects the wider objective of this essay. Unlike the traditional interpretation, which views the Posterior Analytics in light of scientific practice, this study aims to lay the foundation for a comprehensive interpretation of the Posterior Analytics, considering this work from a metaphysical perspective. One of my major assertions is that Aristotle’s conception of substance is essential for a grasp of his theory of demonstration in general, and of the role of syllogistic logic in particular.

Over the past twenty years the transition from the late Middle Ages to the early modern era has received increasing attention from experts in the history of philosophy. In part, this new interest arises from claims, made in literature aimed at a less specialist readership, that this transition was responsible for the subsequent philosophical and theological problems of the Enlightenment. Philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre and theologians like John Milbank display a certain nostalgia for the medieval synthesis of Thomas Aquinas and, consequently, evaluate the period from 1300 to 1700 in rather negative terms. Other historians of philosophy writing for the general public, such as Charles Taylor, take a more positive view of the Reformation but nevertheless conclude that modernity has been shaped by 1 conflicts which stem from early modern times. Ethics and moral thought occupy a central place in these theories. It is assumed that we have lost something – the concept of virtue, for instance, or the source of common morality. Yet those who put forward such notions do not treat the history of ethics in detail. From the historian’s perspective, their far-reaching theoretical assumptions are based on a quite small body of textual evidence. In reality, there was a rich variety of approaches to moral thinking and ethical theories during the period from 1400 to 1600.

In the present book, Pauline Phemister argues against traditional Anglo-American interpretations of Leibniz as an idealist who conceives ultimate reality as a plurality of mind-like immaterial beings and for whom physical bodies are ultimately unreal and our perceptions of them illusory. Re-reading the texts without the prior assumption of idealism allows the more material aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics to emerge. Leibniz is found to advance a synthesis of idealism and materialism. His ontology posits indivisible, living, animal-like corporeal substances as the real metaphysical constituents of the universe; his epistemology combines sense-experience and reason; and his ethics fuses confused perceptions and insensible appetites with distinct perceptions and rational choice. In the light of his sustained commitment to the reality of bodies, Phemister re-examines his dynamics, the doctrine of pre-established harmony and his views on freedom. The image of Leibniz as a rationalist philosopher who values activity and reason over passivity and sense-experience is replaced by the one of a philosopher who recognises that, in the created world, there can only be activity if there is also passivity; minds, souls and forms if there is also matter; good if there is evil; perfection if there is imperfection.

Rights language is a fundamental feature of the modern world. Virtually all significant social and political struggles are waged, and have been waged for over a century now, in terms of rights claims. In some ways, it is precisely the birth of modern rights language that ushers in modernity in terms of moral and political thought, and the struggle for a modern way of life seems for many synonymous with the fight for a universal recognition of equal, individual human rights. Where did modern rights language come from? What kinds of rights discourses is it rooted in? What is the specific nature of modern rights discourse; when and where were medieval and ancient notions of rights transformed into it? Can one in fact find any single such transformation of medieval into modern rights discourse?This book brings together some of the most central scholars in the history of medieval and early-modern rights discourse. Through the different angles taken by its authors, the volume brings to light the multifaceted nature of rights languages in the medieval and early modern world.

Leibniz is known to the wide public and to many scholars mainly as a logician and mathematician, and as the creator of a fascinating but strange metaphysical system. In these, as well as in other fields, his remarkable innovations were achieved by painstaking efforts to establish a fruitful critical dialogue with the leading contemporary thinkers. He was no less important, however, in his practical endeavor to bring opponents to negotiate reasonable solutions to key political and religious conflicts of his time.Both his theoretical and practical activities were informed by a philosophical mind that sought in all circumstances the most general underlying principles; by a juridical mind that sought to bring order and structure to human interaction, without sacrificing the necessary flexibility; by an argumentative mind that knows that persuading is often more important than proving; by a scientific mind eager to organize past and present knowledge so as not to miss any bit of information capable of pointing the way to new discoveries; by a theologian mind that refuses to admit that religious conflicts between true believers are irresolvable; and by an ethical and political mind whose major concern is to direct all our intellectual work towards improving the well-being of humankind.

These essays comprise a first attempt to assess overall the attention awarded to Leibniz’s philosophy in the English-speaking world in his own time and up to the present day. In addition to an introductory overview there are fourteen original and previously unpublished essays considering Leibniz’s connections with his English-speaking contemporaries and near contemporaries as well as the later reception of his thought in Anglo-American philosophy. Some of the papers shed new light on familiar topics, including the influence of Hobbes on Leibniz, his relations with Locke and the well-publicised controversy with Samuel Clarke. Others chart less familiar territory, including Leibniz’s connections with Boyle and Berkeley, Wilkins and Dalgarno. And others still break new ground in considering Leibniz’s connections with John Wallis and Margaret Cavendish. There are four concluding papers on the later reception of Leibniz’s philosophy in the English-speaking world, including two on Bertrand Russell and Leibniz, and two on the reception of Leibniz by American philosophers, Peirce and Loemker.

Leibniz’s notion of possibility is one of his most significant contributions to philosophy as well as one of the cornerstones of his metaphysics. This work attempts to bring out the intrinsic subtlety of Leibniz’s approach to possibility and to explore some of its important repercussions in his metaphysics. This project involves an examination of some of the most difficult questions in Leibniz‘s metaphysics from this vantage point. The book consists of three parts, the first focusing on Leibniz’s notion of possibility, the second on his notion of agency, and the third on his notion of individuality. Leibniz’s preoccupation with the notions of possibility, agency and individuality is evident in his early writings as well as in his later ones. His combinatorial insights regarding the notion of possibility as a model for creating the world, his commitment to the traditional doctrine that activity constitutes being, and his view that individuals are the only true beings are among the formative and persisting tenets of his metaphysics. This work explores these tenets in some detail and seeks to highlight the connections between them. The first part of the book presents Leibniz’s approach to possibility by exposing his early presuppositions about the status and nature of possibilities (chapter 1); his notion of possible individuals (chapter 2); and his notion of possible worlds as constituted by the relations among possible individuals (chapters 3 and 4). The second part discusses the transition from possibility to actuality through the notion of agency.

This volume serves as an introduction to a rich and as yet under-explored period in the history of women's ideas. The volume provides a partial insight into the richness and complexity of women's political ideas in the centuries prior to the French Revolution. The essays in this collection examine women's political writings with particular reference to the themes of virtue (especially the virtue of phronesis or prudence), liberty, and toleration.

He was no less important, however, in his practical endeavor to bring opponents to negotiate reasonable solutions to key political and religious conflicts of his time.Both his theoretical and practical activities were informed by a philosophical mind that sought in all circumstances the most general underlying principles;

Pauliina Remes and Juha Sihvola In the course of history, philosophers have given an impressive variety of answers to the question, “What is self?” Some of them have even argued that there is no such thing at all. This volume explores the various ways in which selfhood was approached and conceptualised in antiquity. How did the ancients understand what it is that I am, fundamentally, as an acting and affected subject, interpreting the world around me, being distinct from others like and unlike me? The authors hi- light the attempts in ancient philosophical sources to grasp the evasive character of the specifically human presence in the world. They also describe how the ancient philosophers understood human agents as capable of causing changes and being affected in and by the world. Attention will be paid to the various ways in which the ancients conceived of human beings as subjects of reasoning and action, as well as responsible individuals in the moral sphere and in their relations to other people. The themes of persistence, identity, self-examination and self-improvement recur in many of these essays. The articles of the collection combine systematic and historical approaches to ancient sources that range from Socrates to Plotinus and Augustine.