Routledge Library Editions: Security and Society – serie

This 12-volume set contains titles, originally published between 1934 and 1995. An eclectic mix of titles, this collection draws from anthropology, economics, ethics, politics, psychology and sociology. Exploring security in both war and peacetime it includes volumes looking at: the causes of war and its effect on society as a whole; the soldiers themselves and their place in society; the portrayal of war in the press, both in words and photographs and the politics behind them.

‘The Duke is a soldier – a bad education for a statesmen in a free country’. Sir Walter Scott’s fear of the political soldier has long been part of Western political life. Yet although many countries would have preferred to keep the military out of politics few have been successful.Originally published in 1976, this book examines the careers of five distinguished twentieth century soldiers and assesses their contribution as statesmen. Hindenburg, Byng, Franco, Eisenhower and De Gaulle all came into political life in different circumstances, but none did so in the name of the profession or to establish a praetorian state. Each was a professional soldier who found himself drawn into the political arena. Each of these essays illuminates one aspect of the range of political, sociological and historical issues which now surround the interrelationship of civil and military. At a time when the tensions of democracy, both internally and externally, impose increasing pressure on the role of the military in society it is important to study the history of soldiers-as-statesmen.

‘The Duke is a soldier – a bad education for a statesmen in a free country’. Sir Walter Scott’s fear of the political soldier has long been part of Western political life. Yet although many countries would have preferred to keep the military out of politics few have been successful.Originally published in 1976, this book examines the careers of five distinguished twentieth century soldiers and assesses their contribution as statesmen. Hindenburg, Byng, Franco, Eisenhower and De Gaulle all came into political life in different circumstances, but none did so in the name of the profession or to establish a praetorian state. Each was a professional soldier who found himself drawn into the political arena. Each of these essays illuminates one aspect of the range of political, sociological and historical issues which now surround the interrelationship of civil and military. At a time when the tensions of democracy, both internally and externally, impose increasing pressure on the role of the military in society it is important to study the history of soldiers-as-statesmen.

What are the influences on war correspondents as they report on news in war-torn countries? Originally published in 1995, Mark Pedelty explores the lives, work and culture of an international press corps. He writes about the reporters who covered El Salvador’s civil war. Going beyond those specifics to look at the institutions, practices, myths, and rituals that pattern the work of journalists everywhere. He tells us the stories of war correspondents at work and at play, as they cover the news.The myth, developed in part from the movies we watch and from CNN, is that war is reported from the front lines. More often, it is reported from the front office as journalists sit around waiting for something "big" to happen. Pedelty looks at the context in which they construct their reports. "Unnamed" diplomats in the US Embassy feed stories to reporters, who are careful not to alienate these crucial sources by adding background information that might be perceived as ideological. Reporters are also constrained by the pens and preferences of editors who work to narrow the focus of news reporting, removing necessary context in the process. By examining how news stories are actually produced, Pedelty highlights the elusiveness of the goal of "objective" journalism. We see how the biases of war correspondents are connected to structures of power, and how these biases affect actual journalistic practices.Pedelty also explores alternative possibilities for war reporting, including emerging alternative international news services and ways to deepen reporters’ understandings of the countries and problems they cover. Influenced by anthropology, communication studies, cultural studies, and sociology, this book will interest scholars and students in those fields, as well as journalists and anyone who watches, reads or listens to news.

What are the influences on war correspondents as they report on news in war-torn countries? Originally published in 1995, Mark Pedelty explores the lives, work and culture of an international press corps. He writes about the reporters who covered El Salvador’s civil war. Going beyond those specifics to look at the institutions, practices, myths, and rituals that pattern the work of journalists everywhere. He tells us the stories of war correspondents at work and at play, as they cover the news.The myth, developed in part from the movies we watch and from CNN, is that war is reported from the front lines. More often, it is reported from the front office as journalists sit around waiting for something "big" to happen. Pedelty looks at the context in which they construct their reports. "Unnamed" diplomats in the US Embassy feed stories to reporters, who are careful not to alienate these crucial sources by adding background information that might be perceived as ideological. Reporters are also constrained by the pens and preferences of editors who work to narrow the focus of news reporting, removing necessary context in the process. By examining how news stories are actually produced, Pedelty highlights the elusiveness of the goal of "objective" journalism. We see how the biases of war correspondents are connected to structures of power, and how these biases affect actual journalistic practices.Pedelty also explores alternative possibilities for war reporting, including emerging alternative international news services and ways to deepen reporters’ understandings of the countries and problems they cover. Influenced by anthropology, communication studies, cultural studies, and sociology, this book will interest scholars and students in those fields, as well as journalists and anyone who watches, reads or listens to news.

Is there a place left in international politics for the real use of violence as an instrument of policy in the nuclear age? Originally published in 1981, Dr Atkinson attempts to answer this question with new considerations in the presentation of a general theory of strategy. He argues that the classical theory of strategy, so influential for the 19th century and for the better half of the 20th century, was built on a mainly hidden structure of reasoning that still infests theory today. The larger and socially-rooted lessons that insurgent warfare can inform, as best exemplified in the primary sources of the Chinese Civil War period, reveal in a new light this hidden structure of which Clausewitz is the earliest and most eloquent example. By this analysis of the insurgent and classical paradigm opposites the author intends to strip away the blinds of convention still circulating in theory today so that observers and students of international politics may see where new forms of politically motivated violence in the nuclear age seem more than ever to be headed.Here we have perfect paradigm opposites. In the conventional world battle-field action and ideally 'decisive battle' is the center of all other issues in which such conventional logic in the end sweeps up everything else and runs it back through the logic into success or failure of armed power on the battle-field. Everything hangs on this. In the 'revisionist' insurgent world where social order is weaponized as an object and source of military power through its inherent and valuable (armed) power structures social order replaces narrow battle-field action (ideally focused on 'decisive battle') and alternatively redirects the entire logic and all other considerations, including previously heroic conventional military assets, are remodeled to act against (armed) enemy power structures inherent (as always) in social order for the ultimate object of military victory. Again, everything is on this alone. Which paradigm - one the opposite mirror image of the other - will prevail will depend on the stability and power of the nation state and its institutions, the continued and unhappy collapse on which I base the General Theory.

Is there a place left in international politics for the real use of violence as an instrument of policy in the nuclear age? Originally published in 1981, Dr Atkinson attempts to answer this question with new considerations in the presentation of a general theory of strategy. He argues that the classical theory of strategy, so influential for the 19th century and for the better half of the 20th century, was built on a mainly hidden structure of reasoning that still infests theory today. The larger and socially-rooted lessons that insurgent warfare can inform, as best exemplified in the primary sources of the Chinese Civil War period, reveal in a new light this hidden structure of which Clausewitz is the earliest and most eloquent example. By this analysis of the insurgent and classical paradigm opposites the author intends to strip away the blinds of convention still circulating in theory today so that observers and students of international politics may see where new forms of politically motivated violence in the nuclear age seem more than ever to be headed.Here we have perfect paradigm opposites. In the conventional world battle-field action and ideally 'decisive battle' is the center of all other issues in which such conventional logic in the end sweeps up everything else and runs it back through the logic into success or failure of armed power on the battle-field. Everything hangs on this. In the 'revisionist' insurgent world where social order is weaponized as an object and source of military power through its inherent and valuable (armed) power structures social order replaces narrow battle-field action (ideally focused on 'decisive battle') and alternatively redirects the entire logic and all other considerations, including previously heroic conventional military assets, are remodeled to act against (armed) enemy power structures inherent (as always) in social order for the ultimate object of military victory. Again, everything is on this alone. Which paradigm - one the opposite mirror image of the other - will prevail will depend on the stability and power of the nation state and its institutions, the continued and unhappy collapse on which I base the General Theory.

Many people believe that the violent and disruptive nature of war makes a military ethic impossible. The authors of this book, originally published in 1986 however, develop an ethical system that aims to control the military monster at least to some degree, rather than one that preaches to it idealistically – with little or no effect. Military ethics, they believe, must be an ethics for peacetime as well as an ethics for war, an ethics for soldiers in the field as well as an ethics for political leaders, and their book is designed to meet these needs. It presents a practical, utilitarian approach: an ethics of what is possible rather than what is ideal, drawing on real military experience and different from any other work previously published.The authors argue that both the pacifists, who claim that the horrible and ungovernable nature of war makes it morally wrong, and the realists, who believe that wars must be fought, but fought without moral scruple, are mistaken. They show that careful attention to the actual circumstances in which individual combatants function and the social institutions shaping their action allows genuine moral constraint.With its emphasis on real problems, Military Ethics will be of practical help to policy makers and military personnel at all levels, as well as being of great interest to students of applied philosophy and ethics.

Many people believe that the violent and disruptive nature of war makes a military ethic impossible. The authors of this book, originally published in 1986 however, develop an ethical system that aims to control the military monster at least to some degree, rather than one that preaches to it idealistically – with little or no effect. Military ethics, they believe, must be an ethics for peacetime as well as an ethics for war, an ethics for soldiers in the field as well as an ethics for political leaders, and their book is designed to meet these needs. It presents a practical, utilitarian approach: an ethics of what is possible rather than what is ideal, drawing on real military experience and different from any other work previously published.The authors argue that both the pacifists, who claim that the horrible and ungovernable nature of war makes it morally wrong, and the realists, who believe that wars must be fought, but fought without moral scruple, are mistaken. They show that careful attention to the actual circumstances in which individual combatants function and the social institutions shaping their action allows genuine moral constraint.With its emphasis on real problems, Military Ethics will be of practical help to policy makers and military personnel at all levels, as well as being of great interest to students of applied philosophy and ethics.

Why do nations go to war? Is war an institutionalized outlet for our aggressive instincts? Or is it a cultural invention rather than a biological necessity?Originally published in 1990, Eric Carlton, looking across a number of societies investigates why men and women go to war, and how they are able to commit atrocities against their enemy. He believes that central to these issues is the perception of the enemy and the ways in which this is ‘converted’ – consciously or unconsciously – into an ideology of aggression. Military training and ideology are based upon the definition of the enemy as ‘the other’, and studies in the text reveal the importance of the stereotyped image of the enemy when soldiers carry out atrocities.Dr Carlton explores the underlying problem of how and why societies resort to war, by analysing the motivations, usually religious and ideological, which legitimize warlike policies and activities. Fascinating case studies consider the ways in which the enemy has been seen in various historical and comparative contexts: for instance, to ancient Egyptians the enemy were non-people, to Romans uncouth barbarians, to Maoists class antagonists. These studies underline the fact that perceptions of the adversary determine the nature of warfare more than any other single factor.The book is unique in its discussion of the idea of the enemy in warfare and military ideology, and in its use of an historical method to comment on situations which are still relevant to the modern world. Its historical and comparative perspective, and its extensive case studies, make it of great value and interest to students of history, sociology, and politics, as well as to those engaged in war studies.

Why do nations go to war? Is war an institutionalized outlet for our aggressive instincts? Or is it a cultural invention rather than a biological necessity?Originally published in 1990, Eric Carlton, looking across a number of societies investigates why men and women go to war, and how they are able to commit atrocities against their enemy. He believes that central to these issues is the perception of the enemy and the ways in which this is ‘converted’ – consciously or unconsciously – into an ideology of aggression. Military training and ideology are based upon the definition of the enemy as ‘the other’, and studies in the text reveal the importance of the stereotyped image of the enemy when soldiers carry out atrocities.Dr Carlton explores the underlying problem of how and why societies resort to war, by analysing the motivations, usually religious and ideological, which legitimize warlike policies and activities. Fascinating case studies consider the ways in which the enemy has been seen in various historical and comparative contexts: for instance, to ancient Egyptians the enemy were non-people, to Romans uncouth barbarians, to Maoists class antagonists. These studies underline the fact that perceptions of the adversary determine the nature of warfare more than any other single factor.The book is unique in its discussion of the idea of the enemy in warfare and military ideology, and in its use of an historical method to comment on situations which are still relevant to the modern world. Its historical and comparative perspective, and its extensive case studies, make it of great value and interest to students of history, sociology, and politics, as well as to those engaged in war studies.

Originally published in 1994, the late Keith F. Otterbein’s scholarship had followed an overall design since 1962, when he began conducting comparative studies of warfare using both ethnographic and cross-cultural methods. Through a conceptual framework derived from systems theory, he made signal contributions to our understanding of the role of warfare in human social evolution. He formulated a Fraternal Interest Group theory, utilizing it to explain not only feuding and warfare but also rape and capital punishment. Believing that armed combat is learned behaviour, he posed questions about its learning process that had yet to be answered. He acted as a major synthesizer of the growing literature on warfare and led attempts among anthropologists to apply their knowledge of war and peace to current events. This volume will serve both as a useful introduction to the anthropology of war and as a needed compendium of Professor Otterbein’s ideas.

Originally published in 1994, the late Keith F. Otterbein’s scholarship had followed an overall design since 1962, when he began conducting comparative studies of warfare using both ethnographic and cross-cultural methods. Through a conceptual framework derived from systems theory, he made signal contributions to our understanding of the role of warfare in human social evolution. He formulated a Fraternal Interest Group theory, utilizing it to explain not only feuding and warfare but also rape and capital punishment. Believing that armed combat is learned behaviour, he posed questions about its learning process that had yet to be answered. He acted as a major synthesizer of the growing literature on warfare and led attempts among anthropologists to apply their knowledge of war and peace to current events. This volume will serve both as a useful introduction to the anthropology of war and as a needed compendium of Professor Otterbein’s ideas.

Why do reasonable people lead their nations into the tremendously destructive traps of international conflict? Why do nations then deepen their involvement and make it harder to escape from these traps? In Paradoxes of War, originally published in 1990, Zeev Maoz addresses these and other paradoxical questions about the war process. Using a unique approach to the study of war, he demonstrates that wars may often break out because states wish to prevent them, and continue despite the desperate efforts of the combatants to end them.Paradoxes of War is organized around the various stages of war. The first part discusses the causes of war, the second the management of war, and the third the short- and long-term implications of war. In each chapter Maoz explores a different paradox as a contradiction between reasonable expectations and the outcomes of motivated behaviour based on those expectations. He documents these paradoxes in twentieth century wars, including the Korean War, the Six Day War, and the Vietnam War. Maoz then invokes cognitive and rational choice theories to explain why these paradoxes arise. Paradoxes of War is essential reading for students and scholars of international politics, war and peace studies, international relations theory, and political science in general.

Why do reasonable people lead their nations into the tremendously destructive traps of international conflict? Why do nations then deepen their involvement and make it harder to escape from these traps? In Paradoxes of War, originally published in 1990, Zeev Maoz addresses these and other paradoxical questions about the war process. Using a unique approach to the study of war, he demonstrates that wars may often break out because states wish to prevent them, and continue despite the desperate efforts of the combatants to end them.Paradoxes of War is organized around the various stages of war. The first part discusses the causes of war, the second the management of war, and the third the short- and long-term implications of war. In each chapter Maoz explores a different paradox as a contradiction between reasonable expectations and the outcomes of motivated behaviour based on those expectations. He documents these paradoxes in twentieth century wars, including the Korean War, the Six Day War, and the Vietnam War. Maoz then invokes cognitive and rational choice theories to explain why these paradoxes arise. Paradoxes of War is essential reading for students and scholars of international politics, war and peace studies, international relations theory, and political science in general.

What makes news patriotic? How is photojournalism used in wartime?In a national crisis, the press operates under various forms of censorship. Within these constraints, it continues to produce news in line with what is considered newsworthy. Everyday ‘human interest’ photographs and stories, which tell of bizarre, comic or tragic events, are turned to patriotic ends. The subject of death is transformed by its use in saving the nation; it is accompanied and displaced by more comforting ideas. Originally published in 1991, with the help of full-page illustrations from newspapers and journals, John Taylor looks at the special truth of war news, how it is built on established ways of storytelling, and how photography is used to make it seem real. Taking examples from the First and Second World Wars, the Falklands campaign and present-day accounts of terrorism and crime within the United Kingdom, Taylor shows that aside from legal controls, the press’s own methods bring it close to the official perspective.Drawing on history, sociology and photo-history, War Photography is a well-illustrated account of the place of photojournalism in the news industry and the use of news in creating national identity.

What makes news patriotic? How is photojournalism used in wartime?In a national crisis, the press operates under various forms of censorship. Within these constraints, it continues to produce news in line with what is considered newsworthy. Everyday ‘human interest’ photographs and stories, which tell of bizarre, comic or tragic events, are turned to patriotic ends. The subject of death is transformed by its use in saving the nation; it is accompanied and displaced by more comforting ideas. Originally published in 1991, with the help of full-page illustrations from newspapers and journals, John Taylor looks at the special truth of war news, how it is built on established ways of storytelling, and how photography is used to make it seem real. Taking examples from the First and Second World Wars, the Falklands campaign and present-day accounts of terrorism and crime within the United Kingdom, Taylor shows that aside from legal controls, the press’s own methods bring it close to the official perspective.Drawing on history, sociology and photo-history, War Photography is a well-illustrated account of the place of photojournalism in the news industry and the use of news in creating national identity.

During the few years prior to publication there had been a growing interest not only in the organisation and efficiency of the British Army, but also in its role in modern British society and the place of soldiering as a significant career. The time was therefore ripe for a book such as this, which looks objectively at the position of our Army whilst at the same time showing the actual experience of a Regular soldier.Originally published in 1972, Colonel Baynes’s book was largely written during a year’s Defence Fellowship at Edinburgh University in 1968-9, where he worked under Professor John Erickson in the Higher Defence Studies sections of the Department of Politics.He begins by examining the ways in which armies can be used, and then turns to more specific issues connected with the employment of the British Army in the modern world. He summarises what the British Army has accomplished since 1945 and how its strength has varied, and follows with a chapter on the cost of maintaining it.The core of the book revolves around three basic questions. First, what, in the 1970s, does British society really think about its Army, and what sort of army does it want? Second, how can soldiers be kept keen and efficient in a period of prolonged peace? And third, who will join the Army in the coming years, what will their conditions of service be like and what are their career opportunities?Some of Colonel Baynes’s solutions to these problems are likely to be unpopular with traditionalists, although he is by no means an iconoclast and has a deep affection for, and belief in, his own profession. At the time this book was strongly recommended to all with an interest in the security of this country and the future of its armed forces: both those serving in them and civilians.

During the few years prior to publication there had been a growing interest not only in the organisation and efficiency of the British Army, but also in its role in modern British society and the place of soldiering as a significant career. The time was therefore ripe for a book such as this, which looks objectively at the position of our Army whilst at the same time showing the actual experience of a Regular soldier.Originally published in 1972, Colonel Baynes’s book was largely written during a year’s Defence Fellowship at Edinburgh University in 1968-9, where he worked under Professor John Erickson in the Higher Defence Studies sections of the Department of Politics.He begins by examining the ways in which armies can be used, and then turns to more specific issues connected with the employment of the British Army in the modern world. He summarises what the British Army has accomplished since 1945 and how its strength has varied, and follows with a chapter on the cost of maintaining it.The core of the book revolves around three basic questions. First, what, in the 1970s, does British society really think about its Army, and what sort of army does it want? Second, how can soldiers be kept keen and efficient in a period of prolonged peace? And third, who will join the Army in the coming years, what will their conditions of service be like and what are their career opportunities?Some of Colonel Baynes’s solutions to these problems are likely to be unpopular with traditionalists, although he is by no means an iconoclast and has a deep affection for, and belief in, his own profession. At the time this book was strongly recommended to all with an interest in the security of this country and the future of its armed forces: both those serving in them and civilians.

Merchants of death was an epithet used in the USA in the 1930s to attack industries and banks that supplied and funded the First World War (then called the Great War). The term was popular in anti-war circles of both the left and the right and was used extensively regarding the Senate hearings in 1936 by the Nye Committee. Originally published in 1934, this book uses the term to expose the international arms industry at the time. It is a careful and subtle, but still passionate, attack on those who would use government to profit themselves at the expense of other people's lives and property. The book not only makes the case against the war machine; it provides a scintillating history of war profiteering, one authoritative enough for citation and academic study.

For millennia humanity has simultaneously deplored and waged war. With each conflict the stakes have risen, and we now face global annihilation for the sake of a practice all the world claims to condemn. Is there some seemingly irresistible force that impels us toward our own destruction?To explain this central paradox of human behaviour, Genetic Seeds of Warfare, originally published in 1989, advances a startling new theory. It traces the origins of warfare back to early groups of Homo sapiens in competition for scarce resources, showing that warfare evolved as these groups evolved: kin-group against kin-group; tribe against tribe; nation against nation. Rather than being tied to a specific gene, warfare emerged as one of many behavioural strategies for maximising genetic survival. As social groups became more complex, motivations for warfare developed from simple protection of blood relations to political appeals to shared ethnicity, religion, and national identity. But the ultimate cause of warfare is rooted in the most basic of human drives: the need to ensure that one’s genes will survive and reproduce.The authors challenge many assumptions about human behaviour in general, and warfare in particular. They convincingly present the case for an evolutionary understanding of the propensity for warfare, supporting their argument with data from a vast array of social and natural science research. In doing so, they reveal why previous attempts at ending war have failed, and make proactive suggestions toward the development of a new agenda for world peace.

For millennia humanity has simultaneously deplored and waged war. With each conflict the stakes have risen, and we now face global annihilation for the sake of a practice all the world claims to condemn. Is there some seemingly irresistible force that impels us toward our own destruction?To explain this central paradox of human behaviour, Genetic Seeds of Warfare, originally published in 1989, advances a startling new theory. It traces the origins of warfare back to early groups of Homo sapiens in competition for scarce resources, showing that warfare evolved as these groups evolved: kin-group against kin-group; tribe against tribe; nation against nation. Rather than being tied to a specific gene, warfare emerged as one of many behavioural strategies for maximising genetic survival. As social groups became more complex, motivations for warfare developed from simple protection of blood relations to political appeals to shared ethnicity, religion, and national identity. But the ultimate cause of warfare is rooted in the most basic of human drives: the need to ensure that one’s genes will survive and reproduce.The authors challenge many assumptions about human behaviour in general, and warfare in particular. They convincingly present the case for an evolutionary understanding of the propensity for warfare, supporting their argument with data from a vast array of social and natural science research. In doing so, they reveal why previous attempts at ending war have failed, and make proactive suggestions toward the development of a new agenda for world peace.

Originally published in 1976, this book explores the relationship between European society and the military institutions it fostered from 1815–1918. In the period from the fall of Napoleonic imperialism to the outbreak of the First World War armies and navies grew in complexity, cost and size. The first half of this book investigates these institutions from within, and looks at some of the factors which held them together in an increasingly difficult and hostile world, at their self-image, and at the pressures upon them from society at large.As the role of military institutions within society increased in importance, analysts began to look for the effects which this interpenetration had on society. Part 2 is concerned with the effects of this growing dominance of society by its defenders. By the end of period covered by this book, the age of total mobilisation for the war effort was upon us. In a sense this second part of the book reinforces the conclusions of the first, that military institutions are separate from the societies which surround them, and between the two a growing gap of misunderstanding and incomprehension yawned.

Originally published in 1976, this book explores the relationship between European society and the military institutions it fostered from 1815–1918. In the period from the fall of Napoleonic imperialism to the outbreak of the First World War armies and navies grew in complexity, cost and size. The first half of this book investigates these institutions from within, and looks at some of the factors which held them together in an increasingly difficult and hostile world, at their self-image, and at the pressures upon them from society at large.As the role of military institutions within society increased in importance, analysts began to look for the effects which this interpenetration had on society. Part 2 is concerned with the effects of this growing dominance of society by its defenders. By the end of period covered by this book, the age of total mobilisation for the war effort was upon us. In a sense this second part of the book reinforces the conclusions of the first, that military institutions are separate from the societies which surround them, and between the two a growing gap of misunderstanding and incomprehension yawned.