Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy – serie

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a ‘postnational constellation’ and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a ''postnational constellation'' and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a ''postnational constellation'' and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation?If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation?If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation?If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a ‘postnational constellation’ and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation?If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it.This book considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves, on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates to the very concept of law.The book approaches these underlying problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.

The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it.This book considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves, on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates to the very concept of law.The book approaches these underlying problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.

The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it.This book considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves, on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates to the very concept of law.The book approaches these underlying problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.

The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it.This book considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves, on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates to the very concept of law.The book approaches these underlying problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.

In the fourth volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy, scholars in contemporary jurisprudence and constitutional theory discuss who gets to decide and who gets to act when constitutional law is silent or fundamentally controversial.It is the very purpose of Constitutions to settle disagreements: to determine who gets to decide and who gets to act when it comes to the polity and its members. But what if, instead of settling disagreements among those subjected to it, the Constitution itself, its end, its functions, its meaning, its existence, becomes the subject of disagreements? What if the Constitution raises issues it is unable to address from the very outset? Who gets to decide then and who gets to act?In a time in which constitutional crises seem to be too ubiquitous to still count as exceptions, questions such as these are asked with ever-increasing urgency. The answers to these questions cannot be found in arguments based on contingent legal stipulations but have to reach beyond the vague and fleeting instructions of positive law.

In the fourth volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy, scholars in contemporary jurisprudence and constitutional theory discuss who gets to decide and who gets to act when constitutional law is silent or fundamentally controversial.It is the very purpose of Constitutions to settle disagreements: to determine who gets to decide and who gets to act when it comes to the polity and its members. But what if, instead of settling disagreements among those subjected to it, the Constitution itself, its end, its functions, its meaning, its existence, becomes the subject of disagreements? What if the Constitution raises issues it is unable to address from the very outset? Who gets to decide then and who gets to act?In a time in which constitutional crises seem to be too ubiquitous to still count as exceptions, questions such as these are asked with ever-increasing urgency. The answers to these questions cannot be found in arguments based on contingent legal stipulations but have to reach beyond the vague and fleeting instructions of positive law.