Empathy is widely discussed, both in philosophy and more generally. One might ask what empathy itself is and how it relates to specific emotions, such as sympathy. This volume is concerned with theories of emotions that can be described as empathetic, either because they presuppose the human capacity for empathy or because they are essential to how empathy operates. By exploring how Western philosophers-from Ancient Greece up to the twentieth century-have understood these emotions, it becomes possible not only to gain a deeper understanding of certain empathetic emotions and their relation to the concept of empathy, but to also see how these emotions are placed within a broader moral, social, or religious context. Taking into account this context is essential when it comes to engaging with a number of compelling questions. Does sympathy provide an adequate basis for a theory of human sociability and fellowship? What roles do compassion and pity play in our moral lives, and in the formation of the practical identities of human beings? Can the altruistic character and concern for others that is traditionally ascribed to certain emotions be reconciled with competing values like self-love and the self-directedness of its concerns? Empathetic Emotions in the History of Philosophy provides answers to these important questions.
