To Form a More Perfect Union

A New Economic Interpretation of United States Constitution

Inbunden, Engelska, 2003

557 kr

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Beskrivning

This is a quantitative reexamination of the behavior of the Founding Fathers during the creation of the United States' Constitution. It employs cliometric analysis, formal economic analysis, and modern statistical techniques, to explain the choices the founders made during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. These include: What form of government did the founders intend for the Constitution? What factors motivated them to adopt particular clauses in the Constitution? What factors led them to ratify the Constitution? The author argues that the findings challenge the prevailing interpretation of the formation of the Constitution.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2003-05-15
Mått:167 x 248 x 33 mm
Vikt:730 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:416
Förlag:OUP USA
ISBN:9780195139709

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Mer om författaren

Robert A. McGuire was born in Long Beach, California, and educated at Long Beach State and the University of Washington. A professor of economics at the University of Akron, he is the author of many studies that have appeared in academic journals, including the American Economic Review, American Journal of Political Science, Economic History Review, Journal of Economic History, and Public Choice. Among his mostrecent research is a study of the Confederate constitution appearing in Economic Inquiry and an ongoing study of the role of diseases in American economic history funded with a National Science Foundation grant in 2000.

Recensioner i media

Robert McGuire's To Form a More Perfect Union is and will long remain the definitive study of the effect of economic influences on the drafting and ratification of the American Constitution

Innehållsförteckning

Prologue: A New Economic Interpretation1: The Evolution of the Prevailing Interpretation2: Economics and the ConstitutionPart I: The Philadelphia Convention of 17873: The Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution4: Another Look at the Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution5: The Choice of the Basic Design of the ConstitutionPart II: The Ratification of the Constitution, 1787-17906: The Overall Ratification Vote in the Nation7: The Ratification Vote within Individual State ConventionsEpilogue: The Lessons of 1787 and RatificationAppendixesAppendix 1: DocumentsAppendix 2: The Data and Their SourcesAppendix 3: Full and Parsimonius Voting Models for the Philadelphia ConventionAppendix 4: Personal-Interest and Constituent-Interest Voting Models for the Philadelphia ConventionAppendix 5: Alternative Voting Model and Hypothesis Tests for Nationalism at the Philadelphia ConventionAppendix 6: Voting Models for Pooled Samples of the State Ratifying ConventionsAppendix 7: Voting Models for Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia Ratifying ConventionsNotesReferencesIndex