Much of the commentary and scholarship on Candrakirti-whether canonical or contemporary-has been concerned with the question of whether Candrakirti is a radical nihilist who denies the possibility of any knowledge and the reality of both the external world and of the mind. Eminent Tibetan exegetes have argued that this is the correct understanding of Candrakirti and of Madhyamaka itself, and that Madhyamaka so understood is the correct philosophical position. Others have argued that Candrakirti provides the resources for reconciling realism with the emptiness of all phenomena. This debate continues among contemporary scholars: many, while less sanguine regarding the cogency of the position they ascribe to Candrakirti, read him explicitly as an ontological and epistemological nihilist. Others take him to advocate a plausible, moderately realist position. The book argues that Candrakirti is not a nihilist. The authors show instead that Candrakirti develops a sophisticated understanding of knowledge in the context of massive delusion, of reality in the world of conventional truth, and of ethics in the domain of human life. This analysis reconciles the claim that all phenomena are empty-that they lack any intrinsic existence or identity-with a moderate realism about the conventional world.

Much of the commentary and scholarship on Candrakirti-whether canonical or contemporary-has been concerned with the question of whether Candrakirti is a radical nihilist who denies the possibility of any knowledge and the reality of both the external world and of the mind. Eminent Tibetan exegetes have argued that this is the correct understanding of Candrakirti and of Madhyamaka itself, and that Madhyamaka so understood is the correct philosophical position. Others have argued that Candrakirti provides the resources for reconciling realism with the emptiness of all phenomena. This debate continues among contemporary scholars: many, while less sanguine regarding the cogency of the position they ascribe to Candrakirti, read him explicitly as an ontological and epistemological nihilist. Others take him to advocate a plausible, moderately realist position. The book argues that Candrakirti is not a nihilist. The authors show instead that Candrakirti develops a sophisticated understanding of knowledge in the context of massive delusion, of reality in the world of conventional truth, and of ethics in the domain of human life. This analysis reconciles the claim that all phenomena are empty-that they lack any intrinsic existence or identity-with a moderate realism about the conventional world.

Much of the commentary and scholarship on Candrakirti-whether canonical or contemporary-has been concerned with the question of whether Candrakirti is a radical nihilist who denies the possibility of any knowledge and the reality of both the external world and of the mind. Eminent Tibetan exegetes have argued that this is the correct understanding of Candrakirti and of Madhyamaka itself, and that Madhyamaka so understood is the correct philosophical position. Others have argued that Candrakirti provides the resources for reconciling realism with the emptiness of all phenomena. This debate continues among contemporary scholars: many, while less sanguine regarding the cogency of the position they ascribe to Candrakirti, read him explicitly as an ontological and epistemological nihilist. Others take him to advocate a plausible, moderately realist position. The book argues that Candrakirti is not a nihilist. The authors show instead that Candrakirti develops a sophisticated understanding of knowledge in the context of massive delusion, of reality in the world of conventional truth, and of ethics in the domain of human life. This analysis reconciles the claim that all phenomena are empty-that they lack any intrinsic existence or identity-with a moderate realism about the conventional world.