Tim Bayne is Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Catherine's College, Oxford. His main research interest is the philosophy of cognitive science, and he has co-edited The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009) and Delusions and Self-Deception: Affective Influences on Belief Formation (Psychology Press, 2008).Michelle Montague lectures in philosophy at the University of Bristol. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and metaphysics, and she has published in these areas in philosophy journals including Nous, Philosophical Studies, and Analysis. She is currently writing a book on the notion of content, with particular reference to the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality.

The volume is an important contribution to the debate on cognitive phenomenology. It should be of interest to philosophers of mind working on consciousness, cognition, and their intersections.

• Contents ; 1. Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction ; 2. The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology ; 3. From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed ; 4. Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content ; 5. On The Phenomenology of Thought ; 6. The Phenomenology of Particularity ; 7. Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content ; 8. The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology ; 9. A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology ; 10. On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia ; 11. Phenomenal Thought ; 12. Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology ; 13. Cognitive Phenomenology: real life ; 14. Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? ; 15. Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking

Tim Bayne is Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Catherine's College, Oxford. His main research interest is the philosophy of cognitive science, and he has co-edited The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009) and Delusions and Self-Deception: Affective Influences on Belief Formation (Psychology Press, 2008).Michelle Montague lectures in philosophy at the University of Bristol. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and metaphysics, and she has published in these areas in philosophy journals including Nous, Philosophical Studies, and Analysis. She is currently writing a book on the notion of content, with particular reference to the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality.

The volume is an important contribution to the debate on cognitive phenomenology. It should be of interest to philosophers of mind working on consciousness, cognition, and their intersections.

• Contents ; 1. Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction ; 2. The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology ; 3. From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed ; 4. Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content ; 5. On The Phenomenology of Thought ; 6. The Phenomenology of Particularity ; 7. Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content ; 8. The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology ; 9. A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology ; 10. On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia ; 11. Phenomenal Thought ; 12. Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology ; 13. Cognitive Phenomenology: real life ; 14. Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? ; 15. Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking

Tim Bayne is Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Catherine's College, Oxford. His main research interest is the philosophy of cognitive science, and he has co-edited The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009) and Delusions and Self-Deception: Affective Influences on Belief Formation (Psychology Press, 2008).Michelle Montague lectures in philosophy at the University of Bristol. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and metaphysics, and she has published in these areas in philosophy journals including Nous, Philosophical Studies, and Analysis. She is currently writing a book on the notion of content, with particular reference to the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality.

The volume is an important contribution to the debate on cognitive phenomenology. It should be of interest to philosophers of mind working on consciousness, cognition, and their intersections.

• Contents ; 1. Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction ; 2. The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology ; 3. From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed ; 4. Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content ; 5. On The Phenomenology of Thought ; 6. The Phenomenology of Particularity ; 7. Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content ; 8. The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology ; 9. A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology ; 10. On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia ; 11. Phenomenal Thought ; 12. Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology ; 13. Cognitive Phenomenology: real life ; 14. Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? ; 15. Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking