Essays in Ancient Epistemology

Gail Fine received her BA from the University of Michigan in 1971, and her PhD from Harvard University in 1975. She also holds an MA from Oxford University (2009). She taught at Cornell University from 1975-2017; and was a Senior Research Fellow at Merton College, Oxford from 2007-2019. She is now Professor Emerita of Philosophy at Cornell University, and Senior Research Fellow Emerita at Merton College. Since 2007, she has been a Visiting Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Oxford University.

The book is provided with a detailed synoptic introduction, which is a useful guide to the content and understanding of F.'s intentions and allows readers to remain within the context prescribed by the author. It is helpful to start with a careful reading of the introduction for a clear understanding of F.'s main principles and concepts.

• 1: Introduction Part I: Plato and [Plato] 2: Does Socrates Claim to Know that He Knows Nothing? 3: Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno 4: The 'Two Worlds' Theory in the Phaedo 5: Epistêmê and Doxa, Knowledge and Belief, in the Phaedo 6: Recollection and Innatism in the Phaedo 7: Plato on the Grades of Perception: Theaetetus 184-186 and the Phaedo 8: Meno's Paradox and the Sisyphus Part II: Aristotle 9: Aristotle on Knowledge 10: Aristotle's Two Worlds: Knowledge and Belief in Posterior Analytics 1.33 Part III: Sextus 11: Sceptical Dogmata: PH I 13 12: Descartes and Ancient Scepticism: Reheated Cabbage? 13: Subjectivity: Ancient and Modern 14: Sextus and External World Scepticism