Michael S. Brady is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, having previously taught at the University of Stirling. He has published in moral philosophy, epistemology, and the philosophy of emotion, and has edited two volumes of essays on the Moral and Epistemic Virtues (with Duncan Pritchard) and on New Waves in Metaethics. He is currently Co-Investigator on an interdisciplinary project on the nature of pain at Glasgow. He is Director of the British Philosophical Association, having previously served as Secretary of the Scots Philosophical Association. He is on the editorial board of The Philosophical Quarterly, and subject editor for Oxford Bibliographies.

What makes this book so important and timely is its penetrating critique of a popular, attractive idea that emotions are normatively similar to perceptual experience in virtue of being psychologically similar to them. The rich and compelling positive picture emerging from the critique merits serious attention in its own right.

• Introduction 1: Towards the Perceptual Model 2: The Perceptual Model 3: Against the Perceptual Model 4: Emotion and Understanding 5: Emotion, Attention, and Virtue Bibliography

Michael S. Brady is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, having previously taught at the University of Stirling. He has published in moral philosophy, epistemology, and the philosophy of emotion, and has edited two volumes of essays on the Moral and Epistemic Virtues (with Duncan Pritchard) and on New Waves in Metaethics. He is currently Co-Investigator on an interdisciplinary project on the nature of pain at Glasgow. He is Director of the British Philosophical Association, having previously served as Secretary of the Scots Philosophical Association. He is on the editorial board of The Philosophical Quarterly, and subject editor for Oxford Bibliographies.

What makes this book so important and timely is its penetrating critique of a popular, attractive idea that emotions are normatively similar to perceptual experience in virtue of being psychologically similar to them. The rich and compelling positive picture emerging from the critique merits serious attention in its own right.

• Introduction 1: Towards the Perceptual Model 2: The Perceptual Model 3: Against the Perceptual Model 4: Emotion and Understanding 5: Emotion, Attention, and Virtue Bibliography

Michael S. Brady is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, having previously taught at the University of Stirling. He has published in moral philosophy, epistemology, and the philosophy of emotion, and has edited two volumes of essays on the Moral and Epistemic Virtues (with Duncan Pritchard) and on New Waves in Metaethics. He is currently Co-Investigator on an interdisciplinary project on the nature of pain at Glasgow. He is Director of the British Philosophical Association, having previously served as Secretary of the Scots Philosophical Association. He is on the editorial board of The Philosophical Quarterly, and subject editor for Oxford Bibliographies.

What makes this book so important and timely is its penetrating critique of a popular, attractive idea that emotions are normatively similar to perceptual experience in virtue of being psychologically similar to them. The rich and compelling positive picture emerging from the critique merits serious attention in its own right.

• Introduction 1: Towards the Perceptual Model 2: The Perceptual Model 3: Against the Perceptual Model 4: Emotion and Understanding 5: Emotion, Attention, and Virtue Bibliography