Richard Pettigrew is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol. He has worked in a number of areas: the philosophy of mathematics, with a particular focus on mathematical structuralism; formal epistemology, with a focus on the epistemic utility theory programme; and rational choice theory, investigating risk-sensitive decision theories and transformative choices, in particular. He is the author of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (Oxford 2016) and the co-editor of The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic (Bloomsbury 2014, with Leon Horsten).

• Preface Part I: Aggregating Selves 1: The Problem of Choosing for Changing Selves 2: The Economists> ' Orthodoxy: Expected Utility Theory 3: Existing Solutions I: The Unchanging Utility Solution 4: Existing Solutions II: The Utility of Utility Solution 5: Existing Solutions III: the One True Utility Solution 6: The Aggregate Utility Solution I: Which Attitudes to Aggregate? 7: The Aggregate Utility Solution II: The Solution Itself 8: Can We Compare Utilities Between Different Selves? 9: Why Aggregate Using Weighted Averages? 10: Do We Know Enough to Make Decisions This Way? Part II: Setting the Weights 11: The Problem of Weighting Changing Selves 12: The Weight of the Past 13: Discounting the Future 14: The Nearer the Dearer 15: I> 'll be Glad I Did It--So, I> 'll Do It 16: The Road Ahead Bibliography

Richard Pettigrew is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol. He has worked in a number of areas: the philosophy of mathematics, with a particular focus on mathematical structuralism; formal epistemology, with a focus on the epistemic utility theory programme; and rational choice theory, investigating risk-sensitive decision theories and transformative choices, in particular. He is the author of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (Oxford 2016) and the co-editor of The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic (Bloomsbury 2014, with Leon Horsten).

• Preface Part I: Aggregating Selves 1: The Problem of Choosing for Changing Selves 2: The Economists> ' Orthodoxy: Expected Utility Theory 3: Existing Solutions I: The Unchanging Utility Solution 4: Existing Solutions II: The Utility of Utility Solution 5: Existing Solutions III: the One True Utility Solution 6: The Aggregate Utility Solution I: Which Attitudes to Aggregate? 7: The Aggregate Utility Solution II: The Solution Itself 8: Can We Compare Utilities Between Different Selves? 9: Why Aggregate Using Weighted Averages? 10: Do We Know Enough to Make Decisions This Way? Part II: Setting the Weights 11: The Problem of Weighting Changing Selves 12: The Weight of the Past 13: Discounting the Future 14: The Nearer the Dearer 15: I> 'll be Glad I Did It--So, I> 'll Do It 16: The Road Ahead Bibliography