Richard Pettigrew – författare
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29 produkter
29 produkter
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2016410 kr
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Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses aboutthe objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan torespond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism.To justify these principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an agent''s credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is theveritist''s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of Iepistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to theevidentialist''s objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20191 068 kr
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What we value, like, endorse, want, and prefer changes over the course of our lives, sometimes as a result of decisions we make—such as when we choose to become a parent or move to a new country—and sometimes as a result of forces beyond our control—such as when our political views change as we grow older. This poses a problem for any theory of how we ought to make decisions. Which values and preferences should we appeal to when we are making our decisions? Ourcurrent values? Our past ones? Our future ones? Or some amalgamation of all them? But if that, which amalgamation? In Choosing for Changing Selves, Richard Pettigrew presents a theory of rational decision making for agents who recognise that their values will change over time and whose decisions willaffect those future times.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20221 050 kr
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How much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? According to this book, not very much. For most people and most bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of beliefs that rationality permits them to have in response to that evidence. The argument, which takes inspiration from William James'' ideas in ''The Will to Believe'', proceeds from two premises. The first is a theory about the basis of epistemic rationality. It''s called epistemic utility theory, and it says that what it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you were given the chance to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you were to care only about their epistemic value. So, to say which beliefs are permitted, we must say how to measure epistemic value, and which decision rule to use when picking your beliefs. The second premise is a claim about attitudes to epistemic risk, and it says that rationality permits many different such attitudes. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two ways: in the way you measure epistemic value; and in the decision rule you use to pick beliefs. This book explores the latter. The result is permissivism about epistemic rationality: different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs; given most bodies of evidence, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit.
E-bok
Engelska, 20221 050 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
How much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? According to this book, not very much. For most people and most bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of beliefs that rationality permits them to have in response to that evidence. The argument, which takes inspiration from William James'' ideas in ''The Will to Believe'', proceeds from two premises. The first is a theory about the basis of epistemic rationality. It''s called epistemic utility theory, and it says that what it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you were given the chance to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you were to care only about their epistemic value. So, to say which beliefs are permitted, we must say how to measure epistemic value, and which decision rule to use when picking your beliefs. The second premise is a claim about attitudes to epistemic risk, and it says that rationality permits many different such attitudes. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two ways: in the way you measure epistemic value; and in the decision rule you use to pick beliefs. This book explores the latter. The result is permissivism about epistemic rationality: different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs; given most bodies of evidence, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2022
1 170 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
How much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? According to this book, not very much. For most people and most bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of beliefs that rationality permits them to have in response to that evidence. The argument, which takes inspiration from William James' ideas in 'The Will to Believe', proceeds from two premises. The first is a theory about the basis of epistemic rationality. It's called epistemic utility theory, and it says that what it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you were given the chance to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you were to care only about their epistemic value. So, to say which beliefs are permitted, we must say how to measure epistemic value, and which decision rule to use when picking your beliefs. The second premise is a claim about attitudes to epistemic risk, and it says that rationality permits many different such attitudes. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two ways: in the way you measure epistemic value; and in the decision rule you use to pick beliefs. This book explores the latter. The result is permissivism about epistemic rationality: different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs; given most bodies of evidence, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2016
1 332 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism.To justify these principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the evidentialist's objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2020
994 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
What we value, like, endorse, want, and prefer changes over the course of our lives, sometimes as a result of decisions we make--such as when we choose to become a parent or move to a new country--and sometimes as a result of forces beyond our control--such as when our political views change as we grow older. This poses a problem for any theory of how we ought to make decisions. Which values and preferences should we appeal to when we are making our decisions? Our current values? Our past ones? Our future ones? Or some amalgamation of all them? But if that, which amalgamation? In Choosing for Changing Selves, Richard Pettigrew presents a theory of rational decision making for agents who recognise that their values will change over time and whose decisions will affect those future times.
Häftad, Engelska, 2018
464 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of I^epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the evidentialist's objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.
E-bok
Engelska, 2025275 kr
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Häftad, Engelska, 2025
239 kr
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Disagreement is a common feature of a social world. For various reasons, however, we sometimes need to resolve a disagreement into a single set of opinions. This can be achieved by pooling the opinions of individuals that make up the group. In this Element, we provide an opinionated survey on some ways of pooling opinions: linear pooling, multiplicative pooling (including geometric), and pooling through imprecise probabilities. While we give significant attention to the axiomatic approach in evaluating pooling strategies, we also evaluate them in terms of the epistemic and practical goals they might meet. In doing so, we connect opinion pooling to some philosophical problems in social epistemology and the philosophy of action, illuminating different perspectives one might take when figuring out how to pool opinions for a given purpose. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2025285 kr
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Inbunden, Engelska, 2025
769 kr
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Disagreement is a common feature of a social world. For various reasons, however, we sometimes need to resolve a disagreement into a single set of opinions. This can be achieved by pooling the opinions of individuals that make up the group. In this Element, we provide an opinionated survey on some ways of pooling opinions: linear pooling, multiplicative pooling (including geometric), and pooling through imprecise probabilities. While we give significant attention to the axiomatic approach in evaluating pooling strategies, we also evaluate them in terms of the epistemic and practical goals they might meet. In doing so, we connect opinion pooling to some philosophical problems in social epistemology and the philosophy of action, illuminating different perspectives one might take when figuring out how to pool opinions for a given purpose. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2020285 kr
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Our beliefs come in degrees. I''m 70% confident it will rain tomorrow, and 0.001% sure my lottery ticket will win. What''s more, we think these degrees of belief should abide by certain principles if they are to be rational. For instance, you shouldn''t believe that a person''s taller than 6ft more strongly than you believe that they''re taller than 5ft, since the former entails the latter. In Dutch Book arguments, we try to establish the principles of rationality for degrees of belief by appealing to their role in guiding decisions. In particular, we show that degrees of belief that don''t satisfy the principles will always guide action in some way that is bad or undesirable. In this Element, we present Dutch Book arguments for the principles of Probabilism, Conditionalization, and the Reflection Principle, among others, and we formulate and consider the most serious objections to them.
Häftad, Engelska, 2020
239 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Our beliefs come in degrees. I'm 70% confident it will rain tomorrow, and 0.001% sure my lottery ticket will win. What's more, we think these degrees of belief should abide by certain principles if they are to be rational. For instance, you shouldn't believe that a person's taller than 6ft more strongly than you believe that they're taller than 5ft, since the former entails the latter. In Dutch Book arguments, we try to establish the principles of rationality for degrees of belief by appealing to their role in guiding decisions. In particular, we show that degrees of belief that don't satisfy the principles will always guide action in some way that is bad or undesirable. In this Element, we present Dutch Book arguments for the principles of Probabilism, Conditionalization, and the Reflection Principle, among others, and we formulate and consider the most serious objections to them.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20112 920 kr
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The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic offers the definitive guide to a key area of contemporary philosophy. The book covers all the fundamental areas of philosophical logic - topics that have continued to attract interest historically as well as topics that have emerged more recently as active areas of research. Seventeen specially commissioned essays from an international team of experts reveal where important work continues to be done in the area and, most valuably, the exciting new directions the field is taking. The Companion explores issues pertaining to classical logic and its rivals, extensional and intensional extensions of classical logic, semantics for parts of natural language, and the application of logic in the theory of rationality. Crucially the emphasis is on the role that logic plays in understanding philosophical problems. Featuring a series of indispensable research tools, including an A to Z of key terms and concepts, a detailed list of resources, a bibliography and a companion website, this is the essential reference tool for anyone working in contemporary philosophical logic.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2011
2 789 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
This is a single volume reference guide to the latest work and potential future directions in Philosophical Logic, written by an international team of leading scholars. "The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic" offers the definitive guide to a key area of contemporary philosophy. The book covers all the fundamental areas of philosophical logic - topics that have continued to attract interest historically as well as topics that have emerged more recently as active areas of research. Seventeen specially commissioned essays from an international team of experts reveal where important work continues to be done in the area and, most valuably, the exciting new directions the field is taking. The Companion explores issues pertaining to classical logic and its rivals, extensional and intensional extensions of classical logic, semantics for parts of natural language, and the application of logic in the theory of rationality. Crucially the emphasis is on the role that logic plays in understanding philosophical problems.Featuring a series of indispensable research tools, including an A to Z of key terms and concepts, a detailed list of resources, a bibliography and a companion website, this is the essential reference tool for anyone working in contemporary philosophical logic. "The Continuum Companions" series is a major series of single volume companions to key research fields in the humanities aimed at postgraduate students, scholars and libraries. Each companion offers a comprehensive reference resource giving an overview of key topics, research areas, new directions and a manageable guide to beginning or developing research in the field. A distinctive feature of the series is that each companion provides practical guidance on advanced study and research in the field, including research methods and subject-specific resources.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2014575 kr
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Logical methods are used in all area of philosophy. By introducing and advancing central to topics in the discipline, The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic emphasizes the crucial role logic plays in understanding philosophical problems. Covering stages in the history of logic and of modern logic, this comprehensive Companion looks ahead to new areas of research and explores issues pertaining to classical logic and its rivals, semantics for parts of natural language, and the application of logic in the theory of rationality. Experts in the field provide a mix of technical chapters that offer excellent encyclopaedias of results in the area and chapters of philosophical discussions that survey a range of philosophical positions. To facilitate further study, this volumes also includes a series of research tools such as a detailed index, an up-to-date list of resources and an annotated bibliography. Balancing technical exposition with philosophical discussion, The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic not only provides students and lecturers with the basis of a course in philosophical logic, it offers anyone working in this key area of contemporary philosophy a valuable research resource.
Häftad, Engelska, 2014
535 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Logical methods are used in all area of philosophy. By introducing and advancing central to topics in the discipline, The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic emphasizes the crucial role logic plays in understanding philosophical problems. Covering stages in the history of logic and of modern logic, this comprehensive Companion looks ahead to new areas of research and explores issues pertaining to classical logic and its rivals, semantics for parts of natural language, and the application of logic in the theory of rationality. Experts in the field provide a mix of technical chapters that offer excellent encyclopaedias of results in the area and chapters of philosophical discussions that survey a range of philosophical positions. To facilitate further study, this volumes also includes a series of research tools such as a detailed index, an up-to-date list of resources and an annotated bibliography. Balancing technical exposition with philosophical discussion, The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic not only provides students and lecturers with the basis of a course in philosophical logic, it offers anyone working in this key area of contemporary philosophy a valuable research resource.
E-bok
Engelska, 2014575 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Logical methods are used in all area of philosophy. By introducing and advancing central to topics in the discipline, The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic emphasizes the crucial role logic plays in understanding philosophical problems. Covering stages in the history of logic and of modern logic, this comprehensive Companion looks ahead to new areas of research and explores issues pertaining to classical logic and its rivals, semantics for parts of natural language, and the application of logic in the theory of rationality. Experts in the field provide a mix of technical chapters that offer excellent encyclopaedias of results in the area and chapters of philosophical discussions that survey a range of philosophical positions. To facilitate further study, this volumes also includes a series of research tools such as a detailed index, an up-to-date list of resources and an annotated bibliography. Balancing technical exposition with philosophical discussion, The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic not only provides students and lecturers with the basis of a course in philosophical logic, it offers anyone working in this key area of contemporary philosophy a valuable research resource.
Häftad, Engelska, 2018
207 kr
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The university system is no longer fit for purpose. UK higher education was designed for much smaller numbers of students and a very different labour market. Students display worrying levels of mental health issues, exacerbated by unprecedented levels of debt, and the dubious privilege of competing for poorly-paid graduate internships. Meanwhile who goes to university is still too often determined by place of birth, gender, class or ethnicity. Who are universities for? argues for a large-scale shake up of how we organise higher education, how we combine it with work, and how it fits into our lives. It includes radical proposals for reform of the curriculum and how we admit students to higher education, with part-time study (currently in crisis in England) becoming the norm.A short, polemical but also deeply practical book, Who are universities for? offers concrete solutions to the problems facing UK higher education and a way forward for universities to become more inclusive and more responsive to local and global challenges.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2018769 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
The university system is no longer fit for purpose. UK higher education was designed for much smaller numbers of students and a very different labour market. Students display worrying levels of mental health issues, exacerbated by unprecedented levels of debt, and the dubious privilege of competing for poorly-paid graduate internships. Meanwhile who goes to university is still too often determined by place of birth, gender, class or ethnicity.
Who are universities for? argues for a large-scale shake up of how we organise higher education, how we combine it with work, and how it fits into our lives. It includes radical proposals for reform of the curriculum and how we admit students to higher education, with part-time study (currently in crisis in England) becoming the norm.
A short, polemical but also deeply practical book, Who are universities for? offers concrete solutions to the problems facing UK higher education and a way forward for universities to become more inclusive and more responsive to local and global challenges.
E-bok
Engelska, 2018200 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
The university system is no longer fit for purpose. UK higher education was designed for much smaller numbers of students and a very different labour market. Students display worrying levels of mental health issues, exacerbated by unprecedented levels of debt, and the dubious privilege of competing for poorly-paid graduate internships. Meanwhile who goes to university is still too often determined by place of birth, gender, class or ethnicity.
Who are universities for? argues for a large-scale shake up of how we organise higher education, how we combine it with work, and how it fits into our lives. It includes radical proposals for reform of the curriculum and how we admit students to higher education, with part-time study (currently in crisis in England) becoming the norm.
A short, polemical but also deeply practical book, Who are universities for? offers concrete solutions to the problems facing UK higher education and a way forward for universities to become more inclusive and more responsive to local and global challenges.
Del 36 - After Dinner Conversation Magazine
After Dinner Conversation Magazine
Häftad, Engelska, 2023
183 kr
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Del 40 - After Dinner Conversation Magazine
After Dinner Conversation Magazine
Häftad, Engelska, 2023
183 kr
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E-bok
Engelska33 kr
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E-bok
Engelska, 202333 kr
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E-bok
Engelska, 2024105 kr
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E-bok
Engelska, 2024105 kr
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Del 2 - After Dinner Conversation - Themes
After Dinner Conversation - Crimes & Punishments
Häftad, Engelska, 2024
266 kr
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