Alex Byrne is chair of the philosophy section at MIT. His main interests are philosophy of mind (especially perception and consciousness), epistemology (especially self-knowledge), metaphysics (especially color), and problems concerning sex and gender. He has written a number of papers on color with David Hilbert of the University of Illinois at Chicago; they also edited the two-volume collection Readings on Color for MIT Press. He recently co-edited The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, now on its second edition.

Byrne glides easily through the historical and contemporary literature on self-knowledge, and he culminates in an account of self-knowledge that is "uniformly detectivist, inferential, and economical, and the direction of inference is always from world to mind" (from the preview). The bibliography is impressive. Summing up: Highly recommended

• 1: Problems of Self-Knowledge 2: Inner Sense 3: Some Recent Approaches 4: The Puzzle of Transparency 5: Belief 6: Perception and Sensation 7: Desire, Intention, and Emotion 8: Memory, Imagination, and Thought

Alex Byrne is chair of the philosophy section at MIT. His main interests are philosophy of mind (especially perception and consciousness), epistemology (especially self-knowledge), metaphysics (especially color), and problems concerning sex and gender. He has written a number of papers on color with David Hilbert of the University of Illinois at Chicago; they also edited the two-volume collection Readings on Color for MIT Press. He recently co-edited The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, now on its second edition.

Byrne glides easily through the historical and contemporary literature on self-knowledge, and he culminates in an account of self-knowledge that is "uniformly detectivist, inferential, and economical, and the direction of inference is always from world to mind" (from the preview). The bibliography is impressive. Summing up: Highly recommended

• 1: Problems of Self-Knowledge 2: Inner Sense 3: Some Recent Approaches 4: The Puzzle of Transparency 5: Belief 6: Perception and Sensation 7: Desire, Intention, and Emotion 8: Memory, Imagination, and Thought

Alex Byrne is chair of the philosophy section at MIT. His main interests are philosophy of mind (especially perception and consciousness), epistemology (especially self-knowledge), metaphysics (especially color), and problems concerning sex and gender. He has written a number of papers on color with David Hilbert of the University of Illinois at Chicago; they also edited the two-volume collection Readings on Color for MIT Press. He recently co-edited The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, now on its second edition.

Byrne glides easily through the historical and contemporary literature on self-knowledge, and he culminates in an account of self-knowledge that is "uniformly detectivist, inferential, and economical, and the direction of inference is always from world to mind" (from the preview). The bibliography is impressive. Summing up: Highly recommended

• 1: Problems of Self-Knowledge 2: Inner Sense 3: Some Recent Approaches 4: The Puzzle of Transparency 5: Belief 6: Perception and Sensation 7: Desire, Intention, and Emotion 8: Memory, Imagination, and Thought