Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honour of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replies to his critics, and sets out his current views on the topics discussed.Contributors: Richard Heck, Frank Jackson, William Lycan, Vann McGee, John Perry, Paul Pietroski, Sydney Shoemaker, Scott Soames, Daniel Stoljar, Timothy Williamson, and Stephen Yablo.

Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one''s mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans'' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is ''transparent'': self-knowledge is achieved by an ''outward glance'' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an ''inward glance'' at one''s own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from ''p'' to ''I believe that p''. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because ''p'' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to ''I intend to do this'', or ''I feel a pain''? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one''s mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one''s mental states (peculiar access).

Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one''s mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans'' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is ''transparent'': self-knowledge is achieved by an ''outward glance'' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an ''inward glance'' at one''s own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from ''p'' to ''I believe that p''. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because ''p'' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to ''I intend to do this'', or ''I feel a pain''? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one''s mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one''s mental states (peculiar access).

Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one's mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is 'transparent': self-knowledge is achieved by an 'outward glance' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an 'inward glance' at one's own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from 'p' to 'I believe that p'. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because 'p' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to 'I intend to do this', or 'I feel a pain'? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one's mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one's mental states (peculiar access).

Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one's mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is 'transparent': self-knowledge is achieved by an 'outward glance' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an 'inward glance' at one's own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from 'p' to 'I believe that p'. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because 'p' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to 'I intend to do this', or 'I feel a pain'? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one's mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one's mental states (peculiar access).

Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honour of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replies to his critics, and sets out his current views on the topics discussed.Contributors: Richard Heck, Frank Jackson, William Lycan, Vann McGee, John Perry, Paul Pietroski, Sydney Shoemaker, Scott Soames, Daniel Stoljar, Timothy Williamson, and Stephen Yablo.

The Norton Introduction to Philosophy is back in a Third Edition, offering an orientation to the discipline that remains unmatched in scope, breadth, and quality. With an expanded selection of readings, more extensive background notes, and engaging reading guides, the Third Edition is designed to resonate with today’s students and spark their interest in philosophy. New essays from contemporary thinkers connect classic philosophical topics—like metaphysics, epistemology, morality, justice, race, and gender—to real-world issues. Available as an affordable, engaging Norton Ebook, this anthology makes philosophy accessible; sharpening students’ critical thinking skills while providing you with robust instructor support.Highlights of the Third Edition’s new content:New: Exclusive commissioned essays from leading philosophers present topics instructors told us they want to teach, at a level suitable for undergraduates. Examples include Michael Patrick Lynch on the value of truth, Ned Hall on causation vs. correlation, Alex Byrne on other minds and artificial intelligence, Jonathan Birch on animal consciousness, Ted Sider on material constitution, Gideon Rosen on ignorance and responsibility, David Wong on relativism, Robert P. George on public morality, and Seana Shiffrin on freedom of speech.New reading selections include David Chalmers on the simulation hypothesis, Hedda Hassel Mørch on panpsychism, Duncan Pritchard on the value of knowledge, Nick Zangwill on the morality of eating meat, and C. A. J. Coady on testimony and observation.New Chapter 14: When Are We Morally Responsible for What We Do? introduces students to leading voices tackling the relationship between morality and ignorance, including Angela Smith, Normy Arpaly, Michele Moody-Adams, and editor Gideon Rosen.New and updated Reader’s Guides accompany 18 of the most challenging selections, providing clear and accessible guidance to help students metabolize what they’ve read.Enhanced pedagogy: The Third Edition offers revised and updated chapter introductions, reading guides, and instructor resources.

Sex used to rule. Now gender identity is on the throne. Sex survives as a cheap imitation of its former self: assigned at birth, on a spectrum, socially constructed, and definitely not binary. Apparently quite a few of us fall outside the categories ‘male’ and ‘female’. But gender identity is said to be universal – we all have one. Humanity used to be cleaved into two sexes, whereas now the crucial division depends on whether our gender identity aligns with our body. If it does, we are cisgender; if it does not, we are transgender. The dethroning of sex has meant the threat of execution for formerly noble words such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’.In this provocative, bold, and humane book, the philosopher Alex Byrne pushes back against the new gender revolution. Drawing on evidence from biology, psychology, anthropology and sexology, Byrne exposes the flaws in the revolutionary manifesto. The book applies the tools of philosophy, accessibly and with flair, to gender, sex, transsexuality, patriarchy, our many identities, and our true or authentic selves. The topics of Trouble with Gender are relevant to us all. This is a book for anyone who has wondered ‘Is sex binary?’, ‘Why are men and women different?’, ‘What is a woman?’ or, simply, ‘Where can I go to know more about these controversies?’Revolutions devour their own children, and the gender revolution is no exception. Trouble with Gender joins the forefront of the counter-revolution, restoring sex to its rightful place, at the centre of what it means to be human.

Sex used to rule. Now gender identity is on the throne. Sex survives as a cheap imitation of its former self: assigned at birth, on a spectrum, socially constructed, and definitely not binary. Apparently quite a few of us fall outside the categories ‘male’ and ‘female’. But gender identity is said to be universal – we all have one. Humanity used to be cleaved into two sexes, whereas now the crucial division depends on whether our gender identity aligns with our body. If it does, we are cisgender; if it does not, we are transgender. The dethroning of sex has meant the threat of execution for formerly noble words such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’.

In this provocative, bold, and humane book, the philosopher Alex Byrne pushes back against the new gender revolution. Drawing on evidence from biology, psychology, anthropology and sexology, Byrne exposes the flaws in the revolutionary manifesto. The book applies the tools of philosophy, accessibly and with flair, to gender, sex, transsexuality, patriarchy, our many identities, and our true or authentic selves. 

The topics of Trouble with Gender are relevant to us all. This is a book for anyone who has wondered ‘Is sex binary?’, ‘Why are men and women different?’, ‘What is a woman?’ or, simply, ‘Where can I go to know more about these controversies?’

Revolutions devour their own children, and the gender revolution is no exception. Trouble with Gender joins the forefront of the counter-revolution, restoring sex to its rightful place, at the centre of what it means to be human.

3rd editionPractical Accounts & Bookkeeping in easy steps, 3rd edition is updated to cover the latest UK legislation. It starts with the basics you need to know to record your day-to-day transactions and how they appear in Nominals, Trial Balance, Profit & Loss and the Balance Sheet. It then covers:Understanding accounts and why they are important.The legal documents required when preparing accounts. What happens if accounts are not submitted in time, and when accounts need to be sent to authorities. Creating a balance sheet using sales ledgers, purchase ledgers, and nominal ledgers. VAT – registering, charging, and reclaiming. Annual adjustments – Prepayments, Accruals, etc. Calculating Profit for tax and Capital Allowances. Key Accounting Principles: Double Entry, Direct and Indirect costs, Fixed and Current Assets, Depreciation, Capital Allowance, and more! This book will help you make sense of the “daunting” accounts world. It will help you to spot problems in the accounts and explain them to others using the correct terminology. It will also show you how computer software has been designed to simplify the processes. Master basic bookkeeping, then work through the book at your own pace to get a deeper understanding of Accounts.Practical Accounts & Bookkeeping in easy steps, 3rd edition is ideal for business owners as well as students. Includes examples to practice, and a Questions and Answers section to test yourself!

The Second Edition of this ground-breaking collection gives students all the tools they need to understand and engage with major philosophical issues. Students are presented with clear yet thorough topic introductions, historical context, reading guides for challenging selections and exclusive commissioned essays written by leading contemporary philosophers specifically for undergraduates. The Second Edition features a NEW co-author, a NEW focus on diversity within the field and NEW readings and topics relevant to students’ lives.

Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honour of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replies to his critics, and sets out his current views on the topics discussed.Contributors: Richard Heck, Frank Jackson, William Lycan, Vann McGee, John Perry, Paul Pietroski, Sydney Shoemaker, Scott Soames, Daniel Stoljar, Timothy Williamson, and Stephen Yablo.

Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one''s mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans'' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is ''transparent'': self-knowledge is achieved by an ''outward glance'' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an ''inward glance'' at one''s own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from ''p'' to ''I believe that p''. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because ''p'' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to ''I intend to do this'', or ''I feel a pain''? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one''s mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one''s mental states (peculiar access).

Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one''s mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans'' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is ''transparent'': self-knowledge is achieved by an ''outward glance'' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an ''inward glance'' at one''s own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from ''p'' to ''I believe that p''. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because ''p'' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to ''I intend to do this'', or ''I feel a pain''? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one''s mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one''s mental states (peculiar access).

Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one's mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is 'transparent': self-knowledge is achieved by an 'outward glance' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an 'inward glance' at one's own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from 'p' to 'I believe that p'. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because 'p' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to 'I intend to do this', or 'I feel a pain'? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one's mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one's mental states (peculiar access).

Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one's mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is 'transparent': self-knowledge is achieved by an 'outward glance' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an 'inward glance' at one's own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from 'p' to 'I believe that p'. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because 'p' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to 'I intend to do this', or 'I feel a pain'? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one's mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one's mental states (peculiar access).

Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honour of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replies to his critics, and sets out his current views on the topics discussed.Contributors: Richard Heck, Frank Jackson, William Lycan, Vann McGee, John Perry, Paul Pietroski, Sydney Shoemaker, Scott Soames, Daniel Stoljar, Timothy Williamson, and Stephen Yablo.

The Norton Introduction to Philosophy is back in a Third Edition, offering an orientation to the discipline that remains unmatched in scope, breadth, and quality. With an expanded selection of readings, more extensive background notes, and engaging reading guides, the Third Edition is designed to resonate with today’s students and spark their interest in philosophy. New essays from contemporary thinkers connect classic philosophical topics—like metaphysics, epistemology, morality, justice, race, and gender—to real-world issues. Available as an affordable, engaging Norton Ebook, this anthology makes philosophy accessible; sharpening students’ critical thinking skills while providing you with robust instructor support.Highlights of the Third Edition’s new content:New: Exclusive commissioned essays from leading philosophers present topics instructors told us they want to teach, at a level suitable for undergraduates. Examples include Michael Patrick Lynch on the value of truth, Ned Hall on causation vs. correlation, Alex Byrne on other minds and artificial intelligence, Jonathan Birch on animal consciousness, Ted Sider on material constitution, Gideon Rosen on ignorance and responsibility, David Wong on relativism, Robert P. George on public morality, and Seana Shiffrin on freedom of speech.New reading selections include David Chalmers on the simulation hypothesis, Hedda Hassel Mørch on panpsychism, Duncan Pritchard on the value of knowledge, Nick Zangwill on the morality of eating meat, and C. A. J. Coady on testimony and observation.New Chapter 14: When Are We Morally Responsible for What We Do? introduces students to leading voices tackling the relationship between morality and ignorance, including Angela Smith, Normy Arpaly, Michele Moody-Adams, and editor Gideon Rosen.New and updated Reader’s Guides accompany 18 of the most challenging selections, providing clear and accessible guidance to help students metabolize what they’ve read.Enhanced pedagogy: The Third Edition offers revised and updated chapter introductions, reading guides, and instructor resources.

Sex used to rule. Now gender identity is on the throne. Sex survives as a cheap imitation of its former self: assigned at birth, on a spectrum, socially constructed, and definitely not binary. Apparently quite a few of us fall outside the categories ‘male’ and ‘female’. But gender identity is said to be universal – we all have one. Humanity used to be cleaved into two sexes, whereas now the crucial division depends on whether our gender identity aligns with our body. If it does, we are cisgender; if it does not, we are transgender. The dethroning of sex has meant the threat of execution for formerly noble words such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’.In this provocative, bold, and humane book, the philosopher Alex Byrne pushes back against the new gender revolution. Drawing on evidence from biology, psychology, anthropology and sexology, Byrne exposes the flaws in the revolutionary manifesto. The book applies the tools of philosophy, accessibly and with flair, to gender, sex, transsexuality, patriarchy, our many identities, and our true or authentic selves. The topics of Trouble with Gender are relevant to us all. This is a book for anyone who has wondered ‘Is sex binary?’, ‘Why are men and women different?’, ‘What is a woman?’ or, simply, ‘Where can I go to know more about these controversies?’Revolutions devour their own children, and the gender revolution is no exception. Trouble with Gender joins the forefront of the counter-revolution, restoring sex to its rightful place, at the centre of what it means to be human.

Sex used to rule. Now gender identity is on the throne. Sex survives as a cheap imitation of its former self: assigned at birth, on a spectrum, socially constructed, and definitely not binary. Apparently quite a few of us fall outside the categories ‘male’ and ‘female’. But gender identity is said to be universal – we all have one. Humanity used to be cleaved into two sexes, whereas now the crucial division depends on whether our gender identity aligns with our body. If it does, we are cisgender; if it does not, we are transgender. The dethroning of sex has meant the threat of execution for formerly noble words such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’.

In this provocative, bold, and humane book, the philosopher Alex Byrne pushes back against the new gender revolution. Drawing on evidence from biology, psychology, anthropology and sexology, Byrne exposes the flaws in the revolutionary manifesto. The book applies the tools of philosophy, accessibly and with flair, to gender, sex, transsexuality, patriarchy, our many identities, and our true or authentic selves. 

The topics of Trouble with Gender are relevant to us all. This is a book for anyone who has wondered ‘Is sex binary?’, ‘Why are men and women different?’, ‘What is a woman?’ or, simply, ‘Where can I go to know more about these controversies?’

Revolutions devour their own children, and the gender revolution is no exception. Trouble with Gender joins the forefront of the counter-revolution, restoring sex to its rightful place, at the centre of what it means to be human.

3rd editionPractical Accounts & Bookkeeping in easy steps, 3rd edition is updated to cover the latest UK legislation. It starts with the basics you need to know to record your day-to-day transactions and how they appear in Nominals, Trial Balance, Profit & Loss and the Balance Sheet. It then covers:Understanding accounts and why they are important.The legal documents required when preparing accounts. What happens if accounts are not submitted in time, and when accounts need to be sent to authorities. Creating a balance sheet using sales ledgers, purchase ledgers, and nominal ledgers. VAT – registering, charging, and reclaiming. Annual adjustments – Prepayments, Accruals, etc. Calculating Profit for tax and Capital Allowances. Key Accounting Principles: Double Entry, Direct and Indirect costs, Fixed and Current Assets, Depreciation, Capital Allowance, and more! This book will help you make sense of the “daunting” accounts world. It will help you to spot problems in the accounts and explain them to others using the correct terminology. It will also show you how computer software has been designed to simplify the processes. Master basic bookkeeping, then work through the book at your own pace to get a deeper understanding of Accounts.Practical Accounts & Bookkeeping in easy steps, 3rd edition is ideal for business owners as well as students. Includes examples to practice, and a Questions and Answers section to test yourself!

The Second Edition of this ground-breaking collection gives students all the tools they need to understand and engage with major philosophical issues. Students are presented with clear yet thorough topic introductions, historical context, reading guides for challenging selections and exclusive commissioned essays written by leading contemporary philosophers specifically for undergraduates. The Second Edition features a NEW co-author, a NEW focus on diversity within the field and NEW readings and topics relevant to students’ lives.