Stefanie Walter is a Full Professor for International Relations and Political Economy at the Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich and Director of the Center for International and Comparative Studies in Zurich. Her publications include Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments (Cambridge University Press, 2013), and she has published in numerous scholarly journals such as American Journal of Political Science, Annual Review of Political Science, European Union Politics, International Organization, and International Studies Quarterly.

In a new book by Stefanie Walter, Ari Ray, and Nils Redeker, The Politics of Bad Options: Why the Eurozone's Problems Have Been So Hard to Resolve (Oxford University Press 2020), the authors argue that the costs of resolution in the Eurozone crisis were borne almost exclusively by indebted deficit countries, whereas the creditor-surplus states did little to share the burden. While debtor states were forced to implement austerity measures and structural reforms that were almost unprecedented in scale, surplus countries—their argument goes—did not significantly adjust their economic policies.

• Introduction 1: Bad Options and Difficult Choices in the Eurozone Crisis 2: Putting the Eurozone Crisis Experience in Perspective 3: Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Deficit Countries 4: Crisis Politics in Deficit Countries 5: Surplus Country Vulnerability to Rebalancing: A Comparative Analysis 6: Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Surplus Countries 7: Crisis Politics in Surplus Countries: Caught between Voter Pressure and Interest Group Stalemate 8: Conclusion

Stefanie Walter is a Full Professor for International Relations and Political Economy at the Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich and Director of the Center for International and Comparative Studies in Zurich. Her publications include Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments (Cambridge University Press, 2013), and she has published in numerous scholarly journals such as American Journal of Political Science, Annual Review of Political Science, European Union Politics, International Organization, and International Studies Quarterly.

In a new book by Stefanie Walter, Ari Ray, and Nils Redeker, The Politics of Bad Options: Why the Eurozone's Problems Have Been So Hard to Resolve (Oxford University Press 2020), the authors argue that the costs of resolution in the Eurozone crisis were borne almost exclusively by indebted deficit countries, whereas the creditor-surplus states did little to share the burden. While debtor states were forced to implement austerity measures and structural reforms that were almost unprecedented in scale, surplus countries—their argument goes—did not significantly adjust their economic policies.

• Introduction 1: Bad Options and Difficult Choices in the Eurozone Crisis 2: Putting the Eurozone Crisis Experience in Perspective 3: Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Deficit Countries 4: Crisis Politics in Deficit Countries 5: Surplus Country Vulnerability to Rebalancing: A Comparative Analysis 6: Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Surplus Countries 7: Crisis Politics in Surplus Countries: Caught between Voter Pressure and Interest Group Stalemate 8: Conclusion

Stefanie Walter is a Full Professor for International Relations and Political Economy at the Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich and Director of the Center for International and Comparative Studies in Zurich. Her publications include Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments (Cambridge University Press, 2013), and she has published in numerous scholarly journals such as American Journal of Political Science, Annual Review of Political Science, European Union Politics, International Organization, and International Studies Quarterly.

In a new book by Stefanie Walter, Ari Ray, and Nils Redeker, The Politics of Bad Options: Why the Eurozone's Problems Have Been So Hard to Resolve (Oxford University Press 2020), the authors argue that the costs of resolution in the Eurozone crisis were borne almost exclusively by indebted deficit countries, whereas the creditor-surplus states did little to share the burden. While debtor states were forced to implement austerity measures and structural reforms that were almost unprecedented in scale, surplus countries—their argument goes—did not significantly adjust their economic policies.

• Introduction 1: Bad Options and Difficult Choices in the Eurozone Crisis 2: Putting the Eurozone Crisis Experience in Perspective 3: Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Deficit Countries 4: Crisis Politics in Deficit Countries 5: Surplus Country Vulnerability to Rebalancing: A Comparative Analysis 6: Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Surplus Countries 7: Crisis Politics in Surplus Countries: Caught between Voter Pressure and Interest Group Stalemate 8: Conclusion