Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz

Joseph E. Stiglitz is University Professor at Columbia University. In 2001, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics, and he was a lead author of the 1995 Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize. Known for his pioneering work on asymmetric information, Stiglitz focuses on income distribution, risk, corporate governance, public policy, macroeconomics and globalization. In 2011, Time named Stiglitz one of the 100 most influential people in the world. During the Clinton administration, Stiglitz was a member of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) from 1993-95, and served as CEA chairman from 1995-97. He then became Chief Economist and Senior Vice-President of the World Bank from 1997-2000. Stiglitz is also currently the Chief Economist of the Roosevelt Institute, Co-President of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue, and the co-chair of the High-Level Expert Group on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress at the OECD.

... this collection includes many diverse publications not easily available. He writes substantial introductions to the volume as a whole as well as for each major section, putting his work into context. Summing up: Recommended

• Part I: Risk and Markets: Basic Concepts Introduction to Part I A. Foundations of Risk Measuring Risk 1: Joseph E. Stiglitz and Michael Rothschild: Increasing Risk 2: Joseph E. Stiglitz and P. Diamond: Increases in Risk and in Risk Aversion Risk with more than one commodity 3: Behavior toward Risk With Many Commodities 4: A Consumption Oriented Theory of the Demand for Financial Assets and the Term Structure of Interest Rates B: Portfolio Theory 5: Joseph E. Stiglitz and D. Cass: The Structure of Investor Preferences and Asset Returns, and Separability in Portfolio Allocation: A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Mutual Funds 6: Joseph E. Stiglitz and D. Cass: Risk Aversion and Wealth Effects on Portfolios with Many Assets Part II: Management of Risk Introduction to Part II A: Trade and Capital Market Liberalization 7: Joseph E. Stiglitz and P. Dasgupta: Tariffs Versus Quotas As Revenue Raising Devices Under Uncertainty 8: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Capital-Market Liberalization, Globalization and the IMF B: Risk Sharing 9: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Risk and Global Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial Integration May be Undesirable 10: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Contagion, Liberalization, and the Optimal Structure of Globalization 11: Joseph E. Stiglitz, Stefano Battiston, Domenico Delli Gatti, Mauro Gallegati, and Bruce Greenwald: Liaisons Dangereuses: Increasing Connectivity, Risk Sharing, and Systemic Risk 12: Joseph E. Stiglitz, S. Battiston, D. Delli Gatti, M. Gallegati, and B. Greenwald: Default Cascades: When Does Risk Diversification Increase Stability? C: Commodity Price Stabilization 13: Joseph E. Stiglitz and D. Newbery: Risk Aversion, Supply Response, and the Optimality of Random Prices: A Diagrammatic Analysis 14: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Optimal Commodity Stock-Piling Rules D: Schochastic Capital Theory 15: Joseph E. Stiglitz, William A. Brock and Michael Rothschild: Stochastic Capital Theory Part III: Theory of the Firm Introduction to Part III A: Corporate Finance 16: Joseph E. Stiglitz: A Re-Examination of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem 17: Joseph E. Stiglitz: On the Irrelevance of Corporate Financial Policy B: Alternative Objectives of the Firm 18: Joseph E. Stiglitz and S. Grossman: On Value Maximization and Alternative Objectives of the Firm 19: Joseph E. Stiglitz and S. Grossman: Stockholder Unanimity in the Making of Production and Financial Decisions 20: Joseph E. Stiglitz and B. Greenwald: Asymmetric Information and the New Theory of the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior C: The Implications of Value Maximization 21: Joseph E. Stiglitz: On the Optimality of the Stock Market Allocation of Investment 22: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Take-Overs 23: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Some Elementary Principles of Bankruptcy Part IV: Industrial Organization Introduction to Part IV A: Monopolistic Competition 24: Joseph E. Stiglitz and A. Dixit: Monopolistic Competition and Optimal Product Diversity 25: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Towards a More General Theory of Monopolistic Competition B: Potential Competition 26: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Potential Competition May Reduce Welfare 27: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Technological Change, Sunk Costs, and Competition C: Vertical Constraints 28: Joseph E. Stiglitz and P. Rey: Vertical Restraints and Producers' Competition 29: Joseph E. Stiglitz and P. Rey: The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition Part V: The Economics of Organization Introduction to Part V 30: Joseph E. Stiglitz and R. Sah: Human Fallibility and Economic Organization 31: Joseph E. Stiglitz and R. Sah: The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies 32: Joseph E. Stiglitz and R. Sah: Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies 33: Joseph E. Stiglitz and R. Sah: Qualitative Properties of Profit-Maximizing K-out-of-N Systems Subject to Two Kinds of Failure 34: Joseph E. Stiglitz and R. Sah: The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations 35: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Incentives, Information and Organizational Design Part VI: Theory of Consumer Behavior Introduction to Part VI 36: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Toward a General Theory of Consumerism: Reflections on Keynes' Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren 37: Joseph E. Stiglitz and K. Hoff: Equilibrium Fictions: A Cognitive Approach to Societal Rigidity 38: Joseph E. Stiglitz and Karla Hoff: Striving for Balance in Economics: Towards a Theory of the Social Determination of Behavior