Disjunctivism

Perception, Action, Knowledge

Häftad, Engelska, 2011

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Beskrivning

Disjunctivism has attracted considerable philosophical attention in recent years: it has been the source of a lively and extended debate spanning the philosophy of perception, epistemology, and the philosophy of action. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson present seventeen specially written essays, which examine the different forms of disjunctivism and explore the connections between them. This volume will be an essential resource for anyone working in the central areas of philosophy, and the starting point for future research in this fascinating field.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2011-07-07
Mått:155 x 234 x 23 mm
Vikt:610 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:422
Förlag:OUP OXFORD
ISBN:9780199693085

Utforska kategorier

Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Mer om författaren

Adrian Haddock is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Stirling.Fiona Macpherson is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow.

Recensioner i media

Review from previous edition a lucid and judicious assessment ... worth having ... a representative snapshot of the current state of play.

Innehållsförteckning

SECTION I: PERCEPTION ; 1. Hinton and the origins of disjunctivism ; 2. Either / or ; 3. Against disjunctivism ; 4. Disjunctivism about visual experience ; 5. Disjunctivism, indistinguishability, and the nature of hallucination ; 6. How to account for illusion ; 7. Disjunctivism and discriminability ; 8. The epistemic conception of hallucination ; SECTION II: ACTION ; 9. Disjunctive theories of perception and action ; 10. A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons ; 11. On how to act - disjunctively ; SECTION III: KNOWLEDGE ; 12. McDowellian neo-Mooreanism ; 13. In defense of disjunctivism ; 14. Perceptual-recognitional abilities and perceptual knowledge ; 15. Starting afresh disjunctively: perceptual engagement with the world ; 16. The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument ; 17. Comment on John McDowell's "The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument"