“[An] excellent book …Arnold seeks to examine the interactions between members of the House of Representatives and members of the upper bureaucracy in respect to the geographical allocation of federal expenditures….The methodology employed is ingenious and persuasive.”—David Fellman, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science“The best book now available on the decision-making process linking bureaucrats and congressmen….A model blending of theory and evidence, overlaid with a lot of good judgment and political sensitivity.”—Richard F. Fenno, Jr.“Douglas Arnold’s carefully wrought study of relations between the U.S. Representatives and selected administrative agencies is a challenging, thought-provoking, imaginative contribution that greatly enriches the field.”—Herbert Kaufman“An indispensable book for political scientists studying Congress, and highly relevant for many others whose interest is in bureaucratic decision-making. The data and the methods of analysis are unique and make the work infinitely superior to previous work on this topic.”—Samuel C. Patterson
