Shira Elqayam is a Reader in Cognitive Science at De Montfort University, Leicester, UK. Her work focuses on reasoning, normative thinking, and rationality. Jean-François Bonnefon is a Senior Research Scientist at the Toulouse School of Economics, France, where he studies the psychology of rational thinking and behavior.David Over is an Emeritus Professor in the Psychology Department at Durham University, UK. His main focus is on the psychology of reasoning.

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• Introduction: New paradigm psychology of reasoning Part I: Probability and degrees of belief 1. Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct 2. Scope ambiguities and conditionals 3. Uncertainty and the de Finetti tables 4. The new psychology of reasoning: A mental probability logical perspective 5. Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm Part II: Utility and social pragmatics 6. New ambitions for a new paradigm: Putting the psychology of reasoning at the service of humanity 7. When emotions improve reasoning: The possible roles of relevance and utility 8. James is polite and punctual (and useless): A Bayesian formalisation of faint praise Part III: Rationality and dual processing 9. Matching bias on the selection task: It’s fast and feels good 10. Rationality in the new paradigm: Strict versus soft Bayesian approaches

Shira Elqayam is a Reader in Cognitive Science at De Montfort University, Leicester, UK. Her work focuses on reasoning, normative thinking, and rationality. Jean-François Bonnefon is a Senior Research Scientist at the Toulouse School of Economics, France, where he studies the psychology of rational thinking and behavior.David Over is an Emeritus Professor in the Psychology Department at Durham University, UK. His main focus is on the psychology of reasoning.

Select Guide Rating

• Introduction: New paradigm psychology of reasoning Part I: Probability and degrees of belief 1. Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct 2. Scope ambiguities and conditionals 3. Uncertainty and the de Finetti tables 4. The new psychology of reasoning: A mental probability logical perspective 5. Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm Part II: Utility and social pragmatics 6. New ambitions for a new paradigm: Putting the psychology of reasoning at the service of humanity 7. When emotions improve reasoning: The possible roles of relevance and utility 8. James is polite and punctual (and useless): A Bayesian formalisation of faint praise Part III: Rationality and dual processing 9. Matching bias on the selection task: It’s fast and feels good 10. Rationality in the new paradigm: Strict versus soft Bayesian approaches

Shira Elqayam is a Reader in Cognitive Science at De Montfort University, Leicester, UK. Her work focuses on reasoning, normative thinking, and rationality. Jean-François Bonnefon is a Senior Research Scientist at the Toulouse School of Economics, France, where he studies the psychology of rational thinking and behavior.David Over is an Emeritus Professor in the Psychology Department at Durham University, UK. His main focus is on the psychology of reasoning.

Select Guide Rating

• Introduction: New paradigm psychology of reasoning Part I: Probability and degrees of belief 1. Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct 2. Scope ambiguities and conditionals 3. Uncertainty and the de Finetti tables 4. The new psychology of reasoning: A mental probability logical perspective 5. Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm Part II: Utility and social pragmatics 6. New ambitions for a new paradigm: Putting the psychology of reasoning at the service of humanity 7. When emotions improve reasoning: The possible roles of relevance and utility 8. James is polite and punctual (and useless): A Bayesian formalisation of faint praise Part III: Rationality and dual processing 9. Matching bias on the selection task: It’s fast and feels good 10. Rationality in the new paradigm: Strict versus soft Bayesian approaches