R. Matthew Shockey is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Indiana University – South Bend, USA

Select Guide Rating

• Introduction: Undertaking To Be 1§1 Being a Self 1§2 Four Questions 2§3 Heidegger’s Kantian Cartesianism 6§4 Methodology 191 Being in Question 24§1 Being Forgotten 24§2 The Ontological Difference and the ArticulatedRegionalization of Being 27§3 The Ontological and Ontical Priority of the Being-Question 30§4 Being and the Self: Pursuing Ontological ‘Self-Transparency’ 36§5 Conclusion 47Table 2: The Basic Concepts of Fundamental Ontology 492 Outward Bounds – World and Others 50§1 World 50§2 World and Dasein 60§3 Presence-at-Hand, and Some Remarks on Method 65§4 Others 713 Inward Bounds I: Care as the Being of the Self 76§1 Overview 76§2 Being-in and Care 78§2a Understanding and Existence 79§2b Discourse and Falling 91§2c Self-finding and Facticity 98§3 Modes of Care 101§4 Summary 1024 Inward Bounds II: Temporality as the Form of Care 105§1 Meaning and Time 105§2 Temporality and Selfhood 108§3 The Structure of Temporality 113§3a The Future 116§3b The Past 120§3c The Present 122§4 Summary and Discussion 1245 Inward Bounds III: The Kantian Reinterpretation of Temporality 129§1 From Being and Time to Kant 129§2 Ontological Knowledge and Imagination 131§3 Imagination as/and Synthesis 1373a The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition 1373b The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination 1393c The Synthesis of (P)recognition in a Concept 142§4 Ontological Creativity and the Nothing 1476 Time and Being 151§1 Introduction 151§2 World, Others, and Self Revisited 152§3 Regions and their Unity 159§4 Inter-Regional Relations 166§5 Conclusion 1747 The End of Ontology 176§1 The Bounds of Self 176§2 Doing Ontology – How? 179§3 Doing Ontology – Why? 188§4 Conclusion: Heideggerian Critique? 196

R. Matthew Shockey is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Indiana University – South Bend, USA

Select Guide Rating

• Introduction: Undertaking To Be 1§1 Being a Self 1§2 Four Questions 2§3 Heidegger’s Kantian Cartesianism 6§4 Methodology 191 Being in Question 24§1 Being Forgotten 24§2 The Ontological Difference and the ArticulatedRegionalization of Being 27§3 The Ontological and Ontical Priority of the Being-Question 30§4 Being and the Self: Pursuing Ontological ‘Self-Transparency’ 36§5 Conclusion 47Table 2: The Basic Concepts of Fundamental Ontology 492 Outward Bounds – World and Others 50§1 World 50§2 World and Dasein 60§3 Presence-at-Hand, and Some Remarks on Method 65§4 Others 713 Inward Bounds I: Care as the Being of the Self 76§1 Overview 76§2 Being-in and Care 78§2a Understanding and Existence 79§2b Discourse and Falling 91§2c Self-finding and Facticity 98§3 Modes of Care 101§4 Summary 1024 Inward Bounds II: Temporality as the Form of Care 105§1 Meaning and Time 105§2 Temporality and Selfhood 108§3 The Structure of Temporality 113§3a The Future 116§3b The Past 120§3c The Present 122§4 Summary and Discussion 1245 Inward Bounds III: The Kantian Reinterpretation of Temporality 129§1 From Being and Time to Kant 129§2 Ontological Knowledge and Imagination 131§3 Imagination as/and Synthesis 1373a The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition 1373b The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination 1393c The Synthesis of (P)recognition in a Concept 142§4 Ontological Creativity and the Nothing 1476 Time and Being 151§1 Introduction 151§2 World, Others, and Self Revisited 152§3 Regions and their Unity 159§4 Inter-Regional Relations 166§5 Conclusion 1747 The End of Ontology 176§1 The Bounds of Self 176§2 Doing Ontology – How? 179§3 Doing Ontology – Why? 188§4 Conclusion: Heideggerian Critique? 196

R. Matthew Shockey is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Indiana University – South Bend, USA

Select Guide Rating

• Introduction: Undertaking To Be 1§1 Being a Self 1§2 Four Questions 2§3 Heidegger’s Kantian Cartesianism 6§4 Methodology 191 Being in Question 24§1 Being Forgotten 24§2 The Ontological Difference and the ArticulatedRegionalization of Being 27§3 The Ontological and Ontical Priority of the Being-Question 30§4 Being and the Self: Pursuing Ontological ‘Self-Transparency’ 36§5 Conclusion 47Table 2: The Basic Concepts of Fundamental Ontology 492 Outward Bounds – World and Others 50§1 World 50§2 World and Dasein 60§3 Presence-at-Hand, and Some Remarks on Method 65§4 Others 713 Inward Bounds I: Care as the Being of the Self 76§1 Overview 76§2 Being-in and Care 78§2a Understanding and Existence 79§2b Discourse and Falling 91§2c Self-finding and Facticity 98§3 Modes of Care 101§4 Summary 1024 Inward Bounds II: Temporality as the Form of Care 105§1 Meaning and Time 105§2 Temporality and Selfhood 108§3 The Structure of Temporality 113§3a The Future 116§3b The Past 120§3c The Present 122§4 Summary and Discussion 1245 Inward Bounds III: The Kantian Reinterpretation of Temporality 129§1 From Being and Time to Kant 129§2 Ontological Knowledge and Imagination 131§3 Imagination as/and Synthesis 1373a The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition 1373b The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination 1393c The Synthesis of (P)recognition in a Concept 142§4 Ontological Creativity and the Nothing 1476 Time and Being 151§1 Introduction 151§2 World, Others, and Self Revisited 152§3 Regions and their Unity 159§4 Inter-Regional Relations 166§5 Conclusion 1747 The End of Ontology 176§1 The Bounds of Self 176§2 Doing Ontology – How? 179§3 Doing Ontology – Why? 188§4 Conclusion: Heideggerian Critique? 196