Danilo Rocha Limoeiro holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT and a Master’s degree with distinction from Oxford University. Currently, he is the co-founder of Turivius, a company dedicated to helping developing countries decrease bureaucracy through technology.

"That Brazil is notoriously one of the hardest countries in the world to do business is often decried but largely unexplained. Combining a sophisticated theoretical approach with careful case studies of tax policies and the pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors, this innovative work shines a spotlight on the political equilibrium that sustains high transaction costs: politicians enjoy leverage over economic actors, who do not collectively resist because well-connected businesses benefit from a regulatory regime that raises the barriers to entry for new entrepreneurs. This book should be of broad interest to students of the political economy of emerging market economies." — Frances Hagopian, Harvard University"Observers in Brazil have long lamented both the excessive regulation by the public sector and the overweening power of big business in the private sector. This deeply researched book finally puts them together, under sustained scrutiny, to show how they are mutually reinforcing. Far from being a fervent advocate of free markets, big business in fact benefits from, and politically supports, the detailed rules and regulations that give big business a leg up and keep potential competitors out. Scholars of market reform and business power, in Brazil and elsewhere, will want to read this innovative and troubling book." — Ben Ross Schneider, MIT

• 1 Cronyism, growth and inequality 2 Crony capitalism actors, continuity and change 3 Industry leaders and political engagement 4 The politics of taxation in Brazil 5 Pharmaceuticals 6 Agriculture 7 Conclusion

Danilo Rocha Limoeiro holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT and a Master’s degree with distinction from Oxford University. Currently, he is the co-founder of Turivius, a company dedicated to helping developing countries decrease bureaucracy through technology.

"That Brazil is notoriously one of the hardest countries in the world to do business is often decried but largely unexplained. Combining a sophisticated theoretical approach with careful case studies of tax policies and the pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors, this innovative work shines a spotlight on the political equilibrium that sustains high transaction costs: politicians enjoy leverage over economic actors, who do not collectively resist because well-connected businesses benefit from a regulatory regime that raises the barriers to entry for new entrepreneurs. This book should be of broad interest to students of the political economy of emerging market economies." — Frances Hagopian, Harvard University"Observers in Brazil have long lamented both the excessive regulation by the public sector and the overweening power of big business in the private sector. This deeply researched book finally puts them together, under sustained scrutiny, to show how they are mutually reinforcing. Far from being a fervent advocate of free markets, big business in fact benefits from, and politically supports, the detailed rules and regulations that give big business a leg up and keep potential competitors out. Scholars of market reform and business power, in Brazil and elsewhere, will want to read this innovative and troubling book." — Ben Ross Schneider, MIT

• 1 Cronyism, growth and inequality 2 Crony capitalism actors, continuity and change 3 Industry leaders and political engagement 4 The politics of taxation in Brazil 5 Pharmaceuticals 6 Agriculture 7 Conclusion

Danilo Rocha Limoeiro holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT and a Master’s degree with distinction from Oxford University. Currently, he is the co-founder of Turivius, a company dedicated to helping developing countries decrease bureaucracy through technology.

"That Brazil is notoriously one of the hardest countries in the world to do business is often decried but largely unexplained. Combining a sophisticated theoretical approach with careful case studies of tax policies and the pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors, this innovative work shines a spotlight on the political equilibrium that sustains high transaction costs: politicians enjoy leverage over economic actors, who do not collectively resist because well-connected businesses benefit from a regulatory regime that raises the barriers to entry for new entrepreneurs. This book should be of broad interest to students of the political economy of emerging market economies." — Frances Hagopian, Harvard University"Observers in Brazil have long lamented both the excessive regulation by the public sector and the overweening power of big business in the private sector. This deeply researched book finally puts them together, under sustained scrutiny, to show how they are mutually reinforcing. Far from being a fervent advocate of free markets, big business in fact benefits from, and politically supports, the detailed rules and regulations that give big business a leg up and keep potential competitors out. Scholars of market reform and business power, in Brazil and elsewhere, will want to read this innovative and troubling book." — Ben Ross Schneider, MIT

• 1 Cronyism, growth and inequality 2 Crony capitalism actors, continuity and change 3 Industry leaders and political engagement 4 The politics of taxation in Brazil 5 Pharmaceuticals 6 Agriculture 7 Conclusion