Inter-Firm Collaboration, Learning and Networks

Bart Nooteboom is Professor of Organization in the Rotterdam School of Management at the Erasmus University Rotterdam.

'I am convinced that the future advance of both these fields would be greatly accelerated if this textbook were widely adopted as a new point of departure in M.S.c and Ph.D coursed in coming years.'- Research Policy

• 1. Introduction 1.1 Aims and scope 1.1.1 Questions 1.1.2 Scope 1.1.3 Disciplines 1.2 Concepts and theory 1.2.1 Competence 1.2.2 Knowledge 1.2.3 Decision heuristics 1.2.4 Organization 1.2.5 Institutions 1.2.6 Complementary cognition 1.2.7 Tacit knowledge, absorptive capacity and firm size 1.2.8 Knowledge transfer to small firms 1.2.9 Governance 1.3 Advanced 1.3.1 Cognitive distance 1.3.2 Empirical tests 1.3.5 Evolutionary psychology 1.3.6 Institutions and evolution 1.3.7 Methodological interactionism 1.3.8 Incommensurability 2. Goals 2.1 Goals 2.1.1 Efficiency 2.1.2 Competence 2.1.3 Positioning 2.1.4 Performance 2.2 Concepts and theory 2.2.1 Economies of scale and scope 2.2.2 Economies of time 2.2.3 Innovation 2.2.4 Learning, exploration and exploitation 2.2.5 Communities of practice 2.2.6 Internationalization 2.3 Advanced 2.3.1 Threshold costs 2.3.2 Cycle of discovery 2.3.3 Leaning by internationalization 3. Structure 3.1 Forms 3.1.1 Structure 3.1.2 Ties 3.1.3 Concentration of ownership and control 3.1.4 Cobwebs 3.2 Choice 3.2.1 MA or alliance? 3.2.2 Bad reasons 3.2.3 Joint ventures 3.2.4 Network structure 3.2.5 Licensing 3.2.6 Structures of buyer-supplier relations 3.2.7 External corporate venturing 3.3 Concepts and theory 3.3.1 Third parties 3.3.2 The revelation problem 3.4 Advanced 3.4.1 Location 4. Governance 4.1 Risk analysis 4.1.1 Governance 4.1.2 Relational risk 4.1.3 An audit of hold-up risk 4.1.4 Network effects 4.2 Instruments 4.2.1 Risk control 4.2.2 Strategic orientations 4.2.3 Instruments 4.2.4 Contingencies 4.3 Concepts and theory 4.3.1 Trust 4.3.2 Go-betweens 4.3.3 Hostages 4.4 Advanced 4.4.1 Detailed risk audit 4.4.1.1 Value 4.4.1.2 Switching costs 4.4.1.3 Room for opportunism 4.4.1.4 Intent towards opportunism 4.4.1.5 Overall system 4.4.2 Detailed choice 4.4.2.1 Conditions 4.4.2.2 Problems of governance 4.4.2.3 Examples 4.4.3 Empirical tests 5. Process 5.1 Stages of relations 5.1.1. Beginning 5.1.2. Management 5.1.3. Adaptation 5.1.4. The end 5.2 Networks for exploration and exploitation 5.2.1 Networks for exploration: the competence side 5.2.2 Networks for exploration: the governance side 5.2.3 Networks for exploitation 5.2.4 Contingencies 5.2.5 Conclusion 5.2.6 Empirical evidence 5.2.6.1 Multimedia 5.2.6.2 Biotechnology 5.2.7 Development of clusters 5.2.8 Development of MNC's 5.2.9 Keiretsu5.3 Advanced 5.3.1 Opening game 5.3.2 Closing game 5.3.3 Generic forms of outsourcing 6. Summary and Conclusions 6.1 Integrated theory 6.2 Dyads and networks 6.3 Goals of collaboration 6.4 Forms of collaboration 6.5 Governance 6.6 Process 6.7 Further research