The contributors to this 1981 volume are all concerned with scientific realism, but each author questions or rejects aspects of the way it has traditionally been discussed. There are three main foci of attention - reduction, time and modality - and the analyses bring out complexities and difficulties obscured in the standard accounts of scientific realism. The papers are powerful and original, representing some of the best in modern philosophy of science, and each were specifically commissioned for the volume. It is an excellent source book for courses on realism or the philosophy of science. The book therefore takes its place in the informal series of volumes arising from meetings sponsored by the Thyssen Foundation, which already includes C. Hookway and P. Pettit (eds.) Action and Interpretation (C. U. P. 1978) and R. Harrison (ed.) Rational Action (C. U. P. 1980).

The contributors to this 1981 volume are all concerned with scientific realism, but each author questions or rejects aspects of the way it has traditionally been discussed. There are three main foci of attention - reduction, time and modality - and the analyses bring out complexities and difficulties obscured in the standard accounts of scientific realism. The papers are powerful and original, representing some of the best in modern philosophy of science, and each were specifically commissioned for the volume. It is an excellent source book for courses on realism or the philosophy of science. The book therefore takes its place in the informal series of volumes arising from meetings sponsored by the Thyssen Foundation, which already includes C. Hookway and P. Pettit (eds.) Action and Interpretation (C. U. P. 1978) and R. Harrison (ed.) Rational Action (C. U. P. 1980).

The contributors to this 1981 volume are all concerned with scientific realism, but each author questions or rejects aspects of the way it has traditionally been discussed. There are three main foci of attention - reduction, time and modality - and the analyses bring out complexities and difficulties obscured in the standard accounts of scientific realism. The papers are powerful and original, representing some of the best in modern philosophy of science, and each were specifically commissioned for the volume. It is an excellent source book for courses on realism or the philosophy of science. The book therefore takes its place in the informal series of volumes arising from meetings sponsored by the Thyssen Foundation, which already includes C. Hookway and P. Pettit (eds.) Action and Interpretation (C. U. P. 1978) and R. Harrison (ed.) Rational Action (C. U. P. 1980).