Richard Healey – författare

Quantum theory launched a revolution in physics. But we have yet to understand the revolution's significance for philosophy. Richard Healey opens a path to such understanding. Most studies of the conceptual foundations of quantum theory first try to interpret the theory - to say how the world could possibly be the way the theory says it is. But, though fundamental, quantum theory is enormously successful without describing the world in its own terms. When properly applied, models of quantum theory offer good advice on the significance and credibility of claims about the world expressed in other terms. This first philosophical lesson of the quantum revolution dissolves the quantum measurement problem. Pragmatist treatments of probability and causation show how quantum theory may be used to explain the non-localized correlations that have been thought to involve "spooky" instantaneous action at a distance. Given environmental decoherence, a pragmatist inferentialist approach to content shows when talk of quantum probabilities is licensed, resolves any residual worries about whether a quantum measurement has a determinate outcome, and solves a dilemma about the ontology of a quantum field theory. This approach to meaning and reference also reveals the nature and limits of objective description in the light of quantum theory. While these pragmatist approaches to probability, causation, explanation and content may be independently motivated by philosophical argument, their successful application here illustrates their practical importance in helping philosophers come to terms with the quantum revolution.

Quantum theory launched a revolution in physics. But we have yet to understand the revolution's significance for philosophy. Richard Healey opens a path to such understanding. Most studies of the conceptual foundations of quantum theory first try to interpret the theory - to say how the world could possibly be the way the theory says it is. But, though fundamental, quantum theory is enormously successful without describing the world in its own terms. When properly applied, models of quantum theory offer good advice on the significance and credibility of claims about the world expressed in other terms. This first philosophical lesson of the quantum revolution dissolves the quantum measurement problem. Pragmatist treatments of probability and causation show how quantum theory may be used to explain the non-localized correlations that have been thought to involve "spooky" instantaneous action at a distance. Given environmental decoherence, a pragmatist inferentialist approach to content shows when talk of quantum probabilities is licensed, resolves any residual worries about whether a quantum measurement has a determinate outcome, and solves a dilemma about the ontology of a quantum field theory. This approach to meaning and reference also reveals the nature and limits of objective description in the light of quantum theory. While these pragmatist approaches to probability, causation, explanation and content may be independently motivated by philosophical argument, their successful application here illustrates their practical importance in helping philosophers come to terms with the quantum revolution.

Pragmatism Works presents what became a unified pragmatist view of quantum theory, science, and metaphysics developed over the past fifteen years. The essays show what work pragmatism can do in philosophy, but also in science. Indeed, the distinction between science and philosophy is relatively recent. The word 'science' originally denoted theoretical knowledge of any kind, not just of the natural world. Only after the scientific revolution did it come to have its more specialized modern meaning. The term 'natural philosophy' referred to a branch of philosophy encompassing any systematic study of the natural world.While the essays are all contributions to natural philosophy, some were originally published in physics journals and others in philosophy journals. Some chapters appeared originally in edited volumes, while two appear here for the first time. Many of these essays concern the proper understanding of a particular physical theory or quantum theory. Ideas from contemporary pragmatist philosophers proved pivotal in seeking a better understanding. One hundred years after Heisenberg's seminal paper, there is still no expert consensus on how quantum theory should be understood. Later essays further develop and defend a pragmatist view of quantum theory against views of other physicists and philosophers.These essays draw on additional pragmatist ideas, about the nature and function of truth and about objectivity. The use of pragmatist ideas in understanding quantum theory prompts their wider application. Later essays explore consequences of pragmatism for general topics in the philosophy of science and for the relations between science and metaphysics. Two address the topic of scientific laws by taking these to have epistemic and practical functions facilitated by their role in licensing reliable inferences. Some scientific explanations fit phenomena into a causal framework designed to satisfy our practical need to control our world. Others provide the epistemic satisfaction of unifying our shared system of belief. Inquiries into the metaphysics of laws, causation, and explanation are misdirected, as are attempts to extract metaphysical conclusions from quantum probability, entanglement, and space-time emergence in quantum gravity.

Gauge theories have provided our most successful representations of the fundamental forces of nature. How, though, do such representations work? Interpretations of gauge theory aim to answer this question. Through understanding how a gauge theory's representations work, we are able to say what kind of world our gauge theories reveal to us.A gauge theory's representations are mathematical structures. These may be transformed among themselves while certain features remain the same. Do the representations related by such a gauge transformation merely offer alternative ways of representing the very same situation? If so, then gauge symmetry is a purely formal property since it reflects no corresponding symmetry in nature.Gauging What's Real describes the representations provided by gauge theories in both classical and quantum physics. Richard Healey defends the thesis that gauge transformations are purely formal symmetries of almost all the classes of representations provided by each of our theories of fundamental forces. He argues that evidence for classical gauge theories of forces (other than gravity) gives us reason to believe that loops rather than points are the locations of fundamental properties. In addition to exploring the prospects of extending this conclusion to the quantum gauge theories of the Standard Model of elementary particle physics, Healey assesses the difficulties faced by attempts to base such ontological conclusions on the success of these theories.

Gauge theories have provided our most successful representations of the fundamental forces of nature. How, though, do such representations work? Interpretations of gauge theory aim to answer this question. Through understanding how a gauge theory's representations work, we are able to say what kind of world our gauge theories reveal to us. A gauge theory's representations are mathematical structures. These may be transformed among themselves while certain features remain the same. Do the representations related by such a gauge transformation merely offer alternative ways of representing the very same situation? If so, then gauge symmetry is a purely formal property since it reflects no corresponding symmetry in nature. Gauging What's Real describes the representations provided by gauge theories in both classical and quantum physics. Richard Healey defends the thesis that gauge transformations are purely formal symmetries of almost all the classes of representations provided by each of our theories of fundamental forces. He argues that evidence for classical gauge theories of forces (other than gravity) gives us reason to believe that loops rather than points are the locations of fundamental properties. In addition to exploring the prospects of extending this conclusion to the quantum gauge theories of the Standard Model of elementary particle physics, Healey assesses the difficulties faced by attempts to base such ontological conclusions on the success of these theories.

The contributors to this 1981 volume are all concerned with scientific realism, but each author questions or rejects aspects of the way it has traditionally been discussed. There are three main foci of attention - reduction, time and modality - and the analyses bring out complexities and difficulties obscured in the standard accounts of scientific realism. The papers are powerful and original, representing some of the best in modern philosophy of science, and each were specifically commissioned for the volume. It is an excellent source book for courses on realism or the philosophy of science. The book therefore takes its place in the informal series of volumes arising from meetings sponsored by the Thyssen Foundation, which already includes C. Hookway and P. Pettit (eds.) Action and Interpretation (C. U. P. 1978) and R. Harrison (ed.) Rational Action (C. U. P. 1980).

Over the last fifteen years GIS has become a fully-fledged technology, deployed across a range of application areas. However, although computer advances in performance appear to continue unhindered, data volumes and the growing sophistication of analysis procedures mean that performance will increasingly become a serious concern in GIS. Parallel computing offers a potential solution. However, traditional algorithms may not run effectively in a parallel environment, so utilization of parallel technology is not entirely straightforward. This groundbreaking book examines some of the current strategies facing scientists and engineers at this crucial interface of parallel computing and GIS.; The book begins with an introduction to the concepts, terminology and techniques of parallel processing, with particular reference to GIS. High level programming paradigms and software engineering issues underlying parallel software developments are considered and emphasis is given to designing modular reusable software libraries. The book continues with problems in designing parallel software for GIS applications, potential vector and raster data structures and details the algorithmic design for some major GIS operations. An implementation case study is included, based around a raster generalization problem, which illustrates some of the principles involved. Subsequent chapters review progress in parallel database technology in a GIS environment and the use of parallel techniques in various application areas, dealing with both algorithmic and implementation issues.; "Parallel Processing Algorithms for GIS" should be a useful text for a new generation of GIS professionals whose principal concern is the challenge of embracing major computer performance enhancements via parallel computing. Similarly, it should be an important volume for parallel computing professionals who are increasingly aware that GIS offers a major application domain for their technology.