Representation through Taxation

Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States

AvScott Gehlbach

Häftad, Engelska, 2010

Del i serien Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

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Beskrivning

Social scientists teach that politicians favor groups that are organized over those that are not. Representation through Taxation challenges this conventional wisdom. Emphasizing that there are limits to what organized interests can credibly promise in return for favorable treatment, Gehlbach shows that politicians may instead give preference to groups - organized or not. Gehlbach develops this argument in the context of the postcommunist experience, focusing on the incentive of politicians to promote sectors that are naturally more tax compliant, regardless of their organization. In the former Soviet Union, tax systems were structured around familiar revenue sources, magnifying this incentive and helping to prejudice policy against new private enterprise. In Eastern Europe, in contrast, tax systems were created to cast the revenue net more widely, encouraging politicians to provide the collective goods necessary for new firms to flourish.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2010-09-13
Mått:152 x 229 x 12 mm
Vikt:320 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Antal sidor:216
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521168809

Utforska kategorier

Statsvetenskap och politisk teori inom Samhälle och politik

Mer om författaren

Scott Gehlbach is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He is also a research associate of the Centre for Economic and Financial Research in Moscow, where he spent the 2007–8 academic year as a Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Abroad Fellow, and is a recent recipient of a Social Science Research Council Eurasia Program Postdoctoral Research Fellowship. His work has appeared in numerous journals, including the American Journal of Political Science, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Economics and Politics, and Rationality and Society. His dissertation on the political economy of taxation in postcommunist states won the Mancur Olson Award for the best dissertation in the field of political economy. Professor Gehlbach received his PhD in political science and economics from the University of California, Berkeley.

Recensioner i media

'Why do different postcommunist governments pursue differing investment strategies? Gehlbach shows that game theory and econometrics, when combined with expert area knowledge, produces an interesting answer, namely, that given some sets of conditions, governments invest inefficiently so as to maximize their tax revenue.' Nathaniel Beck, New York University

Innehållsförteckning

1. Taxes, representation, and economic development in the Russian heartland; 2. The creation of tax systems; 3. The logic of representation through taxation; 4. Patterns of collective-goods provision; 5. Revenue traps; 6. Conclusions.