Aviad Heifetz is Professor of Economics at the Open University of Israel, where he served as chair of the Economics and Management Department from 2006 to 2009. He was previously Visiting Professor of Managerial Economics at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (2009–2011).

'This book fills a long-standing need for a first-rate textbook for an undergraduate course in game theory. It strikes an almost ideal balance between accessibility and rigor with a series of well-chosen examples to light the way. The standard examples (Cournot, Bertrand, location choice) are here along with a host of less common ones (currency speculation, the Six Day War, the Cuban Missile Crisis). Anyone teaching an undergraduate game theory course should consider adopting Heifetz's book as a text.' Bart Lipman, Boston University

• Part I. Strategic Interactions as Games: 1. Strategic form games; 2. Representing strategic interactions with games; Part II. Basic Solution Concepts for Strategic-Form Games: 3. Dominant strategies; 4. Strongly dominated strategies; 5. Weakly dominated strategies; 6. Nash equilibrium; Part III. Prominent Classes of Strategic-Form Games: 7. Cooperation and conflict, strategic complements and substitutes; 8. Concentrated markets; 9. Coordination games and strategic uncertainty; Part IV. Uncertainty and Mixed Strategies: 10. Choice under uncertainty and risk dominance; 11. Mixed strategies; 12. Security strategies, strictly competitive games and the minimax theorem; 13. Mixed strategies in general games; Part V. Advanced Topics in Strategic Form Games: 14. Rationalizable strategies; 15. Stability of equilibria; 16. Games and evolution; 17. Global games; Part VI. Dynamic Games: 18. Extensive form games; 19. Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction; 20. Commitment; 21. Backward induction: limitations and difficulties; 22. Moves of nature; Part VII. Repeated Games: 23. The repeated prisoner's dilemma; 24. Games with unbounded horizon: additional models and results.

Aviad Heifetz is Professor of Economics at the Open University of Israel, where he served as chair of the Economics and Management Department from 2006 to 2009. He was previously Visiting Professor of Managerial Economics at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (2009–2011).

'This book fills a long-standing need for a first-rate textbook for an undergraduate course in game theory. It strikes an almost ideal balance between accessibility and rigor with a series of well-chosen examples to light the way. The standard examples (Cournot, Bertrand, location choice) are here along with a host of less common ones (currency speculation, the Six Day War, the Cuban Missile Crisis). Anyone teaching an undergraduate game theory course should consider adopting Heifetz's book as a text.' Bart Lipman, Boston University

• Part I. Strategic Interactions as Games: 1. Strategic form games; 2. Representing strategic interactions with games; Part II. Basic Solution Concepts for Strategic-Form Games: 3. Dominant strategies; 4. Strongly dominated strategies; 5. Weakly dominated strategies; 6. Nash equilibrium; Part III. Prominent Classes of Strategic-Form Games: 7. Cooperation and conflict, strategic complements and substitutes; 8. Concentrated markets; 9. Coordination games and strategic uncertainty; Part IV. Uncertainty and Mixed Strategies: 10. Choice under uncertainty and risk dominance; 11. Mixed strategies; 12. Security strategies, strictly competitive games and the minimax theorem; 13. Mixed strategies in general games; Part V. Advanced Topics in Strategic Form Games: 14. Rationalizable strategies; 15. Stability of equilibria; 16. Games and evolution; 17. Global games; Part VI. Dynamic Games: 18. Extensive form games; 19. Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction; 20. Commitment; 21. Backward induction: limitations and difficulties; 22. Moves of nature; Part VII. Repeated Games: 23. The repeated prisoner's dilemma; 24. Games with unbounded horizon: additional models and results.

Aviad Heifetz is Professor of Economics at the Open University of Israel, where he served as chair of the Economics and Management Department from 2006 to 2009. He was previously Visiting Professor of Managerial Economics at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (2009–2011).

'This book fills a long-standing need for a first-rate textbook for an undergraduate course in game theory. It strikes an almost ideal balance between accessibility and rigor with a series of well-chosen examples to light the way. The standard examples (Cournot, Bertrand, location choice) are here along with a host of less common ones (currency speculation, the Six Day War, the Cuban Missile Crisis). Anyone teaching an undergraduate game theory course should consider adopting Heifetz's book as a text.' Bart Lipman, Boston University

• Part I. Strategic Interactions as Games: 1. Strategic form games; 2. Representing strategic interactions with games; Part II. Basic Solution Concepts for Strategic-Form Games: 3. Dominant strategies; 4. Strongly dominated strategies; 5. Weakly dominated strategies; 6. Nash equilibrium; Part III. Prominent Classes of Strategic-Form Games: 7. Cooperation and conflict, strategic complements and substitutes; 8. Concentrated markets; 9. Coordination games and strategic uncertainty; Part IV. Uncertainty and Mixed Strategies: 10. Choice under uncertainty and risk dominance; 11. Mixed strategies; 12. Security strategies, strictly competitive games and the minimax theorem; 13. Mixed strategies in general games; Part V. Advanced Topics in Strategic Form Games: 14. Rationalizable strategies; 15. Stability of equilibria; 16. Games and evolution; 17. Global games; Part VI. Dynamic Games: 18. Extensive form games; 19. Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction; 20. Commitment; 21. Backward induction: limitations and difficulties; 22. Moves of nature; Part VII. Repeated Games: 23. The repeated prisoner's dilemma; 24. Games with unbounded horizon: additional models and results.