What Minds Can Do

Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World

AvPierre Jacob,Ernest Sosa

Häftad, Engelska, 1997

Del i serien Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

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Beskrivning

Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, this 1997 book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1997-01-23
Mått:140 x 216 x 17 mm
Vikt:375 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Antal sidor:312
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521574365

Utforska kategorier

Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Recensioner i media

'... the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate, in both Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and language, cognitive science and psychology.' French Book News

Innehållsförteckning

Part I. The Naturalization of Intentionality: 1. What is intentional realism?; 2. Introduction to informational semantics; 3. Three problems for informational semantics; 4. Information and teleology; Part II. The Casual Role of Intentionality: 5. The computational representational theory of mind (CRTM); 6. Must an intentional realist be a meaning atomist?; 7. Functionalism and the threat of pre-emption; 8. Explaining intentional behaviour; 9. Conclusion: a postlude on semantics and psychology; References; Index.