Legislative Voting and Accountability

John M. Carey is John Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences at Dartmouth College. He has also taught at the Universidad Católica de Chile, the University of Rochester, Washington University in St Louis, Harvard University, and at the Fundación Juan March in Madrid, Spain. His interests are comparative politics, elections, and Latin American politics. His research focuses on institutional design and democratic representation. Carey's books include Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (with Matthew Shugart, Cambridge University Press), Executive Decree Authority (also with Shugart, Cambridge University Press), Term Limits in the State Legislatures (with Richard Niemi and Lynda Powell, University of Michigan Press), and Term Limits and Legislative Representation (Cambridge University Press). He has published articles in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, Perspectives on Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Electoral Studies, Party Politics, Comparative Politics, Latin American Politics and Society, Public Choice, Estudios Publicos, Political y Gobierno, the Revista de Ciencias Politicas, and the Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, as well as chapters in twenty edited volumes. Data and results from his research are available on his website (http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/).

'Legislative accountability is a core question in any democratic polity. Carey writes insightfully, analytically, and with technical virtuosity and pertinent evidence, about presidents, parliaments, parties, and politicians, and their complex relationships with voters. He illuminates topics of broad comparative concern and sets a new standard of excellence for the study of legislatures and legislators in Latin American countries.' Jorge I. Domínguez, Harvard University

• 1. To whom are legislators accountable?; 2. Collective accountability and its discontents; 3. The supply of visible votes; 4. Demand for visible votes; 5. Counting votes; 6. Explaining voting unity; 7. The individual-collective balance.