Michael C. Jensen is Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration Emeritus, Harvard Business School.

The book provides the fundamental building blocks for agency theory and discusses a wide variety of topics, including the nature of man, the theory of the firm, specific and general knowledge, organizational structure, executive compensation and performance measurement. These essays, which span the past 25 years, illustrate how Jensen’s views have evolved and expanded over time… Jensen’s integrated theory is a noble attempt to combine economic analysis of markets and behavioral organization theorists’ understanding of the internal aspects of organizations.

• Preface Introduction I. Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control 1. U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s 2. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 3. Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy II Agency Costs, Residual Claims, and Incentives 4. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure 5. Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory 6. Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination 7. Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions 8. The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors Notes References Acknowledgments Index

Michael C. Jensen is Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration Emeritus, Harvard Business School.

The book provides the fundamental building blocks for agency theory and discusses a wide variety of topics, including the nature of man, the theory of the firm, specific and general knowledge, organizational structure, executive compensation and performance measurement. These essays, which span the past 25 years, illustrate how Jensen’s views have evolved and expanded over time… Jensen’s integrated theory is a noble attempt to combine economic analysis of markets and behavioral organization theorists’ understanding of the internal aspects of organizations.

• Preface Introduction I. Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control 1. U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s 2. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 3. Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy II Agency Costs, Residual Claims, and Incentives 4. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure 5. Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory 6. Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination 7. Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions 8. The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors Notes References Acknowledgments Index

Michael C. Jensen is Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration Emeritus, Harvard Business School.

The book provides the fundamental building blocks for agency theory and discusses a wide variety of topics, including the nature of man, the theory of the firm, specific and general knowledge, organizational structure, executive compensation and performance measurement. These essays, which span the past 25 years, illustrate how Jensen’s views have evolved and expanded over time… Jensen’s integrated theory is a noble attempt to combine economic analysis of markets and behavioral organization theorists’ understanding of the internal aspects of organizations.

• Preface Introduction I. Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control 1. U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s 2. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 3. Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy II Agency Costs, Residual Claims, and Incentives 4. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure 5. Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory 6. Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination 7. Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions 8. The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors Notes References Acknowledgments Index