Douglas G. Baird is Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Robert H. Gertner is Professor of Economics and Strategy at the University of Chicago. Randal C. Picker is Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.

Game Theory and the Law promises to be the definitive guide to the field. It provides a highly sophisticated yet exceptionally clear explanation of game theory, with a host of applications to legal issues. The authors have not only synthesized the existing scholarship, but also created the foundation for the next generation of research in law and economics.

• Preface Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior Bibliographic Notes Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game The Normal Form Game Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes The Nash Equilibrium Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria Summary Bibliographic Notes Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment Subgame Perfection Summary Bibliographic Notes Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate Summary Bibliographic Notes Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information Signaling and Screening Modeling Nonverifiable Information Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules Screening and the Role of Legal Rules Summary Bibliographic Notes Reputation and Repeated Games Backwards Induction and Its Limits Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation Summary Bibliographic Notes Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models Collective Action and the Role of Law Embedded Games Understanding the Structure of Large Games Collective Action and Private Information Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking Herd Behavior Summary Bibliographic Notes Noncooperative Bargaining Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade Legal Rules as Exit Options Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations Collective Bargaining and Exit Options Summary Bibliographic Notes Bargaining and Information Basic Models of the Litigation Process Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages Information and Selection Bias Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information Summary Bibliographic Notes Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law Notes References Glossary Index

Douglas G. Baird is Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Robert H. Gertner is Professor of Economics and Strategy at the University of Chicago. Randal C. Picker is Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.

Game Theory and the Law promises to be the definitive guide to the field. It provides a highly sophisticated yet exceptionally clear explanation of game theory, with a host of applications to legal issues. The authors have not only synthesized the existing scholarship, but also created the foundation for the next generation of research in law and economics.

• Preface Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior Bibliographic Notes Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game The Normal Form Game Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes The Nash Equilibrium Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria Summary Bibliographic Notes Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment Subgame Perfection Summary Bibliographic Notes Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate Summary Bibliographic Notes Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information Signaling and Screening Modeling Nonverifiable Information Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules Screening and the Role of Legal Rules Summary Bibliographic Notes Reputation and Repeated Games Backwards Induction and Its Limits Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation Summary Bibliographic Notes Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models Collective Action and the Role of Law Embedded Games Understanding the Structure of Large Games Collective Action and Private Information Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking Herd Behavior Summary Bibliographic Notes Noncooperative Bargaining Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade Legal Rules as Exit Options Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations Collective Bargaining and Exit Options Summary Bibliographic Notes Bargaining and Information Basic Models of the Litigation Process Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages Information and Selection Bias Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information Summary Bibliographic Notes Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law Notes References Glossary Index

Douglas G. Baird is Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Robert H. Gertner is Professor of Economics and Strategy at the University of Chicago. Randal C. Picker is Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.

Game Theory and the Law promises to be the definitive guide to the field. It provides a highly sophisticated yet exceptionally clear explanation of game theory, with a host of applications to legal issues. The authors have not only synthesized the existing scholarship, but also created the foundation for the next generation of research in law and economics.

• Preface Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior Bibliographic Notes Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game The Normal Form Game Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes The Nash Equilibrium Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria Summary Bibliographic Notes Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment Subgame Perfection Summary Bibliographic Notes Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate Summary Bibliographic Notes Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information Signaling and Screening Modeling Nonverifiable Information Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules Screening and the Role of Legal Rules Summary Bibliographic Notes Reputation and Repeated Games Backwards Induction and Its Limits Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation Summary Bibliographic Notes Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models Collective Action and the Role of Law Embedded Games Understanding the Structure of Large Games Collective Action and Private Information Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking Herd Behavior Summary Bibliographic Notes Noncooperative Bargaining Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade Legal Rules as Exit Options Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations Collective Bargaining and Exit Options Summary Bibliographic Notes Bargaining and Information Basic Models of the Litigation Process Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages Information and Selection Bias Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information Summary Bibliographic Notes Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law Notes References Glossary Index