Telecommunication Policy for the Information Age

Gerald W. Brock is Professor of Telecommunication and Director of the Graduate Telecommunication Program at George Washington University, and was previously Common Carrier Bureau Chief at the Federal Communications Commission.

A factually rich analysis of telecommunication policymaking, Brock's book is the first insider's look at how policymakers struggled to mesh together economic efficiency, politics, markets, and technology to reach their goals--which often conflicted. After reading this carefully researched work by an outstanding academic who actually wound up in the fray, you will wonder how it was all accomplished.

• Introduction Positive Results of the Decentralized Process Potential Benefits of a Decentralized Policy Process Plan of the Book Perspectives on the Policy Process Blackstone versus Bentham Landis versus Stigler Information Economics and Transaction Costs Preferences and Principles A Model of the Decentralized Policy Process The Coordination of Decentralized Public Policy and of Scientific Research The Structure of the Decentralized Policy Model Examples of the Decentralized Policy Model Institutions of Telecommunication Policy The Communications Act of 1934 The Structure of the FCC Non-FCC Policy Institutions Economic Characteristics of the Telecommunication Industry The Development of Telephone Monopoly Regulation and the Sharing of Toll Revenue The 1956 Consent Decree Interconnection and the Network Externality THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION Competition in Terminal Equipment Hush-A-Phone Carterfone Protective Connecting Arrangements Opposition to Terminal Competition Computer II and Detariffing Initial Long Distance Competition Bulk Private Service: "Above 890" MCI Initial Application Specialized Common Carrier Competition Interconnection and Long Distance Competition The Private Line Interconnection Controversy AT&T's Rate Response to Private Line Competition Execunet and Switched Services Competition Interconnection Charges: ENFIA Competition under the ENFIA Agreement STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES The Divestiture The Consumer Communications Reform Act The Antitrust Suit The Reagan Administration'sPerspectives The Divestiture Agreement Implementing the Divestiture Access Charges: A Confusing Ten Billion Dollar Game The First Plan: Pre-Divestiture Agreement The 1982 Access Plan Separations Reform and High-Cost Subsidy The Implementation of Access Charges Congressional Influence on Access Charges Initial Switched Access Charge Managed Competition for Political Perceptions Completion of the Access Charge Plan ALTERNATIVES TO THE DIVESTITURE MODEL The Dismantling of Structural Separation The Third Computer Inquiry The DOJ and the MFJ Information Services Restriction Judge Greene and the Information Services Restriction Competition in Local Service Network Issues with Local Competition Local Competition and Interconnection Price Caps and Regulatory Boundaries The First Plan: Bridge to Deregulation The Revised Plan: Better Regulation Political Issues in the AT&T Price Cap Plan The LEC Price Cap Plan Conclusion The Evolution of Telecommunication Policy Fact Perceptions Incorporated into Policy Policy Goals Notes Index