Social Foraging Theory

Luc-Alain Giraldeau is Professor of Biology at Université du Québec à Montréal. Thomas Caraco is Associate Professor of Biology at the State University of New York, Albany.

"Social Foraging Theory will stimulate and guide future work on the evolution and ecology of group foraging for years to come."--Graeme D. Ruxton, Book Reviews "This book will surely have a major influence on the field of behavioral ecology for years to come ... To offer a shameless directive, if you have any interest in the evolution of social behavior, do yourself a favor and read this book."--Thomas A. Waite, Ecology "This book's] framework is so useful and insightful that I expect it to be very widely used. I find it hard to imagine how the authors of any future paper published on the foraging of animals in groups could get away without citing this work. I think it will become a classic text."--Graeme D. Ruxton, Ethology "A well-written, extensive, and unique review of the theoretical model developed to predict and explain the foraging behaviors of animals while in groups... Behavioral ecologists specializing in animal foraging will find this book to be an indispensable resource."--Craig L. Frank, Quarterly Review of Biology "In what is certain to become a landmark publication, Luc-Alain Giraldeau and Thomas Caraco present a frame that links differing ecological questions that, to date, have rarely been related."--Michael Gillingham, ISBE Newsletter

• Preface xi Acknowledgments xv 1 Social Foraging Theory: Definitions, Concepts, and Methods 3 1.1 What Is Social Foraging? 3 1.2 Concepts and Methods of Social Foraging Theory 6 1.3 Interactions Among Social Foragers 15 1.4 Concluding Remarks 17 Math Boxes 1.1-1.3 19 PART ONE: Group Membership Games 2 Two-Person Games: Competitive Solutions 35 2.1 Introduction 35 2.2 Achieving an Aggregation Economy 36 2.3 A Symmetric Group Membership Game 40 2.4 An Asymmetric Group Membership Game 43 2.5 Concluding Remarks 48 Math Box 2.1 50 3 Two-Person Games: Conditional Cooperation 54 3.1 Introduction 54 3.2 Food-Sharing with a Communal Cost 56 3.3 Food-Calling and Cooperation 66 3.4 Concluding Remarks 73 Math Boxes 3.1-3.3 78 4 Group Size in Aggregation Economies 85 4.1 Introduction 85 4.2 Which Group Size to Expect? 87 4.3 The Effect of Genetic Relatedness on Equilibrium Group Size 90 4.4 Integrating Entry Rules, Relatedness, and Aggressive Dominance 96 4.5 Risk-Sensitive Group Membership Games 100 4.6 Concluding Remarks 109 Math Boxes 4.1-4.4 113 5 Predicting Group Size in Dispersion Economies 119 5.1 Introduction 119 5.2 Introduction to Continuous Input Models 121 5.3 Changing the Assumptions of Continuous Input Models 123 5.4 Introduction to Interference Models 5.5 Changing the Assumptions of Interference Models 140 5.6 Concluding Remarks 146 PART TWO: Producer-Scrounger Decisions 6 An Introduction to Producer-Scrounger Games 151 6.1 Introduction 151 6.2 The Diversity of Kleptoparasitism 152 6.3 Kleptoparasitism: A Game-Theoretic Approach 153 6.4 A Symmetric Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model 155 6.5 Empirical Tests of the Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model 164 6.6 Concluding Remarks 168 Math Box 6.1 170 7 Producer-Scrounger Games in Stochastic Environments 174 7.1 Introduction 174 7.2 A Stochastic Producer-Scrounger Game 174 7.3 Analysis of the Stochastic Game 180 7.4 Numerical Evaluation 184 7.5 Experimental Evidence of Risk-Sensitive 194 7.6 Concluding Remarks 196 Math Boxes 7.1-7.2 199 PART THREE: Decisions within Patches 8 Social Patch and Play Models 205 8.1 Introduction 205 8.2 Models of Social Patch Exploitation 206 8.3 Tests of Social Patch Models 220 8.4 Social Prey Models 222 8.5 Concluding Remarks 225 PART FOUR: Models of Phenotypic Diversity 9 Quantifying Phenotypic Diversity 229 9.1 Composition of Foraging Groups 229 9.2 Quantifying Variability in Foraging Behavior 232 9.3 Phenotypic Diversity 234 9.4 Concluding Remarks 246 Math Box 9.1 248 10 Learning in Foraging Groups 253 10.1 Introduction 253 10.2 Some Functional Definitions of Learning 253 10.3 Learning How: Individual Learning Only 255 10.4 Models of Individual Learning Only 257 10.5 Learning How: Social Learning 269 10.6 Models with Both Individual and Social Learning How 271 10.7 Learning About Individual Learning 277 10.8 Learning About Social Learning 277 10.9 Concluding Remarks 280 Math Boxes 10.1-10.3 282 11 Efficiency of Diversity: The Skill Pool 287 11.1 Background 288 11.2 A Skill Pool: Static Model 289 11.3 A Skill Pool: Stochastic Dynamic Model 302 11.4 Conclusions 315 Math Box 11 .1 322 PART FIVE: Final Thoughts 12 Synthesis and Conclusions 325 12.1 Introduction 325 12.2 Group Membership Models 325 12.3 Searching Decisions within Groups 330 12.4 Models for Decisions within Patches 331 12.5 Models of Phenotypic Diversity 332 12.6 Conclusions 334 References 335 Subject Index 359 Species Index 361