"The reprinting of these two volumes is evidence of the continuing interest being expressed ... in Ambassador Kennan and his work... These two readable volumes will prove very useful."--Perspectives on Political Science

• *FrontMatter, pg. i*PREFACE, pg. vii*CONTENTS, pg. xi*ILLUSTRATIONS, pg. xiii*PROLOGUE, pg. 1*CHAPTER I. THE IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, pg. 8*CHAPTER II. PERSONALITIES, pg. 27*CHAPTER III. FIRST REACTIONS, pg. 71*CHAPTER IV. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO AN ARMISTICE, pg. 85*CHAPTER V. FIRST PROBLEMS OF "CONTACT" WITH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES, pg. 99*CHAPTER VI. ALLIED DELIBERATIONS IN PARIS, pg. 131*CHAPTER VII. WILSON AND THE WAR AIMS, pg. 140*CHAPTER VIII. LANSING AND THE RECOGNITION PROBLEM, pg. 149*CHAPTER IX. THE PROBLEM OF ANTI-BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA, pg. 160*CHAPTER X. THE KALPASHNIKOV AFFAIR, pg. 191*CHAPTER XI. THE FIRST BREST-LITOVSK CRISIS, pg. 219*CHAPTER XII. THE FOURTEEN POINTS, pg. 242*CHAPTER XIII. SIBERIA-THE BACKGROUND, pg. 275*CHAPTER XIV. SIBERIA-THE FIRST EXCHANGES, pg. 291*CHAPTER XV. JAPAN ASKS FOR A FREE HAND, pg. 316*CHAPTER XVI. THE DIAMANDI INCIDENT, pg. 330*CHAPTER XVII. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, pg. 343*CHAPTER XVIII. BREST-LITOVSK AND THE AMERICANS, pg. 364*CHAPTER XIX. WASHINGTON AND THE PROBLEM OF "CONTACTS", pg. 378*CHAPTER XX. COMPLICATIONS IN PETROGRAD, pg. 397*CHAPTER XXI. THE BREAKUP IN PETROGRAD, pg. 412*CHAPTER XXII. THE SISSON PAPERS, pg. 441*CHAPTER XXIII. SIBERIA AND THE FINAL BREST-LITOVSK CRISIS, pg. 458*CHAPTER XXIV. ROBINS AND RATIFICATION, pg. 486*APPENDIX, pg. 519*ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, pg. 523*SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY, pg. 525*INDEX, pg. 533

"The reprinting of these two volumes is evidence of the continuing interest being expressed ... in Ambassador Kennan and his work... These two readable volumes will prove very useful."--Perspectives on Political Science

• *FrontMatter, pg. i*PREFACE, pg. vii*CONTENTS, pg. xi*ILLUSTRATIONS, pg. xiii*PROLOGUE, pg. 1*CHAPTER I. THE IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, pg. 8*CHAPTER II. PERSONALITIES, pg. 27*CHAPTER III. FIRST REACTIONS, pg. 71*CHAPTER IV. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO AN ARMISTICE, pg. 85*CHAPTER V. FIRST PROBLEMS OF "CONTACT" WITH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES, pg. 99*CHAPTER VI. ALLIED DELIBERATIONS IN PARIS, pg. 131*CHAPTER VII. WILSON AND THE WAR AIMS, pg. 140*CHAPTER VIII. LANSING AND THE RECOGNITION PROBLEM, pg. 149*CHAPTER IX. THE PROBLEM OF ANTI-BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA, pg. 160*CHAPTER X. THE KALPASHNIKOV AFFAIR, pg. 191*CHAPTER XI. THE FIRST BREST-LITOVSK CRISIS, pg. 219*CHAPTER XII. THE FOURTEEN POINTS, pg. 242*CHAPTER XIII. SIBERIA-THE BACKGROUND, pg. 275*CHAPTER XIV. SIBERIA-THE FIRST EXCHANGES, pg. 291*CHAPTER XV. JAPAN ASKS FOR A FREE HAND, pg. 316*CHAPTER XVI. THE DIAMANDI INCIDENT, pg. 330*CHAPTER XVII. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, pg. 343*CHAPTER XVIII. BREST-LITOVSK AND THE AMERICANS, pg. 364*CHAPTER XIX. WASHINGTON AND THE PROBLEM OF "CONTACTS", pg. 378*CHAPTER XX. COMPLICATIONS IN PETROGRAD, pg. 397*CHAPTER XXI. THE BREAKUP IN PETROGRAD, pg. 412*CHAPTER XXII. THE SISSON PAPERS, pg. 441*CHAPTER XXIII. SIBERIA AND THE FINAL BREST-LITOVSK CRISIS, pg. 458*CHAPTER XXIV. ROBINS AND RATIFICATION, pg. 486*APPENDIX, pg. 519*ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, pg. 523*SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY, pg. 525*INDEX, pg. 533